I’ve previously reviewed at least seven blockchain-specific books in the past number of years. No one has paid me to review them, although I have received a couple copies for free. Unfortunately more than half of the books have been pretty bad… both technically wrong and often very polemical.
Fortunately, a page turner appeared in my inbox about a month ago: “The Billionaire’s Folly” by Faisal Khan. I’ve already posted a couple of short comments on the bird app and an usual for me – do not have a lot more to add. Mostly because it lacked many errors. Sure, it had a couple of typos here and there and a couple of debatable points but overall it was well-written and informative.
It also didn’t try to stray far away from what it aimed to do: discuss Khan’s perspective working at ConsenSys, an Ethereum-focused company, during what turned out to be the heady days of the ICO era. So in some ways, it is closer to Nathaniel Popper’s Digital Gold (which was equally well-written) than most of the other b-word books.
I didn’t mention this in the thread above but a number of anecdotes that Khan shares in the book were either relayed to myself (often through co-workers) or by actually witnessing it first hand. So it is interesting to see some of them independently confirmed.
One that did not (because Khan had yet to join the company) but definitely could have fit right in, involved an event held in the spring of 2016 near Seattle. About 60ish employees of this Fortune 100 tech company hosted a day-long powwow about “blockchains” and only three external companies were allowed to send representatives:
A well-known, large consulting company
ConsenSys, who sent several executives
R3 (my then-employer) sent myself
After presentations were given, the floor was opened for questions and a senior architect in the back questioned the urgency and immediacy that one of the promoters had claimed. And during the ensuing war-of-words, a partner at the consulting firm literally stood on the table at this closed-room event, crooning to everyone that “blockchain was the biggest thing in his career and that it would dramatically impact this tech company.” One of Khan’s future colleagues from the table over made eye contact with me and we just shook our heads. Although in retrospect, he was probably shaking his head for very different reasons than I was. I’m ngmi, right?
Either way, Khan has oodles of stories packed into a book that isn’t polemical. Check it out.
Last week I was interviewed in a Twitter Spaces hosted by Taariq Lewis at Paloma. The other guest was Ameen Soleimani, co-founder of Reflexer Labs, which created Rai (an unpegged, stabilized asset on Ethereum).
The primary topic of the conversation started with “stablecoins” in relationship to OFAC. OFAC is a governmental organization that we have discussed in some previous posts.
What is OFAC?
The Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) of the US Department of the Treasury administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions based on US foreign policy and national security goals against targeted foreign countries and regimes, terrorists, international narcotics traffickers, those engaged in activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and other threats to the national security, foreign policy or economy of the United States.
Why is OFAC is in the news and why have we written about it before?1
OFAC has previously sanctioned cryptocurrency-related assets and addresses before, most notably, starting with proceeds of ransomware operated by several Iranian nationals.
OFAC maintains and updates a list of SDNs, or Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons. Nearly four years ago, they added several Bitcoin addresses, not just human beings.2
Over the past four years, other cryptocurrency addresses have been added to the list. The Block recently put together an easy-to-read guide chronicling these actions.
So what is the big deal this time? After all, we have written about this potential scenario several times in the past including in mid-2015, dubbing one gated flavor “permissioned-on-permissionless” — it is a weird hydra that combines the worst of both worlds (e.g. no legal recourse).
Two weeks ago, OFAC went beyond sanctioning specific addresses and sanctioned a smart contract called Tornado Cash. What is Tornado Cash?
Recall that by default, all activity on public chains (and private chains) is unshielded. While there are several zero-knowledge-based proposals in the works, on-chain privacy only exists through mixing or tumbling coins together. In contrast, centralized applications (and intermediaries) such as Venmo, users can often shield their activity from 3rd parties.
Tornado Cash is a free, open-source protocol that was implemented first on Ethereum. The implementation that was sanctioned, could in theory, be deployed to virtually every EVM-compatible chain, public or private.
Yes, code was sanctioned which is arguably beyond the scope of what OFAC was intended to monitor and police.
Administrators of centrally issued pegged coins went different directions. The operators of USDC quickly blacklisted the ~$750,000 in USDC held by addresses linked to the 45 address OFAC had sanctioned.3 In contrast, Tether LTD announced it would only do so if explicitly requested by U.S. authorities.
But Gerard’s take is bad because the sanctions go beyond hitting SDNs (humans) to instead contracts and code, creating a chilling effect downstream by creating sanctions exposure for innocent people.4
For example, within 24 hours: the public repository for Tornado Cash was removed by Microsoft (owners of Github) and several developers who had contributed to the Tornado Cash, had their github accounts shut down. Infrastructure providers such as Alchemy and Infura blocked access to Tornado Cash. The Tornado Cash Discord server also was shut down.5
While the protocol still exists on Ethereum, activity on it has dwindled and some miners have stopped including TC-related transactions.
At least one other example of the unintended consequence of sanctioning code is the direct impact on researchers at both for-profit and non-profit organizations. For instance, if Matthew, a cryptographer, conjures up some code to help users retain privacy while transacting on-chain, yet does not implement or deploy the code — and someone else does — is Matthew now a target for sanctioning? This actually isn’t a hypothetical because Matthew Green, a tenured cryptographer at Johns Hopkins just did that yesterday.6
Are the people who develop the libraries that Matthew used also a viable target? Anti-coiner responses, such as Gerard’s 1,500 word post, do not delve into these real downstream effects.
What is another reason Gerard’s take is bad?
Because Bitcoin miners, and other cryptocurrency infrastructure operators, have included transactions from sanctioned addresses into blocks for about four years. While it may be a matter of “national security,” it is not consistent. For instance, in spring 2021, Marathon Digital – a U.S. based mining operator – announced that it would provide “OFAC-compliant” bitcoin mining. A month later it reversed this policy amid angst from Bitcoiners. Thus the question that Gerard and others who danced on Tornado Cash’s grave must ask: what about consistency?7
And Tim, what are your bonafides on this matter?
Above is a (mostly) one-way interaction between a coin lobbyist from Coin Center in 2015. What was Peter complaining about then and what does it have to do with OFAC’s recent actions?
This was a strawman cited throughout the paper that describes what later evolved into miner extractable value (MEV). MEV is a friendly acronym that describes what a number of lobbyists – and their think tank supporters – used to claim never would happen: proof-of-work miners (and other participants adjacent a miner) using discretion to (re)order transactions in a block. For more on MEV, highly recommend listening to episode 455 from Epicenter.
According to the Flashbots project, about $673 million in profits has been extracted by MEV over the past two-and-a-half years.
Okay, so at least in mid-2022 no one is arguing that MEV is non-existent nor are proof-of-work miners necessarily neutral parties (see Ethermine and Marathon Digital above).9.
So what was the other nugget?
(2) The story about Symbiont using Bitcoin (which they would later reverse):
Scrolling back through the 2015 archives is a blast from the past. “Enterprise blockchain” startups such as Chain, Digital Asset, and Symbiont first attempted to tokenize real-world assets (RWA) and embed them into the Bitcoin blockchain. Yet early on in each of their approaches, they were told by regulators that this probably would not fly due to sanctions. Don’t shoot themessenger!
What does that mean in the 2015-era? Recall that at the time, (incumbent) regulated financial institutions (typically banks) were already hesitant at doing something blockchain-related because of the negative connection with Mt. Gox and Silk Road. Adding sanctions screening to the list was a doozy.
What did sanctions actually have to do with tokenizing RWAs and Bitcoin mining?
At the time, the scenario was pretty straightforward: if tokenized interest rates swaps (IRS) or tokenized syndicated loans were mined by a pool based in a sanctioned country, such as North Korea or Iran, knowingly paying a transaction fee to that pool would likely be falling afoul of some sanction. So rather than having to deal with that headache (among others, such as, what happens to stolen tokenized assets on a public chain), regulated financial institutions punted on that and headed down into the sterilized world of permissioned chains, where every counterparty was known and screened ahead of time.
Obviously that does not mean sanctions violations do not occur — in aggregate the largest money laundering and violation of anti-money laundering laws still occur through banks — but the justification at the time was that block producers for permissioned chains would not be operating out of a sanctioned country. Yet as I mentioned on the Twitter Spaces interview: this approach kills composability. Why? Because all contracts would have to be whitelisted which is one of the reasons why the bulk of “enterprise blockchain” projects pivoted or shut down. But again, a topic for another day.
This post could continue on, discussing hypothetical scenarios in which U.S. based intermediaries involved in staking – such as centralized exchanges – are required by OFAC (or other regulatory / enforcement bodies) to censor sanctioned transactions. But there are already a lot of goodtwitterthreads on that. Especially from Gabriel Shapiro.
Instead I think the most concise argument opposed to sanctioning contracts and code is from an attorney, Nelson Rosario:
We could have ended this post by discussing the 2013 guidance from FinCEN regarding administrators and how miners were not included. And how FinCEN / OFAC have had inconsistent enforcement toward North Korean – and other “bad” state actors – when it comes to mining. For instance, hardware manufacturers such as Bitmain sell equipment (first and second hand) to parties that commercially interact with miners in sanctioned countries.10 Or U.S. based miners and pools process Bitcoin transactions that involve proceeds of malware.11
But that would detract from Rosario’s excellent point about code. Code in public repositories. Code implemented by independent 3rd parties. The sanctioned Tornado Cash contract should highlight the need for privacy-by-default, not as a bolt-on afterwards.
And who better to describe this mantra than the coiner of Fedcoin, J.P. Koning:
You do not have to like blockchains or be an industry lobbyist at all to see the core issues at hand — on privacy — are reminiscent to the legal fights over PGP nearly three decades ago. To galvanize hoi polloi, worth listening to the reflections from Phil Zimmermann, who spearheaded the fight (and defense) of code during that time.
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We would be remiss if we did not highlight that Angela Walch was the first academic to argue that “miners are intermediaries” in a vetted long form paper. You do not have to agree with her conclusions to recognize that she blazed a trail during a time period in which lobbyists tried to spin any and all examples of transaction discretion by miners. [↩]
Note: this post is partially based on a presentation I gave over two years ago: “Regtech and Blockchains” for MIT Horizon. [↩]
In the U.S., sanctions are usually enforced by a centralized payment system or some entity that provides a service. [↩]
One common way transactional “tracing” occurs today is through contracting 3rd party vendors such as Chainalysis, Elliptic, and TRM Labs. We have discussed analytics providers in the past but worth highlighting how in the instance of Tornado Cash, it is unclear how many “hops” away funds that touched Tornado Cash are perceived as clean versus dirty. And the methodology varies from vendor to vendor (Maya Zehavi rightly points out the abuse of user metadata that “Web2” companies like Facebook were involved in and how compliance around Tornado Cash resurfaces some of the same thorny issues.). This then ties in with nemo dat, a principal we have covered many times. E.g., in the real world, physical cash is exempted from encumbrances because commerce would grind to a halt if holders had to trace the chain of custody each time they did a cash-based transaction. [↩]
A dusting attack also took place in which 0.1 ETH from Tornado Cash was sent to publicly identifiable Ethereum addresses, the owners of whom were unable to use the frontend of popular DeFi dapps. [↩]
Not a coincidence that the EFF is assisting Matthew Green in his effort, just as they formed to defend Internet civil liberties during the ‘cypher wars‘ in the early ’90s. [↩]
One argument law enforcement might make is that Tornado Cash – via the DAO and fees around the protocol – is providing a service for sanctions evaders. A counterargument could be that the Tornado Cash frontend used the Chainalysis API to block sanctioned wallets and the TORN governance token did not capture those fees for holders. [↩]
According to a guest in episode 372 of Unchained (at around the 51m mark), “PMCGoohan” independently described MEV in 2014. [↩]
Earlier examples of discretionary transaction selection include: (1) Slush mining pool manually helping Tone Vays win a bet against Roger Ver; (2) Luke-Jr, a developer and mining pool operator, threatening to censor Satoshi Dice transactions from Eligius pool; (3) during the ICO boom of 2017, certain Ethereum mining pool operators such as F2Pool wouldaccept pre-payment in order to guarantee investors a spot in a block for Status, Brave, and other offerings [↩]
A mid-2017 article hypothesized a scenario that an advisor to the company explicitly told me was occurring. [↩]
Why now, why Tornado Cash, what about other TC deployed on chains, miners, dapps? For instance, Tornado Cash that was cloned and deployed on BSC and Arbitrum was not sanctioned. As a former regulator explained: On the other hand, uneven enforcement is an inevitability in part because organizations like FinCEN have ~30 people and only half a dozen or so are lawyers. The equivalent in the MAS is about 2 people, thus principals in Terra and Anchor still quietly reside in Singapore. The only entity with the manpower, probably, were the PRC and they gave up after less than a year. [↩]
I have found a blockchain-related book that did not have me completely shaking my fist in the air. For background, I have reviewed six other blockchain-focused books, most of which were pretty bad and/or filled with inaccuracies (the exception thus far was Digital Gold).
In contrast, The Cryptopians by Laura Shin was a breezy read and one that – from a technical perspective – I feel comfortable recommending to both geeky and non-geeky audiences trying to understand some of the people that created the Ethereum ecosystem (as well as a few other blockchains).
For instance, I enjoyed the steady dripping of GRE words like pastiche and bucolic which were carefully placed throughout each chapter alongside detailed (physical) descriptions of venues and individuals. I look forward to seeing it turned into a mini-series (Luka Dončić will obviously play Vitalik).
In terms of “inside baseball,” while I have bumped into and interacted with many of the people mentioned, I don’t know enough to comment on several figures discussed so the review below is largely about other portions of the book.
With that said, there were a few areas that I had quibbles with. For instance, I probably would’ve highlighted how much aggregate fraud took place during the 2017-2018 ICO boom (e.g., why Chinese governmental authorities kicked out exchanges, etc.). But that likely would have distracted the main story around how Ethereum evolved as infrastructure.
And before I’m labeled a rose-tinted glasses fanboy, worth pointing out that when I first interacted with Shin years ago, we didn’t agree on a number of things. Rather than dwell on those past differences, I think it is a credit to her reporting that she provided nuances in the story (such as the early days of Hyperledger project and Enterprise Ethereum Alliance) that pundits who are new to this space are unaware of or put no effort in understanding. Calling everything a scam is the laziest form of concern trolling and fortunately readers have a list of citations to peruse instead of relying on innuendo from flash-in-the-pan Twitter personalities.
Note: all transcription errors are my own. See my other book reviews on this topic. Spoiler Alert: there are a bunch of spoilers below!
Before we begin, worth pointing out that the book covers a roughly four year timespan (January 2014-January 2018) and was published in February 2022. The preface included a helpful backdrop of what was occurring in the financial services area during this time frame. One paragraph stuck out, stating on p.3:
Soon financial institutions as powerful as JPMorgan Chase, Nasdaq, Visa, HSBC, State Street, UBS, Santander, and many others worldwide began exploring the technology. In late 2015, “Blockchain, not bitcoin” became the mantra on Wall Street, and from January 2014 into February 2017, more than fifty financial services firms invested in the space.1
To be pedantic, the very first person I am aware of that said “Blockchain, not bitcoin” is a VC named Adam Draper, who opportunistically pivoted the messaging from his portfolio companies in late 2015:
I attempted to chronicle some of these wordsmith shenanigans in October 2015.
Is it important in the scheme of things?
Maybe not. But I think it is worth re-highlighting this fairweather etymology. For instance, contemporaneously some anti-coiners actively attempt to memoryhole the slur that is “no-coiner” to play identity politics; e.g., People who purposefully do not own snow skis are not labeled as “no-skier” or someone who doesn’t own an airplane, a “no-planer” or someone who doesn’t own a computer a “no-computerer.” One of the reasons some anti-coiners do not call themselves anti-coiners is because they likely do not understand the etymology of “no-coiner” and how it is a grammatic corpse.
But that’s a different story, although germane for 2022.
Chapter 1 provides readers with a short biography about Vitalik Buterin, including his early childhood (I was unaware of his prowess with Excel!).
I made a pedantic scribble on p. 12:
Shutting down Bitcoin would require tracking down and switching off the devices of every single person running the software — and that would require the coordinated action of every government in the world. But even shutting off all existing computer on the network wouldn’t stop anyone else from spinning up the Bitcoin software.
This is accurate at a high level. Pedantically however, in mid-2022 a well-resourced attacker (such cooperating governments) has a bit simpler task: (1) shut down large mining farms which ultimately slows down block production (e.g., the difficulty overhang would likely require a hard fork); (2) shut down or compromise just three ISPs or BRN/FIBRE — a protocol that propagates blocks directly between mining pools; (3) shut down or severely curtail liquidity providers (e.g., require large CEXs such as Coinbase to delist Bitcoin).
Again, we could argue (and Bitcoiners love to argue!) about the likelihood of either occurring but in my view a better illustration of geopolitical resiliency would be proof-of-stake (P-o-S) networks such as Avalanche, Polkadot, or Cosmos which do not rely on easily-identifiable points of failure (e.g., large mining farms) and are therefore mostly immune to scenario 1 (although clearly dependence on centralized cloud providers for any of these can be a weakness).
With that said, going down this rabbit trail clearly would have been confusing to the average reader so it is understandable why this hypothetical wargamming was not included.
Pages 15-17 provided some interesting background on how Bitcoin Magazine came into being (although maybe a missed opportunity to describe how it ultimately turned into a mother-son Bitcoin maximalist operation!).
On page 16, the author identified some good foresight:
Back home in Toronto after his globe-trotting, Vitalik was coding up a client using the language Python for Ethereum, while Gavin and Jeffrey worked on the C++ and Go clients, respectively. (Vitalik wanted Ethereum to work on different software clients so that a bug in one wouldn’t take the whole blockchain down; the entities on the network could run another one while the buggy one was fixed.)
This is an important paragraph and I am glad that Shin mentioned this so early on.
Why is implementation pluralism a good thing? Because as she described, it provides resiliency in the event something catastrophic or existential occurs (such as a bug that knocked 13% of Ethereum validators offline two years ago). Most blockchains, even a few years after launch, still are dependent on a single codebase maintained by a single team. Apart from resiliency (e.g,. a different implementation surviving a bug that knocks other implementations offline), this could lead to some perverse scenarios such as with Bitcoin wherein de factogatekeepers ossifying around the BIP process (e.g., a priori anti-bigger blocks).
Today, there are at least four different “Eth 2” client implementations that are undergoing stress tests for the upcoming “merge.” Up through the spring, Prysm has been the most popular implementation and is actively attempting to reduce its marketshare by acknowledging that a network is more resilient with more active implementations.
On a personal level Chapter 2 is interesting because during the time frame it takes place (January 20, 2014 to June 3, 2014) I was also writing a short book and had a chance to interview a few of the people mentioned. I witnessed odd behavior at least once: I had a Skype call with a couple members of the original Ethereum team. During the call, one person pointed a video camera (with its bright light) right back at me and video tapped it. I don’t recall the names but according to Shin, at least one person in that group was actively recording things which kind of seems off (or maybe I’m not sentimental enough!). I also thought Charles Hoskinson (who I separately interviewed) used phrases and words intimating as if he was a middle aged mathematics guru. And only learned he wasn’t through the book.2
Shin does a good job throughout the book articulating what the inner monologue was, what key people were thinking at the time. On p. 31 she writes about Gavin Wood who was brought on as the first developer and learns that the organization isn’t fully formed. Stating, “Why are they discussing this? If Ethereum hasn’t been founded yet, then damnit, I want to be a founder!”
This is followed-up with supporting details two pages later, “Later, Gavin would feel shafted as a lower-tier founder when he says he eventually found out that Charles had gotten into the Skype group only a day before he had.”
Another interesting detail on p. 36, “From Christmas to mid-February, for their respective Ethereum clients, Gavin and Jeff wrote more than seventy thousand lines of code.3 (Eventually, Vitalik’s Python client would mostly be used for research.)
On p. 40 the author pointed out how Charles had told at least one person in the team (Mihai) that he was Satoshi.
But as Shin notes,
The real Satoshi could easily prove his/her/their identity by moving a coin in the first block of the Bitcoin blockchain. There was no need for all of Charles’s hocus-pocus. Ultimately, most of the Zug group decided Charles was not Satoshi.
Pedantically the first sentence is both true and false. The real Satoshi could prove their identity by moving coins in the first block mined on January 9th, but not by moving coins in the actual Genesis block (from January 3rd). Why not? Because the Genesis block was hardcoded into the chain, the coins cannot be spent. Shin’s statement is a good barometer for filtering out wanna-be Satoshi’s, such as Craig Wright.
I’m also glad that Shin referenced Gavin Wood’s original essay on “Web 3” which was published in April 2014. You don’t have to agree with it, but unlike many of the VCs who promote “Web 3” or the anti-coiners who permahate on it, Wood provides some specific characteristics defining it. Is that too much to ask letter campaigns today?
Chapter 2 also goes into some details about the “holons” which I always thought was kind of bananas. Stating, “The Romanian Mihai, the Bitcoin Magazine founder who had lived in anarchist squats, enjoyed drinking, and was sociable, spontaneous, and creative, wanted Ethereum to comprise a series of live-work holons.”
The book goes into some depth about the drama these live-work locations, eventually they were dropped from official sponsorship and funding.
Page 48 mentions people, such as Vitalik, possible being “on the spectrum of Autism” and I seem to recall finger pointing at various events of who is and isn’t “on the spectrum.” Hopefully these antics will retire, there’s no room for the rudeness in polite society.
Chapter 2 closes with some nice imagery:
Vitalik walked out onto the front deck, the larger of the two on the top floor. It was drizzling outside. Beneath his feet were perfectly straight, cherry-stained wooden slats, and off to the side, a black barbecue grill, four black planters with bushes, and a yellow flower pinwheel.
Shin does a good job placing these details throughout the book, helping the reader imagine the scene.
This is also an interesting chapter in terms of how certain events moved by quickly. For instance, with the crowdsale, on p. 71:
Stiftung Ethereum was finally established on July 9. By Friday July 18, the Ethereum crew had Pryor Cashman’s draft opinion letter. On Monday, July 21, they received it signed. On Tuesday, July 22, at midnight Central European Summer Time, they launched the crowdsale.
On p. 73 it is kind of funny to see some Bitcoin maximalists enter the chat:
Meanwhile, many Bitcoiners claimed “alt-coins” like Ethereum were unnecessary. For instance, a March blog post titled “The coming Demise of the Altcoins (and What You Can Do to Hasten It)” sad, “When people say, ‘But Ethereum can do smart contracts!’ this is actually false… Ethereum will therefore soon be forgotten like the rest once it inevitably fails to deliver on its promise.”
Coincidentally a few months ago I highlighted that same article and how the author ended up kicked out of the little institute he co-created, later joining the Bitcoin SV circus. Without endorsing Ethereum itself, it is empirically clear that it has not been forgotten and has delivered more than most publicly funded blockchain projects. This still doesn’t sit well with vocal maximalists (and anti-coiners).
On p. 84 the author mentions cold storage devices that stored the Ethereum Foundation’s bitcoin and specifically mentioned Michael Perklin.4 The one related anecdote I have about him: I spoke at Devcon 2 which took place from September 17-19 in 2016 in Shanghai. This is about a month after Bitfinex was hacked for around 119,000 bitcoin.
Just a total coincidence but when I got on the maglev, Perklin and I ended up sitting next to one another. Recognizing him, I started peppering him with questions about Bitfinex, who he was helping provide a security audit (he was mentioned in an official blog post on it). If I recall, my argument was that in traditional financial markets, an exchange operator that had suffered a similarly huge loss would have been closed down by regulators, least of all not been allowed to socialize losses and issue a couple of IOUs. Long story short, we disagreed on some fundamental issues and went our separate ways.
Chapter 3 concludes with the formal launch of Ethereum mainnet and the hiring of Ming Chan.
Chapter 4 & 5
Chapters 4 & 5 had lots of interesting anecdotes and drama I was unaware of. Geeky readers may be asking, “what’s with the big deal gossip?” In my view, I find it impressive that anything was built and delivered with the type of work dynamics described, e.g., it’s hard to imagine operating in an environment with a senior leader having loud outbursts throughout every conversation.
Chapter 4 ends with the termination of Gavin from the foundation and Chapter 5 concludes with The DAO being drained. A number of ICOs were mentioned, such as Lisk and DigixDAO. Where are they today? Lisk still exists, maintaining an SDK for developers. Digix suspended its operations five months ago, and is reviewing its license requirements in Singapore. A companion book could probably have been written to discuss (and scrutinize!) the types of ICOs and tokens that were created between the collapse of The DAO and early 2018, more on this later.
Chapter 6 & 7
Chapter 6 was quite the page turner. Even though I was actively providing analysis at that time, it’s always interesting to read a cohesive blow-by-blow, with comments from the key developers and stake holders (the timeline at the end is great!). The fact that Phil Potter had such a dismissive view about Ethereum (calling it a “shit coin” a couple of times, including p. 182), isn’t a huge surprise considering his previous antics of “cat and mouse” bank accounts.5
For instance, I had no idea the role Andrey Ternovskiy, the creator of Chatroulette, had in increasing the drama-per-second following The DAO hack, leading up to the hard fork (he pretended to be the original DAO hacker and tried to social engineer some outcomes).
An interesting technical point from an excellent Chapter 7 (especially the sleepless nights for the Robin Hood Group), on p. 166:
The hard fork was indeed less complicated, especially compared to a similar process on Bitcoin. Because Bitcoin was “a peer-to-peer electronic cash system,” as Satoshi Nakamoto described it in the Bitcoin white paper, it had a chain of custody that could be followed all the way from the creation of a bitcoin to the one (or fraction of one) that someone owned. It made possible the digital equivalent of being able to trace a dollar bill from the time it gets minted to the time it gets used to tip a cab driver, who then uses it to buy flowers from a florist, who then pays bus fare with it. In order to unwind something like the DAO on Bitcoin, to undo the cabbie’s tip, one would also have to rescind the bus ticket and return the flowers.
Bitcoin uses the UTXO model and Ethereum uses an accounts model, in principal, the forking process could work the same way if planned ahead of time. For example, while the flow of funds (payments) between users and merchants were not reversed when Ethereum split into ETH and Ethereum Classic, but with forks like Bitcoin Cash, if a blob of UTXO had ever been used, it really cannot be precisely excised and grafted onto the new fork without having to fully unwind the butterfly effect (see the 2013 accidental hardfork of Bitcoin for the winners-and-losers).
The brief discussion of Bitcoin maximalism on p. 181 as well as the quote from Aaron van Wirdum (a vocal Bitcoin maximalist at Bitcoin Magazine) reminded me of a tweet I posted just after the hardfork:
What’s the context of this dumpster fire? Recall that beginning in summer 2015, the Bitcoin “community” was undergoing a (negatively) transformative event: the Bitcoin civil war. At the heart was whether or not to hard fork and increase the block size. Several proposals, such as Bitcoin XT had been drafted up and a vocal wing, primarily composed of Blockstream-affiliated developers and organizations were opposed to any hard fork, let alone one that increased the block size (hence the “block size debate“).
This same group of antagonists regularly claimed that hard forks were unsafe and would lead to disaster, disarray, and the collapse of the entire ecosystem. Seriously, that’s how overdramatic some of these “small blocker” developers came across. Look up reddit and listserve discussions at the time, it was crazy talk.
Suffice to say, you don’t have to have an opinion over whether or not a hard fork should or should not have taken place on Ethereum to simultaneously observe that it did not lead to the collapse of the entire ecosystem. Hence, the egg-on-face, dumpster fire gif above. A number of other major L1s have successfully coordinated hard forks, multiple forks in fact, without leading to total pandemonium.
On p. 188-190, the author discusses the origins behind what is now called Ethereum Classic (ETC) as a separately traded coin. One personal anecdote: I distinctly recall the head of trading at a large U.S.-based exchange reaching out to me during this time period (July 2016) asking if I knew of any Ethereum holders who might be interested in selling their ETC. Worth pointing out, this was before it was listed on Poloniex. So the story of the various parties working in the background to get ETC off the ground probably could be expanded if a second edition is ever written (not that it needs a second edition!).
On p. 189, the author found a maximalist:
On the day of the fork, Bitcoin Magazine, Vitalik’s old publication, wrote an article about “the launch of a spin-off project: Ethereum Classic.” While the author, Aaron van Wirdum, noted that Ethereum Classic, “seems to be a bit of a joke, intended to make a point,” he wrote, the project has been gaining some traction, with a small-but-growing user-base on Reddit and Slack […]”
Fast forward nearly six years by several metrics such as TVL and active full-time developers, Ethereum Classic never really grew beyond its core group of devotees: Bitcoin maximalists who LARPed as Ethereans.6
Just as Litecoin and Dogecoin have not faded away (despite a lack of usage or developer interest), traders will probably continue to trade ETC until PoW coins are delisted for ESG reasons.
On this note, on p. 192 the author writes:
They could see that, in the community at large, Bitcoiners in particular felt that Ethereum’s hard fork would illustrate one of Bitcoin’s core features: its immutability.
Two quibbles with this:
(1) some of the largest Bitcoin holders are not maximalists but like Bitcoin for other reasons (e.g., can be used as collateral on other chains);
(2) from a technical perspective, no public chain is “immutable” in the sense that it cannot be forked, if anything immutability describes the one-way hash function. Bitcoin’s development has fully ossified over the past five-ish years, with those interested in building actual dapps having left for greener pastures. Arguably the only thing “immutable” with Bitcoin today is who acts as the gatekeepers to the BIP process: the same self-appointed guards that prevented bigger blocks back in 2015-2016.
Chapters 8 & 9
On p. 198-199 the author mentions some pro-ETC tweets from Barry Silbert (founder of DCG):
Bought my first non-bitcoin digital currency… Ethereum Classic (ETC)
At $0.5.0, risk/return felt right. And I’m philosophically on board
Vitalik was stunned. He had met with Barry at the DCG offices in March, and at that time Barry had offered to help him and be his advisor. Now he was finding out that despite the friendly overture, Barry had never bought ether and now instead had bought ether classic.
Somewhat ironically five years ago, a group of Bitcoin maximalists actually chided Barry Silbert for his tweets (turning it into a full on Medium post). Around the same time, Reuters did a story about whether or not someone in his position would be falling afoul of SEC regulations for the type of tweets he was publishing. Putting personalities aside for the moment, it is worth pointing out that ETC has since had multiple deep reorgs and as shown in the presentation from Electric Capital above, does not really have developer mindshare.
These two chapters also provided some interesting background to both Poloniex (now co-owned by a syndicate led by Justin Sun) and Bitcoin Suisse (who had a change in management last year).
For instance, on pgs. 217-218
The WHG was trying to return people’s money, but instead they’d gotten the majority of it frozen at an exchange. When they asked Polo why it had blocked the trade, Griff and Jordi say the rep asked how Polo was to know the difference between a white hat and a black hat hacker. According to Griff, the rep then said that Polo was going to hold the money because it wasn’t the WHG’s money. Bity and the White Hat Group told Poloniex that it wasn’t theirs either. (Eventually, the WHG would realize that although Kraken was happy to let the Bity account trade, the exchange had blocked its withdrawals.)
Around the same time, someone working in the Bity office, who was then helping the WHG, recalls hearing a rumor from what they believed to be a credible source that the FBI had opened an investigation into the WHG’s activity, which scared the shit out of some group members. For the next two days, they spent a lot of time staring up at a big screen, incessantly refreshing the Poloniex account page to see if the money had been unfrozen. During this stretch of time, they slept very little — going to bed at 8 a.m. the night they realized the funds were frozen — and when people passed out, they did so on the sofas around the office. Weed and bottles of whiskey were strewn about, though the White Hat Group didn’t partake.
Another example of a prominent Bitcoin maximalist attempting to derail Ethereum, on p. 221
A few days after Alexis of Bity published a blog post on the status of the ETC refund, which explained why the WHG had first wanted to convert everything to ETH, a Bitcoin maximalist who went by the online handle WhalePanda published a blog titled “Ethereum: Chain of liars & thieves,” in which he delineated the trades that the White Hat Group tried to do on the various exchanges and concluded, “TLDR; We market dumped the illegally obtained ETC to crash/kill ETC but failed and now we want the locked funds back, sorry.”
His real name is Stefan Jespers and despite the fact that he has publicly invested in Ethereum-related tokens, his social media personality is toxic to this day.
Moving along, although I participated at the tail end of Devcon 2, I was completely unaware of all of the drama that was going on in the background.7
For instance, on p. 238
In the end, Bob didn’t even hear the final answer from Gav himself. Brian Behlendorf of Hyperledger had a call with Parity: Gav’s firm had decided not to go through with it. Bob felt Gav was acting out of spite. Bob also wondered if Gavin wanted to kill a potential competitor to Parity. Gav said Parity’s lawyer, who handled the company’s licensing strategy, had decided against it. Parity had partly gotten its VC funding by pitching an enterprise Ethereum implementation, so if the C++ codebase was permissively licensed, it might compete with Parity’s future product.
This was interesting because in retrospect, this future scenario didn’t really happen. While Parity did participate in several “enterprise” pilots and projects, this codebase was ultimately deprecated and turned into OpenEthereum (and later dropped altogether by Gnosis). Also, Pantheon (from ConsenSys) was donated to the Hyperledger project and re-emerged as “Besu.”
On pgs. 245-246 we learn about a possible motivation behind the denial of service attacks that took place during Devcon2
The DoS attacks were finally over. Though the period was stressful, Vitalik found fighting–and winning– this cyberwar fun in a way. Throughout, the attacker’s motivation was unclear. There wasn’t an obvious financial gain, although he or she could have shorted ETH. (The price did slide from about $13 to below $10 over the two months of the attacks.) In fact, he or she had spent one thousand ETH (roughly $12,000) on the attacks, plus the time to research and execute them. Many mused that perhaps the only people with such an incentive would be Bitcoin maximalists. Regardless, Ethereum became stronger and more capable of handling a high load of transactions–a beneficial maturation given what lay ahead.
When discussing the salaries of Ethereum Foundation employees and candidates, on p. 250:
But even her good qualities had downsides. For instance, even after the foundation found itself in a financially comfortable spot, she lowballed potential employees. When Google employees were applying and stated their salary requirements, she would say things like “Nobody gets paid that much” or that she and Vitalik didn’t–as if developers’ salaries should be benchmarked against her own. (Entry-level Google engineers would typically have incomes higher than Ming’s at the time, plus get valuable stock, and senior-level engineers’ compensation could be $1 million including stock.) At least one former Googler at the foundation was paid half his previous earnings; plus he was made a contractor, so he had no leave or benefits; another applicant from Google simply didn’t join the EF.
I don’t think these are good arguments for a couple of reasons:
(1) The Ethereum Foundation, like most coin foundations, is non-profit. We can argue about what the role of non-profits should or not be in society or what the salaries of their staff should or not be, but there is an implicit assumption that Foundations in general typically cannot offer the same types of compensation that many for-profit organizations can. For instance, the executive director role for both Hyperledger Project and the Enterprise Ethereum Alliance is around $400,000 a year. Since there is no equity or coin rewards for that role, is that high or low? Maybe it is low relative to the value that these organizations are perceived to create for the ecosystems they operate in.
(2) Having worked in the Bay area for five years (where my wife as a hardware engineer), with the current mini bear market in tech equities, arguably the salaries of Big Tech (software) employees were inflated. Plus in the case of Google, virtually all of their revenue comes from adtech which effectively monetizes personally identifiable information (PII) which is morally dubious at best. I don’t know what the “fair market value” of a senior engineer at Google should or should not be able to command after this mini bear market concludes, but the author should have used an apples-to-apples comparison: the salary of an experienced, senior engineer at other Foundations, and not with for-profit adtech companies in the Bay area.
Chapters 10 & 11
As mentioned at the beginning I don’t think the book was critical enough of ICOs in general, and specifically the way some organizers effectively fleeced retail by not disclosing much, if anything. Or how in many cases, a token was not needed.
One example of trying to force a token where one is probably unneeded on p. 256:
Many projects were, like the DAO, fund-raising by creating a token designated for use on that specific network. He said these tokens weren’t just being used to line initial coin offering (ICO) issuers’ pockets with ETH; they were actually being used in the dapps themselves. The people who offered services to the network could be pad in that token, which could then be exchanged for other money. Setting these projects apart was the fact that each was not a traditional app with a company at the center pushing out updates and making business deals; these were “decentralized software protocols” (emphasis added). Historically, such protocols had not been profitable. For instance, the people working on simple mail transfer protocol (smtp) for email did not make money. Outlook, Hotmail, and Gmail, the applications using smtp, had. However, now tokens made it possible for protocol builders to reward themselves since tokens could be created with the network, and they could keep some, like retaining equity in a start-up, and allocate some for continued work on the protocol.
A few quibbles about this passage:
(1) What the author (and the VC) is describing is: public goods, problem of free-riders, etc. Basically there is some useful internet infrastructure (smtp) that could be built but… : who builds it, who pays for the labor, who owns the IP, and so forth. The “Web 2” world now dominated by an oligopoly often referred to as Big Tech that sometimes builds out socially useful technology in exchange for monetizing personally identifiable information (e.g., rent-seeking). That is a morally bad exchange that has been normalized. We don’t have time to go into the years of abuse and exploitation (e.g., Cambridge Analytica scandal) that has occurred but this was one of the original motivations for proponents of “Web 3” in 2014. In practice, over the past eight years many VCs attempt to reinsert themselves and/or their portfolio companies (intermediaries like CEXs) in place of these tech incumbents. That’s not really mentioned in the book but probably should in a future edition.
(2) A sundry of ICO issuers did in fact attempt to line their pockets at the expense of retail. While some useful dapps and infrastructure have arisen out of the chaos of the 2016-2018 ICO mania, continually pointing to these is textbook survivorship bias. We don’t have time to go into how crowdfunding should or should not look like, but clearly there were a lot of victims who had no recourse and that’s not typically mentioned by coin promoters (such as the coin VCs of that era). The author doesn’t say it, but others have defended this time frame as “the ends justify the means” and I don’t think that is a good argument either. Nor is having to donate to unaccountable public goods (e.g., Wikipedia) the only other viable alternative.
(3) Unlike anti-coiners, I don’t think it is fair to throw the baby out with the bath water when it comes to creating new methods of funding public goods. Not everything was a scam or a fraud. Even securities regulators are okay with certain forms of crowdfunding from retail. Simultaneously I’ve been consistent over the years that a “tcpipcoin,” if it had been created almost 50 years ago, would have likely led to distractions for the stakeholders of that era, much like today.
For instance, below is a passage from a paper I wrote in April 2015 (pgs 18-19)
Moving along, on p. 257 the author put together a concise (and interesting!) history of ERC-20:
Suddenly everyone was on the hunt for the next big protocol tokens. And creating new ones on Ethereum was so easy. The previous fall, Fabian Vogelstellar of the Robin Hood Group had solicited comments on an idea that Vitalik had long discussed: standardizing a smart contract for creating new tokens. Fabian made it issue number twenty on a board designated for discussing protocol improvements called Ethereum Request for Comments. After 362 comments, they settled on a standard called ERC-20 tokens, which became a class of tokens that, because they were in a standardized smart contact, could be added easily be exchanges, wallets, and so forth.
In the discussion of crowdfunding, on p. 260 the author mentioned a now mostly dead project, Augur:
Right when they launched, the presale for Augur, a decentralized prediction market in which people could make predictions and bet on the outcome, was happening. When Taylor went to put money in, she was stymied, again, by challenging technical instructions. She asked Kosala to make a one-click button for her. He did, and they added an “Augur Crowdsale” tab to the site. Late in the sale, which ended October 1, 2015, teh Augur newsletter gave a shout-out to MyEtherWallet for the button. Taylor and Kosala exchanged chats peppered with “omg omg”–thrilled to have been noticed by others in the community.
Apart from the handful of people who bought it at < $2 immediately post-launch, the insiders of Augur did okay.8 Why? Today at around $8, Augur (REP) trades at roughly the same level as it did five summers ago. While money may not be the motivating factor for all crowdsale participants, ETH grew and sustained several multiples higher over the same time period (e.g., opportunity cost of capital). Apart from betting on the outcome of U.S. presidential elections, the platform – like Open Bazaar – remains a ghost town. To its credit, unlike other ICO survivors from that era, the Augur team converted 90% its ETH holdings for real money to build and deploy a working prediction market that is updated from time to time.
On p. 269 we learn how Poloniex operated a lot like Binance did pre-2021:
By the time of that victory, the exchange was facing a new problem. Due to US sanctions, it needed to block Iranians from using Poloniex. However, it could not, because the exchange did not have a robust know-your-customer (KYC) program to verify customers’ identities. (The one instituted in 2015 was, according to an early employee, “super basic” and “really, really easy to work around.”) It was a three-tiered KYC system that granted users greater trading access in exchange for higher levels of verification, and part of the reason for it was that Jules and Mike wanted to minimize friction for users to sign up and deposit funds. These discussions dragged on from the end of 2016 into the first half of 2017, when Jules and Mike finally relented.
Even cynical readers familiar with the cyber coin world were probably shaking their heads at this passage: how can operators of a U.S.-based CEX enrich themselves for years intentionally slow-walking compliance with the BSA?
It reminded me of when news leaked around Circle’s acquisition of Poloniex several years ago:
Speaking of the SEC, to-date they have prosecuted and/or settled with around 60 token issuers since the start of 2017 (collectively Canadian provinces and individual U.S. states have pursued about as many). The book spends a bit of time on The DAO report, published in July 2017, but doesn’t really highlight retail-focused solicitations, such as Kik (e.g., Kik was mentioned on p. 271 but nothing about their very public fight with the SEC). A second edition could include some retrospection around these retail-focused raises; e.g., why did different governmental bureaus in China ban ICOs around the same time frame?9
On pgs. 282-283 Poloniex is described as a panopticon:
In 2017, Poloniex’s volume grew fifty to seventy-five times what it had been in December 2016. With more customers, more volume, and now more processes, the company became buried. About twenty people were managing almost five million accounts, and the owners had not invested in the company at all. Instead of hiring a third-party know-your-customer vendor, as many companies would, to make sure each submitted ID matched the selfie taken and that the address given wasn’t for, say, a strip mall in Nevada, Polo employees had to process IDs one by one. Support was still bare-bones: according to a manager at the time, five people handled more than one hundred thousand support tickets. In the first half of the year, Johnny managed to “poach” a few troll box moderators to be new support agents, brining the total to eight. According to Johnny, Jules made workers put their phones in cubbies upon entering the office, forbade them from listening to music, and though this might also be for security reasons, blocked their computers from the internet so they could only do one thing on those machines: work. They had to wear headphones so that they wouldn’t accidentally overhear any conversations, they were recorded via cameras inside the office, and they were instructed to communicate with each other only on chat. (Later Jules would acknowledge to employees that they were surveilling all staff chats, including direct messages.)
On p. 288 the author mentioned some of the exuberance during the “Consensus” event in 2017:
The next day, EOS, which billed itself as a faster (but more centralized) competitor to Ethereum, kicked off its nearly year long ICO. The month before, it had advertised its sale on a massive billboard in Times Square, during the consensus conference, which had twenty-seven hundred attendees. The advertisement was ironic given that the EOS ICO blocked US IP address. That week, the ETH price again traded with highs in the $330s and lows in the $200s.
I attended this event and recall visiting the “official” afterparty wherein one of Block.One (the commercial backer of EOS) pointed out that the EOS billboard was just aesthetics and wasn’t encouraging anyone to participate in the ICO. One update for a future edition of the book: in September 2019 Block.One, settled with the SEC for a small sum of $24 million. Not-so fun fact: one of the defense attorney’s who worked on that case also (successfully) defended several other 2017-era ICOs that had purposefully focused on retail investors. This is part of the history that anti-coiners, who are new to town, should probably focus their wrath on instead of traffickingconspiracy theories.
On p. 294 we hear a prominent ICO promoter mentioned in passing:
Meanwhile, on the rocky, lizard- and fern-filled island of Ibiza the Parity team and friends were at a lovely terra-cotta-tiled, exotic-plant-adorned home rented by Brock Pierce, the former Mighty Ducks actor turned crypto VC, wrapping up a weeklong retreat that, for at least some attendees, was at times an alcohol-and drug-fueled blur. The previous Sunday, in the VIP room of the club Amnesia, the group had made merry.
There are a number of similar party-the-night-away excerpts throughout the book. One wonders how anything was shipped during this time frame! Speaking of Pierce, in early February 2018, The New York Timespublished a critical story of Pierce (and his crew) arriving in Puerto Rico to take advantage of the lenient tax treatment of capital gains (and income) without contributing much in return. Later that same month, clearly without any motivation to clear his name, he publicly pledged to donate $1 billion. To-date, there has been no follow-up, despite folks asking what he has done beyond drumming up easy PR. This is a pattern with some of the prominent coin promoters (post ICO mania) who promise big donations, yet little materializes beyond the press release.
Another example of why a future chapter dedicated to ICO then-and-now reflection is found on p. 298,
For instance, on May 26, the day after Token Summit, there was an ICO for something called Veritaseum that hadn’t open-sourced its code, hadn’t published a white paper, and, based on its jumbled marketing, appeared to be a centralized company that could have easily accepted US dollars for payment — not a decentralized network. It did not even take the basic step of having a secure website, despite the hacks rampaging throughout crypto. It raised $11 million. Early on, VERI tokens ranked tenth among crypto assets by market cap. On July 22, the market cap based on circulating supply was $458 million. But accounting for the fact that Veritaseum had only released 2 percent of its tokens, its market cap by the total float was $22.9 billion. By that measure, the one-month-old company was almost twice as valuable as Nasdaq. Its market cap was more than that of Ethereum’s, which on that day closed $21.5 billion. And who controlled 98% of VERI? The founder.
Two things that stuck out:
(1) In November 2019, Reggie Middleton (the founder of Veritaseum) settled with the SEC for about $9.5 million (most of which was disgorgement), this could be added in a future edition.
(2) Intermediaries such as Nasdaq have an oligopoly on the services (and infrastructure) they provide. If anything, the entire “blockchain” set of experiments (including those initiatives Nasdaq has rolled out into production) should highlight the large amount of market share that systemically important financial institutions and utilities are able to capture and hold and gorge upon. Dismissing all alternatives out-of-hand, as most anti-coin commentators frequently do, raises the question: who are anti-coiners actually trying to help? Financial incumbents who get bailed out by governments? Retail who get fleeced with PFOF? If their goal is to somehow “help” the average Joe, then clearly defending the status quo isn’t very helpful either since it largely rewards incumbents who despite having a regulatory moat, in times of need also get bailed out because they are “too big to fail.”
For all of the discussions around The DAO, Slock.it, and securities regulations, there was one interesting info nugget on p. 301:
While the document was incriminating and put the crypto industry on notice, it wasn’t entirely accurate (The SEC, which declined to comment on this matter, had not interviewed Slock.it and reached out only to at least one American curator. An October 2020 FOIA request turned up no documents on any discussion around who deployed the DAO) Slock.it hadn’t set up the DAO-hub forums (though it had set up the Slack), it hadn’t deployed the DAO smart contract (unknown DAO community members had created eight of them and Taylor’s then fiancé Kevin had tossed the coin that had chosen which DAO to use), and the Robin Hood and White Hat groups, which included some Slock.it employees on their own time, helped resolve the attack. Regardless, the SEC had meant the document to be foundational, to show how the SEC was looking at the space. Lawyer surmised the agency had chosen a “21a report”–giving others notice that going forward the commission would likely follow up with enforcement actions for similar behaviors–because the DAO no longer existed and people had not lost money.
What other regulators may have reached out to Slock.it and curators? Was there a line-in-the-sand somewhere?
On p. 307 we learned about one Ethereum co-founder’s involvement in several ICOs:
At this time, during the ICO craze, Anthony had made a name for himself–not necessarily in a good way. He was slapping his name on ICOs as an advisor in exchange for tokens: Civic, Blockmason, Etherparty, Enjin Coin, Worldwide Asset eXchange, Skrumble Network, Cindicator, Polymath, AION, PayPie, Storm, Unikrn, WAX, Po.et, and Veriblock. Although Civic, Polymath, WAX, and Unikrn were somewhat well-known, the others were no-name projects. He’d also invested in two Chinese projects, Vechain and Qtum.
Not sure why the Chinese angle was worth highlighting; also not an endorsement but both Vechain and Qtum are around and still putting out “announceables.” It is worth mentioning that there are a number of high profile coin VCs who have removed or whitewashed their shilly ICO past, to somehow become… thought-leaders. In the U.S. it is more than two hands can count. Despite the collective “coinesia,” retail-focused promoters-turned-investors probably deserved to be named in a future edition.
On p. 319, more interesting information about Poloniex was described:
That fall, Poloniex’s dominance began to slip. If in June it had sometimes seen trading volume of $5 billion per week, early that fall the peaks were more like $4 billion. Still, even with the dip, the exchange was making a killing. One reason for the drop was that competitors were investing in upgrades, but Polo was doing the bare minimum. Seeing competitor Kraken boast about a slew of new features, Polo employees asked, “Why are we not doing this? Why are we just letting them take our business?” One example: Kraken launched an efficient, self-service feature for two-factor authentication allowing users themselves to disable it. Even though customer service said launching a similar feature would cut a third of all open support tickets, Jules and Mike wouldn’t let Tristan work on it. (As far as most people could tell, Tristan controlled nearly every aspect of Poloniex’s code–a grasp of its intricacies wasn’t spread out among a team of people, as would be expected of an exchange transacting in billions of dollars’ worth of crypto every week.) By this point, according to someone familiar with the matter, the exchange had almost half a million open support tickets. Johnny managed to poach more trollbox moderators to act as customer service agents, reaching twelve total by year’s end. He would feel really good the few times in the fall of 2017 that they got the number of open support tickets down to one hundred thousand. Jules and Mike did let them hire a few freelancers, who Johnny, the head of customer support, trained to help out with the backlog of KYC verification. They were good, so he suggested hiring them all immediately. He recall Jules and Mike said, essentially, No, we’re not going to hire anyone. Work with what you’ve got.
It’s interesting to hear this side of the story because throughout this time period, on social media and in chat groups, people would complain about Poloniex’s customer service. Now we know why.
Dentacoin was name dropped on p. 325. It is routinely lampooned for as you can guess, what it is named after.
Chapter 12 & 13
On pgs. 335-336 readers are presented with a thought experiment:
But most of all, things had been different during the DAO drama. Back then, Ethereum had done so many forks before, the community thought forking was without consequences. At that time, not forking was the threat. However, after the DAO, they knew that a hard fork could create yet another Ethereum. And that became the threat. Another factor was that, unlike with the DAO, there was no time pressure. The funds were frozen, and absent any decisions, they would be frozen forever. With the DAO the time for a rescue was limited, and that had prompted people to act. Additionally, with so many new tokens having been built on Ethereum, a contentious hard fork created the risk of producing all kinds of duplicate assets on another chain–Gnosis Very Classic, BAT Very Classic, Status Very Classic, and so forth.
I chuckled at the “Very Classic” names. But truth be told, both Ethereum and Ethereum Classic have had hard forks since the time frame this passage took place (late 2017). So technically speaking, those alt tokens could exist, although to my knowledge no major exchange supported the now-deprecated forks and alts.
On p. 343 we see mentions of Julian Assange and efforts like Pineapple Fund. Assange is frequently lionized by some Bitcoin promoters but he willingly only dumped secrets that damaged one specific U.S. political party and went out of his way not to publish anything that damaged Putin’s government. Ecuador’s government (which allowed Assange to live in its embassy for several years) found direct ties between Assange and the Russian government. In 2017, then-Trump advisor Dana Rohrabacher visited Assange in London and offered a pardon in exchange for Assange publicly stating “the Russians were not involved in the email leak that damaged Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign in 2016 against Trump.”
Obviously this would have been a distraction in the book but in my mind it is hard to mention this very controversial character without providing context on why he was likely a willing Russian asset.
The epilogue tries to tie many of the threads into complete knots. Some worked, like the Poloniex conclusion on p. 358:
Circle’s acquistion of Poloniex closed on February 22, 2018. Fortune reported the deal was for $400 million, but according to a source familiar with the matter, the actual amount eventually paid out was between $200 million and $300 million. The sale was almost perfectly time to when not only the flood of trading volume began to wane at Polo but also the crypto bubble itself began to burst and volumes globally were lower than at their peak in mid-December. Polo had been shopping itself since the spring of 2017, such as to Barry Silbert’s Digital Currency Group and Blockchain.com. Circle had been hoping to close the deal in November, but Jules, Mike, and Tristan, citing the crushing amount of work (which the staff and another person who worked with them attributed to their “greedy” refusal to hire additional employees), managed to drag it out while the exchange was still bringing in obscene amounts of revenue–and yet to close before the employees’ shares vested. Some early staff calculated they’d been strong-armed out of $5 million to $10 million apiece.
Wow, that sucks. I have some close friends that had a similar story about a different NYC-based technology company during the same time frame.
Other knots didn’t quite close, like the lawsuits between ConsenSys management and its former employees discussed on p. 364-365. One recently settled and at least one of the lawsuits is ongoing and continues to garner headlines and involves a fight over IP rights for infrastructure such as Metamask.
From a technical standpoint the book was pretty good, just a few small quibbles. As mentioned at the beginning, while I heard rumors, I don’t know enough about a bunch of the inner circle to comment on a number of the personalities that were the focus of the book.10
There are several other books describing the ins and outs of how Ethereum was created that I hope to read through this summer, and time willing write-up a review. In the meantime, if you are looking for a page turner that doesn’t require a PhD in cryptography to understand, I think The Cryptopians is worth adding to your reading list.
Also, if you’re interested in hearing a credible candidate for who The DAO hacker may have been, Shin published a related thread with links a few months ago.
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[Note: there was a footnote from a relevant 2017 CB Insights article. [↩]
The only two interactions I am aware of on Twitter are: (1) when Brian Hoffman, creator of OB1 & Open Bazaar and Charles Hoskinson said I bashed Hoffman’s platform (For the record I repeatedly, publicly said it is unclear why Open Bazaar would succeed when it was relying on users spending bitcoin which historically they had not. Today OB1 no longer exists and Open Bazaar lives on in name only via IPFS); (2) Charles throwing barbs at Vitalik with respect to the then fork between Ethereum and Ethereum Classic. [↩]
These stats are based on their github repo contributions. [↩]
This is not the first time Bitfinex has been “debanked” before. Phil Potter, the CFO of Bitfinex, recently gave an interview and explained that whenever they have lost accounts in the past, they would do a number of things to get re-banked. In his words: “We’ve had banking hiccups in the past, we’ve just always been able to route around it or deal with it, open up new accounts, or what have you… shift to a new corporate entity, lots of cat and mouse tricks that everyone in Bitcoin industry has to avail themselves of.” [↩]
Two of the most prominent Bitcoin maximalists quickly became Ethereum Classic supporters – Nick Szabo and Eileen Ou (note: that in 2015 Ou was sued and settled with the SEC). As noted by Shin, Greg Maxwell heckled Vitalik with a couple of emails during this time as well. [↩]
Technically speaking, I spoke on Day 5 of the International Blockchain Week (agenda), on September 23 entitled: “Opportunities and Challenges for Financial Services in the Cloud: Trade-offs in digitizing and automating finance.” Interestingly, GDPR has not been strictly enforced and public blockchains seem to have gotten a “free pass.” However the lack of data sharing, data portability agreements harmed many “private” blockchain-focused consortia. [↩]
One of the founders, Jeremy Gardner, gave a public presentation in January 2015 highlighting how Augur could be used for “assassination markets.” I challenged him, in front of the audience, why anyone in that room would find that useful. He tried to brush it off and has publicly called me a “derp.” [↩]
Because of rampant fraud, several local and national regulators inspected then banned several dozen trading platforms from offering ICOs on the mainland. [↩]
Over the course of reading the book I compiled a number of personal anecdotes that while relevant, probably should be part of a separate blog post altogether. [↩]
[Note: The views expressed below are solely my own and do not necessarily represent the views of my employer or any organization I advise.]
As we have discussed before, “Web3” is a nebulous term that has been used to market a slew of products and services, often via “chainwashing.”
What is “Web3?”
This past week 25 guys and one gal signed and published a 741-word letter to senior U.S. legislators calling for “Support of Responsible Fintech Policy.” And while many “Web3” promoters do deserve a good chastising, this letter has many technical shortcomings and is a disappointment to those who have been in the trenches for years… before being a “critic” was considered en vogue. Worst, it doesn’t define what “Web3” or even a “blockchain” is or is not.
But let’s start with a comment that I thought was pretty good, the intro:
“Today, we write to you urging you to take a critical, skeptical approach toward industry claims that crypto-assets (sometimes called cryptocurrencies, crypto tokens, or web3) are an innovative technology that is unreservedly good. We urge you to resist pressure from digital asset industry financiers, lobbyists, and boosters to create a regulatory safe haven for these risky, flawed, and unproven digital financial instruments and to instead take an approach that protects the public interest and ensures technology is deployed in genuine service to the needs of ordinary citizens.”
I – along with a number of other independent researchers such as Angela Walch (who they referenced) – have publicly made similar requests in the past. For instance, the original conclusion in my 2018 WSJ op-ed expanded upon the lack of transparency and surveillance sharing for why the SEC has not approved a bitcoin-denominated ETF by stating, “…the retail public wants seductive narratives and fantastical returns. The supply of fraud will therefore grow to meet that demand.”
To reuse a cliché analogy, throughout most of 2021 you could probably throw a baseball at a collection of dapps and hit one that at the very least, played fast and loose with marketing high APR yields.
This was followed with a quizzical take:
“Not all innovation is unqualifiedly good; not everything that we can build should be built. The history of technology is full of dead ends, false starts, and wrong turns. Append-only digital ledgers are not a new innovation. They have been known and used since 1980 for rather limited functions.”
The first sentence probably has a lot of supporters, including myself, as it relates to non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The somber and horrific legacies of the atomic and hydrogen bombs are certainly an example of something that should not have been built.
But the shade thrown at “append-only digital ledgers” is pretty farcical. Why do these authors get to determine what is or is not useful in the spring of 2022?
For instance, if we look at the core moving pieces of the Bitcoin blockchain, all of the main elements (“prerequisites“) had been around for years. And it was by assembling them together that we have arguably the first blockchain.1 The authors are taking a page from the lazy Maximalist playbook, one that does not withstand empirical scrutiny.
In looking at the “tech stack” of Big Tech, Google maintains a project called “Certificate Transparency” (implemented as “Trillian“).2 Certificate Transparency is not a blockchain, but it is a Merkle tree of things which are interconnected and signed and in production today.
From the Trillian team:
The ideas underpinning Certificate Transparency, Revocation Transparency and related efforts are not specific to certificates, but can in fact be used to make almost anything transparent. These technologies are strongly related to the much-hyped blockchain. The reality, of course, is that there isn’t a “the” blockchain, and that decentralisation is not always the answer. We are not making “the” blockchain, and we do not claim to support decentralisation.
As mentioned in a previous post, the problem with the a priori position that anti-coiners (and many maximalists) have is that over time they continually get backed up into a corner. Why? Because over the past decade we continue to see – empirically – how blockchains and blockchain-like elements are incorporated by a spectrum of organizations from Big Tech and Big Finance all the way down to small startups.
As Matthew Green (a cryptographer) explains in a thread on this topic, the granular fine points around “blockchain technology” is mostly bad:
Unfortunately the authors – while seemingly well intentioned – do not clearly state what parts of a blockchain they dislike, what parts of “distributed ledger technology” that they explicitly think is bad.
Furthermore, the idea of a neutrally owned, shared ledger is not a new concept. Several initiatives in the financial industry — such as a Joint Back Office (JBO) — pre-date the euphoria around blockchains but languished in concept mode.3 What is the lure for maintaining a shared ledger between (competing) organizations? Resiliency and reduction of reconciliation often come up as two of the main reasons but the list is long and deserves its own post. Suffice to say, claiming that “append-only digital ledgers” are a plaything of the ’80s is not even wrong.
Another broad sweeping set of statements that lack precision:
As software engineers and technologists with deep expertise in our fields, we dispute the claims made in recent years about the novelty and potential of blockchain technology. Blockchain technology cannot, and will not, have transaction reversal mechanisms because they are antithetical to its base design.
As Green and Byrne (among other responders) have pointed out, there is a missing nuance by the authors in that there are different types of blockchains. For instance, depending on the implementation some permissioned blockchains allow – in theory – certain participants to freeze transactions.4
Likewise on public chains, administrators of USDC, USDT, and other collateral-backed pegged coins, regularly blacklist and freeze transactions. In fact, any chain with smart contract functionality can provide some form of reversibility (or at the very least, freezing of state). We also see this empirically during and after exploits, with developer teams freezing tokens.
This is a strange miss because one of the signatories is Stephen Diehl, who as far back as July 2017 (when I spoke to him in an official meeting) was/is the CTO and director at Adjoint, which is a British private blockchain firm that has previously announced payment-related partnerships.
This statement starts out good:
Similarly, most public blockchain-based financial products are a disaster for financial privacy; the exceptions are a handful of emerging privacy-focused blockchain finance alternatives, and these are a gift to money-launderers. Financial technologies that serve the public must always have mechanisms for fraud mitigation and allow a human-in-the-loop to reverse transactions; blockchain permits neither.
Green (and suzuha) points out that the authors are trying to have their cake and eat it too:
For example, as far back as 2015, banks involved in R3 presented use-cases that required – by law – protection of PII. At the time, any company or organization wanting to engage with regulated financial institutions quickly learned how PII was an unmovable touchstone (see this related presentation). And so from those functional requirements arose different solutions ranging from hardware-based solutions (like SGX) to software-based solutions (like ZK-Snarks). The public chain world was often where these ideas either first originated or at the very least, first tested.5
Over the years I have regularly pointed out how privacy and confidentiality-features could be used for a sundry of illicit activities. But just because it could be used by those types of actors, does not mean it regularly is.
On that point, in 2016 I helped edit a paper on this very topic. It was co-authored by Danny Yang (founder of Blockseer), Zooko Wilcox-O’Hearn, and Jack Gavigan. Wilcox-O’Hearn and Gavigan are executives at the Electric Coin Company, a for-profit company leading the development of Zcash. Worth pointing out that one of the signatories on the letter above amplified false information about myself two months ago, claiming I was not an advisor at Blockseer. Not only is this false, but I still own the equity in DMG Blockchain (which acquired Blockseer four years ago). This calls into question the credibility of the individuals amplifying information they did not fact check. What other false information are they claiming about blockchains?
Scare quotes is not the only thing that harms this section:
By its very design, blockchain technology, specifically so-called “public blockchains”, are poorly suited for just about every purpose currently touted as a present or potential source of public benefit. From its inception, this technology has been a solution in search of a problem and has now latched onto concepts such as financial inclusion and data transparency to justify its existence, despite far better solutions already in use.
The paragraph preceding this one also mentions “public blockchains” but doesn’t use quotes around it. And neither defines or provides nuance to explain the differences between “permissioned” (or private) blockchains compared with “public” (or anarchic) blockchains.
Either way, the authors make a good argument about how pulling on the heart strings of financial inclusion is mostly bupkis and I agree, and others have pointed that this rings hollow too.6 To strengthen this, the authors should have provided a citation or at least an example of “far better solutions already in use.” For example, Raúl Carrillo (who is not one of the listed authors) has pointed to Postal Banking as a possible avenue for (re)banking not just marginalized persons. Blockchains aren’t need for that or arguably for other retail activity.7
The next part of the paragraph is painfully arbitrary:
After more than thirteen years of development, it has severe limitations and design flaws that preclude almost all applications that deal with public customer data and regulated financial transactions and are not an improvement on existing non-blockchain solutions.
First of all, the first web browser (appropriately called the “WorldWideWeb“) was launched in 1990. It wasn’t until 2004 that Google revealed Ajax-based Gmail followed by Google Maps. If the authors are trying to make the claim that anything (everything?) useful should have been invented in 13 years then they should hold other tech initiatives to the same standard.
The lack of nuance in this letter is striking because not every blockchain is based on the purposefully limited architecture of Bitcoin. Between 2009-2015, a typical on-chain user could only access Bitcoin or a Bitcoin-based fork or clone (like Litecoin). Ethereum and other chains with a virtual machine, did not launch until the summer of 2015.8 That is part of the reason why regulated financial institutions (Big Banks) and large technology companies (Big Tech) began deploying resources in this sector in 2015: first with consortia and later setting up their own internal teams of subject matter experts. What a user could do with a blockchain changed over time thus a priori declaring “almost all applications” dead is incredulous.
And again, the authors provide no examples of what “existing non-blockchain solutions” they are referring to. For example, every single major vendor that provides core banking software for banks — such as FIS, Fiserve, and Jack Henry — have integrated tools that enable the software to interact with or hook into a blockchain. Every major Big Cloud vendor provides both tools for blockchain node operators as well as dedicated “Web3” development teams to compete with Alchemy and Infura. Several CSDs and CCPs have invested in a blockchain-focused company (like Digital Asset or Axoni) and have announced blockchain-based pilots. Pretending that this digitization and tokenization trend is not occurring beyond niche NFT art collections is intellectually dishonest.
I agree with most of this statement but it needs nuance:
Finally, blockchain technologies facilitate few, if any, real-economy uses. On the other hand, the underlying crypto-assets have been the vehicle for unsound and highly volatile speculative investment schemes that are being actively promoted to retail investors who may be unable to understand their nature and risk. Other significant externalities include threats to national security through money laundering and ransomware attacks, financial stability risks from high price volatility, speculation and susceptibility to run risk, massive climate emissions from the proof-of-work technology utilized by some of the most widely traded crypto-assets, and investor risk from large scale scams and other criminal financial activity.
The nuance these authors need to include is defining what “blockchain technology” is and is not. Trillian is not a blockchain but shares several common elements. Thus throwing the baby with the bath water flies in the face of the empirical reality.9 As far as criticisms around the negative externalities created by proof-of-work-based blockchains: I 100% agree. I have written on this topic roughly every 18 months. What would strengthen their statement is to provide actual statistics and data regarding each of their points (the data exists from companies like Chainalysis or previously, Blockseer).
Their polemical statement meanders on a bit more but this statement is worth assessing:
The catastrophes and externalities related to blockchain technologies and crypto-asset investments are neither isolated nor are they growing pains of a nascent technology. They are the inevitable outcomes of a technology that is not built for purpose and will remain forever unsuitable as a foundation for large-scale economic activity.
The second sentence falls under Hitchens razor: that which is presented without evidence can be dismissed without evidence. In fact, we do know why Bitcoin was built, Satoshi explained it at length on mailing lists and in the white paper. And Bitcoin was just the first “blockchain,” other chains have arisen later that fulfill other requirements. Onyx from JP Morgan is now being used for trading intraday repos. Maybe Onyx is just a flash in the pan, but it serves as a narrative violation — and there are more than a dozen other examples that the authors are likely unaware of, just read Ledger Insights each week.10
Lastly, in the Financial Times, one of the authors was quoted saying:
“The computational power is equivalent to what you could do in a centralised way with a $100 computer,” said de Icaza. “We’re essentially wasting millions of dollars’ worth of equipment because we’ve decided that we don’t trust the banking system.”
This is true with respect to proof-of-work-based blockchains but not at all relevant to alternate Sybil resistant models like proof-of-stake (P-o-S). Conflating the two is not accurate. Also, de Icaza and others needlessly defend the status quo, both with comments like this as well as the letter itself. Fortunately for retail, “the banking system” is not completely static and changes over time (it is also not a single monolithic entity). Also, not a single author listed works for a financial institution yet opines on it; there are plenty of blockchain “skeptics” within the financial industry why not find one?
Which brings us to the next section.
(Un)intentionally defending the status quo
The only reason to publicly identify themselves is to give weight or credibility to the matters discussed in the letter. Even though this letter was directed at U.S. congressmen and women, more than half of the signees are neither US residents or citizens. Even though more than a handful work at public tech companies or large organizations that rely on donations, let us give them the benefit of the doubt that they were not explicitly defending the status quo.
Yet without offering specifics beyond vague “non-blockchain solutions,” the authors are implicitly defending both systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) and systemically important cloud providers. Both are bad for society and we should not defend their existence.
It is worth pointing out apart from two or three, most of these authors were not actively critical during the very public 2017-2018 ICO boom.11 What has motivated them to self-deputize and attempt to police what can and cannot be done with a blockchain in 2022 and ignore those who have been pathfinders in prior years? Perhaps there is a good reason, busy solving other worldly problems. I am certainly a fan of more introspection by disinterested parties!
I have written about it before but if the aim is to (1) influence policy makers and work with (2) regulators, there are at least two ways to achieve their goals:
Set up a not-for-profit lobbying organization modeled after Coin Center… the Anti-Coin Center. Hire former regulators and policy makers and re-use the lobbyist blueprint to engage with decision makers. A couple of years ago I wrote out a general overview to a couple L1 creators, it’s not complicated. You don’t even need a blockchain. But it does require some capital to hire for various roles, so it is not completely lean (e.g., would probably need to hire an actual blockchain engineer instead of relying on IT administrators). Oh and someone who posts frivolous memes all day is a must.
About four months ago, I asked one of the authors to submit their concerns directly with various agencies, such as the SEC and CFTC. This can be done formally through a whistle blower process (I’ve done it!). An ad hoc Hail Mary… is to informally do so through letter writing campaigns coordinated on social media. And as they haven’t stated otherwise, instead of submitting paperwork, some of these authors spend all day engagement farming on social media. If the outcome is “to get regulators to do something” this seems suboptimal because U.S. regulators typically need a paper trail to get the bureaucracy moving.
The blockchain world needs critics and criticism but it also needs criticism that is technically valid. And this letter is not only imprecise but sounds like something incumbent technology firms would write to defend their turf (which probably isn’t how it originated).
Over the past 18 months, the most recent coin bull market brought in a slew of new commentators a few of whom have attempted to co-opt the term “critic.” Clearly no one owns this term, there is no monopoly on it. Heck, I’ve even been labeled a “crypto” or “bitcoin” critic on more than one occasion. Yet we are seeing a cottage industry of professional “skeptics” who have a priori made up their mind irrespective of the evidence presented.
In addition to writing the most widely cited paper on “permissioned” blockchains, I wrote the first long form discussion on potential systemic important cryptocurrency networks in 2018 and think it is a bit absurd that some anti-coin commentary claims that cyber coins currently threaten the entire financial system. Feel free to disagree, but the onus is on the party making the positive claim. The counterfactual occurred the past five months: more than half of the aggregate coin marketcap evaporated. As collateral-backed pegged coins unwound, they did not lead to massive treasury liquidations crushing the traditional financial market.12
This is not defending the way centralized, commercial-bank backed pegged coins arose or currently operate.13 Rather it is a statement of fact: today the cyber coin world is not “too big to fail” and hopefully it never will be. Contagion can be real and should be simulated and stress tested!14 There are plenty of good criticisms to be lobbed at the “Web3” world, none of which requires making up fanciful conspiracies or playing fast and loose with technical verbiage.
If we are going to (rightly) criticize startups, investors, and other interested parties for mis-marketing “Web3” we should provide specific reasons as well as definitions. And while we are at it, let us bring a fine comb and scrutinize other hyped tech verticals that dramatically impact the well being of individuals such as: A.I. and workplace discrimination, privacy rights over data (including identity).15
Crusades can be big tent and incorporate more than just a small echo chamber of folks who (rightly) point out that a lot of cryptocurrency buzz is likely a financial grift with little real utility. Yet it is not a coincidence that perhaps the best critics are actual practioners, engineers, and architects who saw the limitations or drawbacks in certain blockchain designs and decided to build a different way. If there is a second version of this letter, it is highly recommended that input from outsiders be solicited. Including the world’s richest man, Colin Platt!
Or maybe we’ll just have to settle for a Kimberley process for Web3 claims, for both promoters and pundits alike.
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Depending on how it is defined, a candidate for the “original blockchain” was the Haber and Stornetta timestamping system published in 1990 (and thrice cited in the Bitcoin whitepaper). Therefore archaic blockchains had a useful niche before Bitcoin but were not capable of moving assets without a third party. Note: as they failed to provide a definition of a “blockchain” in their letter, the authors overly broad usage of “not useful” could encompass e-signature providers such as DocuSign and HelloSign. [↩]
One of the authors, Kelsey Hightower, works at Google, and a couple others work for large tech companies partly reliant on adtech revenue [e.g., monetizing personal information and data.] [↩]
At one point Accenture proposed an “edit” feature that does not appear to have been adopted by any chain. Stellar has implemented a feature that allows developers to “burn an asset.” [↩]
The experiments in the “dangerous” public chain space are funding and battle testing some of the new privacy and tech stacks that ‘Big Banks’ were not incentivized to build. Two examples in the U.S.: the FTX clearing proposal might be a better “exchange stack” than existing traditional finance operations and the Silvergate banking API (SEN) quickly confirms transactions based on on-chain data. Both services might not have been built even in the private blockchain world; at least they have not thus far. [↩]
To be fair, a number of financial incumbents and non-blockchain-related fintechs market their products and services as “financial inclusion.” They all attend many of the same events and sit on the same panels too. [↩]
See also the proposed E-Cash Act co-authored by Rohan Grey. [↩]
Technically Mastercoin, Counterparty, and several colored coin projects launched before Ethereum did, but they did not include a virtual machine that can run arbitrary code. [↩]
For balance, traditional financial markets also facilitate the transfer of illicit funds (money laundering) and ill-gotten gains from scams and fraud. The authors would have a stronger argument if they provided actual stats, e.g., what percentage of on-chain transactions involved illicit activities. [↩]
For instance, this coming October, a tokenized pound (‘synthetic CBDC’) on a blockchain platform operated by Fnality International will go-live in the U.K. Uptake may be slow in part because of issues around composability and because initial participants are banks that need to change the way they make payments. AntChain from Alibaba is a production chain used to settle e-commerce payments (connecting their banks to their merchants). Another example would be “perpetuals” which were conceived by Robert Shiller in 1992 and first implemented in 2016 by Bitmex, and now widespread on many major CEXs and a few DEXs. [↩]
The Federal Reserve Board annually conducts stress tests of the U.S. financial system. Similar tests occur in other countries. Researchers at the IMF recently released a paper describing the underlying framework of GST. [↩]
U.S. legislators at the national level have failed at providing a comprehensive digital rights and privacy framework, as well as A.I. auditing guidance. These issues are arguably just as important and impactful as cryptocurrency-related topics. [↩]
The second half of 2020 saw a large set of draft regulations and proposals surrounding cryptocurrencies and specifically, “stablecoins.”1
For instance, in July, the influential Group of Thirty published its investigation into digital currencies and stablecoins. In late September, the E.U. announced an expansive regulatory framework called Markets in Crypto Asset Regulation, or MiCA.2 A month later the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the top global stability watchdog, released its “final” report on what they called global stablecoins (GSCs). A month after that, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) released a report specifically looking at stablecoins.
A few days later there was a flurry of tweets and articles written up in response to the newly proposed STABLE Act in the United States. And coincidentally, this past month the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets released a report on stablecoins that came out swinging against “multi-currency” projects like Facebook’s Diem (formerly Libra) as well as broad pieces of enabling infrastructure. 3
While each was written by different sets of authors in different jurisdictions, all had some common ground: regulation and risks of panjurisdictional commercial bank-backed “stablecoins.”4
This post will go through some of the background for what commercial bank-backed stablecoins are, the loopholes that the issuers try to reside in, how reliant the greater cryptocurrency world is dependent on U.S. and E.U. commercial banks, and how the principles for financial market structures, otherwise known as PFMIs, are being ignored.5
Let’s start in reverse order.
What are the PFMIs?
We have discussed the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMIs) before. It is an evolving set of principles and guidelines for financial market infrastructures (such as CSDs, CCPs, payment systems) that are maintained and updated based on research and collaboration between two international regulatory bodies: BIS and IOSCO. Their joint 2012 paper is considered the gold standard and is frequently cited in the press, academia, and regulatory bodies.
For the purposes of this article, we will look at just once slice of the 2012 document. Principle 9 of the PFMIs states:
An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.
We have ample evidence from the 2007-2009 Great Financial Crisis (and other eras) that dependence on commercial banks is subpar and adding yet another (underaccountable) layer on systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) is not ideal. 6
Without going into weeds, the PFMIs and the committees involved in drafting them, state and then re-state the importance of reducing credit risk exposure to commercial banks. Yet in all instances today, almost every collateral-backed stablecoin that has thus far been issued does so through tokenizing deposits custodied at commercial banks.
This is improper for a variety of reasons and there are remedies and solutions. For instance, while we await liberalized access to central bank digital accounts (CBDAs) or currencies (CBDCs), setting up “narrow banks” or FedAccounts have been highlighted as complimentary solutions in the United States.78
When presenting these alternatives in public — especially on social media — a noticeable amount of “fist shaking” and “pearl clutching” occurs from partisans unaware of how reliant stablecoins are on the U.S. and E.U. commercial banking systems. 910
For example, a number of prominent cryptocurrency promoters claim that draft legislation (such as the STABLE Act) would destroy innovation or even blockchains themselves. 11
As it stands today, non-compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) is strictly speaking not “innovation.” It is regulatory arbitrage which can create a race to the bottom that may harm consumers.1213 Commercial bank-backed stablecoins are ‘innovative’ insomuch as they are not playing by the same explicit rules that other bank-like entities have to.
We will discuss them at length further below but currently – as measured in trading volume – the two most “popular” commercial bank-backed stablecoins are USDT (Tether) and USDC (USD Coin).14 Both claim to be collateralized by U.S. dollars held in custody at commercial banks. Together they accounted for nearly 90% of all stablecoin trading volume this past year. 15
How big is that volume?
As an aggregate, in 2020, on-chain volume alone from these stablecoins reached more than $1 trillion. That does not count the exchange-based (off-chain) transactions that also use these collateral-backed coins. And problematic for policy makers: the on-chain volume was exchanged with limited oversight or surveillance sharing, which is part of the reason why various governments are moving quickly to pass laws to deanonymize self-hosted wallets that are exchanging this parasitic “e-banknote” or “shadow deposit.”161718
For example, Tether and USDC are not being stifled through the proposed STABLE Act, rather they would be required to jump through the same hoops as anyone else providing similar financial services.19 Based on how their product is used, these issuers are arguably a form of wildcat banks (from the 19th century) or what is called a shadow bank or shadow payments today. Lots of shadows!
What is a “shadow bank”?
The term itself is just over a decade old but these entities existed prior to 2007. In general they are “non-bank financial intermediaries that provide services similar to traditional commercial banks but outside normal banking regulations.”20 Readers can imagine that this type of activity is what organizations such as the Financial Stability Board (FSB) would like to keep track of.
One member of the FSB is the Federal Reserve. The screenshot (above) is a relevant portion of their mandate and why they could – in theory – be interested in obtaining information of off-shore entities that are attempting to (anonymously) use U.S. linked e-banknotes.21
“Shadow banking” is occurring off-shore through intermediaries (e.g., coin exchanges and lending protocols) that use Tether or USDC without needing to connect to a local bank who would require some semblance of surveillance such as AML or CFT compliance.2223
Based on their external messaging, multiple centralized exchanges (CEXes) claim to operate banklessly but this is a superficial: they each maintain an umbilical cord to the U.S. dollar via USDT or USDC. 24 Similarly, decentralized lending protocols such as Compound or Aave accept commercial bank-backed stablecoins as collateral and allow rehypothecation of these same tokens (or others). 25
Putting aside new proposed legislation for the moment: stablecoin issuers (administrators) have fought feverishly to categorize themselves under a “lighter” more lenient regulatory regime (money service business) despite more stringent laws covering deposit-taking activities that are not enforced, such as 12 USC 378 (a)(2) being on the books. 2627
More precisely, in retrospect specific activities enabled by commercial banks (such as issuance of e-money) were not properly regulated. Righting this wrong that exists to day – so the argument goes – all MSBs (not just commercial bank-backed stablecoin issuers) should no longer be able to conduct unregulated shadow payments or banking activities.2829
Related to the concept of shadow banking is shadow money, and clearly stablecoins fit the bill. When he was a Governor at the Federal Reserve, Dan Tarullo gave a speech, stating:
“Shadow banking also refers to the creation of assets that are thought to be safe, short-term, and liquid, and as such, “cash equivalents” similar to insured deposits in the commercial banking system. Of course, as many financial market actors learned to their dismay, in periods of stress these assets are not the same as insured deposits.”
The classic example of shadow money is money market funds which were deemed to be “money good” pre-2008 crisis. Reforms were implemented post-crisis, such as redemption gates and floating NAVs for certain money funds, but in March 2020 the Federal Reserve still had to backstop money funds via the money market mutual fund liquidity facility (MMLF). Last month the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets released a report highlighting the need for further reforms to money market funds.
If consumers and investors think stablecoins are the same as insured deposits because they are “backed” by insured deposits at a commercial bank, they are clearly not. Does this mean that if stablecoins become big enough, the U.S. government would bail the sector out just like they have bailed out other shadow money investors? This is an open question but the answer should arguably be no. 30
While regulators have informally discussed systemically important cryptocurrencies networks and potentially overlap with PFMIs, to date there have been few discussions in long-form prose.31 Let us check back in on this topic next year.
Double the credit risk
As mentioned above, the credit risk (solvency) of commercial banks is worse than central banks.32 During the 2007-2009 financial crisis, while a number of commercial banks received direct taxpayer-funded bailouts that immediately underwent public scrutiny, the entire financial industry was effectively propped up through the coordinated actions of central banks and finance ministries around the world.
We could always argue about which policies should or should not have been implemented during that time. The Dodd-Frank Act was just one set of legislation that was passed in an attempt to prevent another, similar systemic crisis from happening again.
What does this have to do with parasitic stablecoins?
Transactional users and speculators of commercial bank-backed stablecoins are faced with at least two potential credit risks:
the credit risk of the stablecoin issuer
the credit risk of the commercial bank that the stablecoin issuer uses as a custodian
A conventional bank account exposes to the account holder to a single level of credit risk, the risk that the bank becomes bankrupt and is unable to meet its liabilities to account holders. In most developed countries and many developing countries, deposits are protected by a national deposit insurance scheme ranging between tens and hundreds of thousands of dollars.
Even if Signature Bank or Silvergate Bank have impeccable credit quality, they are not the lender of last resort. They rely on the implicit and explicit backing of the FDIC and the Federal Reserve.33
As a result, stablecoins present a double layer of credit risk. There is the risk that the issuer of the coins fails and the risk that the party holding the reserves (e.g. a bank, fails). Generally stablecoins would not benefit from the deposit insurance provided for bank accounts.34 Where the issuer invests in a more complex range of assets to act as reserves, such as debt instruments, it also exposes the stablecoin holder to the risk that assets fall in value, which can be an issue, even for relatively short-dated assets, where reserves have to be liquidated. 35
This raises a major question: who bears losses, the issuer or the holder of coins? An issue banks deal with (to a certain extent) by having to set aside regulatory capital.3637
In other words: a stable coin backed by commercial bank deposits has worse credit risk than simply having money in the bank because it would not benefit from any deposit insurance scheme.38
Tangentially related to the PFMIs are central bank digital currencies (CBDCs). Public discussions surrounding the regulation of stablecoins often neglects prior research conducted by central banks, industry, and academia.
For instance, several years ago, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) published one of the most widely cited papers on the topic of CBDCs. In it, the so-called “money flower” Venn diagram illustrated how existing money could be categorized:
As we can see, the current crop of stablecoins (such as USDC) and cryptocurrencies (such as Bitcoin) are clearly in different categories from CBDCs.
Representatives of coin lobbying organizations, such as the Chamber of Digital Commerce, makes the common mistake of conflating the two:
Are commercial bank-backed stablecoins a central bank digital currency (CBDC)?
No. There is a lot of commentary which blends stablecoins with CBDCs but they are not the same. Unless a stablecoin is backed by reserves at the central bank or issued directly by a central bank, a stablecoin marketing itself as a CBDC is being dishonest.
Furthermore, the DC/EP initiative in China is not a CBDC. It is a liability of an intermediary that is not the People’s Bank of China.39
Are CBDCs a stablecoin?
No, although in theory central bank reserves could be tokenized and put onto a blockchain. But that’s not what is happening today (yet).41
Any other reasons why stablecoins are lumped together with CBDCs?
Stability. Credible central banks such as the Federal Reserve, provide a reliable unit-of-account such that more than two dozen countries “dollarize” their domestic economies with it. This article will not go into the merits or demerits of issuing CBDCs or if a blockchain is needed in doing so.42
Ironically, while some vocal coin promoters have claimed a “hyperbitcoinization” event will occur soon. But the cryptocurrency ecosystem as a whole has seen the opposite take place: rapid dollarization due to the growth of commercial bank-backed stablecoins. This is the central conceit for much of the coin world today: promoters and meme artisans often claim they are about to launch off from planet Earth all while drilling ever deeper foundations into the Earth’s crust.
For example, in the second half of 2020 at least four U.S.-based cryptocurrency companies applied for deposit-taking licenses or banking charters.43 And because of how embedded these tokens have become to “DeFi” apps, portions of it have turned into centralized DeFi (CeDeFi), which is an oxymoron.44
As a result, it has made anarchic chains less resilient which will be discussed later.45
Relianceon external U-o-A
One characteristic or function of actual “money” is something called the unit-of-account (U-o-A). A unit-of-account is used to price goods and services in an economy. On a macro level, economic aggregates such as GDP are measured by a stable U-o-A, such as the USD or EUR.
Similarly, international commerce and trade is often denominated in a stable U-o-A. In this case, foreign exchange ultimately takes place somewhere along on “the edges” but the price discovery and (often) payment settlement occurs in the stable U-o-A. 46
For instance, despite doomsday predictions, the USD is becoming more dominant – not less dominant – in financial markets.
What does this have to do with cryptocurrencies and specifically stablecoins?
More precisely, the question should be: why are stablecoins so popular?
The answer is one that has been discussed many times on this site: volatility.47 Contrary to what some promoters claim, Bitcoin is not becoming less volatile over time. As JP Koning illustrated in the chart (above), bitcoin is more volatile today than it was in early 2017 when it had a ‘market cap’ of just $15 billion or in 2013, when it was worth just $1 billion.
While some early coin investors and hoarders may be okay with rampant swings in volatility, actual users (such as day traders or remitters) desire stability. As a result, more than 20 different U.S. dollar-linked stablecoins have been created to fill that need. And unsurprisingly, because the identity of on-chain activity can be obfuscated, another set of stablecoin users are criminals involved in money laundering and terrorism, as identified by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).
For the purposes of this article “stablecoin” is a catch-all term used to describe a spectrum of coins that attempt to peg a token to exogenous (external) value.48 Typically the exogenous value is denominated in USD. In terms of trading volume, the two biggest buckets of stablecoins are:
Collateral-backed tokens such as USDT (Tether), USDC, PAX, TrueUSD, and DAI49
Algorithmic or synthetics such as AMPL, ESD… and the older generation of BitUSD, and Nubits
In practice, nearly all collateral-backed tokens in use today are commercial bank-backed tokens that are centrally issued by a singular entity.50 In contrast, virtually all of the algorithmic tokens are launched by anonymous teams and often use a form of rebasing or Seigniorage Shares model to arrive at a value.51
The focus of this article is on the former not the latter. Let’s dive into a few of them.
USD Coin (USDC) is a stablecoin issued through the Centre Foundation and backed by Circle, Coinbase, and others. This entity is registered as a MSB in the United States. USDC is an ERC20 token that can be moved around the Ethereum network however the “backend” on-and-off ramps are fully powered by U.S.-based commercial banks such as Silvergate in San Diego.52
At the time of this writing about $4.3 billion of USDC has been issued. In Q4 2020, the trading volume of USDC was usually between $335 million to $1.3 billion per day.53
USDT is issued by Tether Ltd which is also registered as a MSB in the United States.54 Customers that want to use USDT, create an account on the Tether website and link their bank account. Then using the traditional financial system, wire cash to Tether’s partner banks. USDT has been issued onto multiple different blockchains, including Bitcoin and Ethereum. As of this writing, it is the most actively used ERC20 token.
Tether Ltd and its parent company (iFinex) have been debanked multiple times. Why?
Because both are under multiple investigations from several regulators and law enforcement (such as the New York Attorney General) for lying about their collateralization levels, among other allegations.
At the time of this writing about $21.3 billion USDT has been issued. In Q4 2020, the trading volume of USDT was usually between $25 billion to $80 billion per day.55
When it was initially launched in December 2017, DAI was collateralized only with ETH and the software company that created it, Maker, is not registered as a MSB (though it could be categorized as a “shadow MSB“). About 18 months ago, DAI transitioned to accept “multi-collateral” which includes other types of coins, such as commercial bank-backed stablecoins. In addition to being listed on most major cryptocurrency exchanges, traders can also buy DAI directly via 3rd party partners (such as Wyre and MoonPay).
However, depending on the day of the week, the proportion of U.S. commercial bank-backed stablecoins can comprise more than 50% of the collateral backing DAI (which is why it was identified by authors of the STABLE Act):
The chart (below) shows the growth (measured by ‘supply’) of the most popular collateral-backed stablecoins this past year.
Assuming the self-reported numbers are correct, this illustrates an increase in USD deposits sitting in banks on behalf of stablecoin issuers.
Note that at the time of this writing about $21.3 billion USDT has been issued and about $4.3 billion of USDC has been issued.
The bar chart (below) shows the daily trading volume of roughly the same collateral-backed stablecoins over the past three year:
Recall from above that in Q4 2020, with a few outliers the trading volume of USDT was between $25 billion to $80 billion per day and the the trading volume of USDC was between $335 million to $1.3 billion per day.
In other words, the average daily turnover for USDT was about 2 to 4 times the amount allegedly deposited with their banking partners. This likelyshows that some forms of leverage, credit creation, and rehypothecation are taking place. 5657
The line chart (below) shows the total value of tokens that are locked up (TVL) in DeFi-related projects over the past ~3 years:
As we can observe above, growth of TVL substantially increased between January 1, 2020 and January 1, 2021 by about 2,000 percent. DAI contributes to about 20 percent of these deposits.
What about Diem née Libra?
With mountains of press and marketing the past 18 months, they are finally planning to launch (soon). What Libra initially proposed in the summer of 2019 (to the chagrin of regulators and payment-related partners) was that Libra would deposit user funds in multiple custody banks (like Citi) but purposefully do it in a way such that no single regulator (such as FinCEN or OCC or the Fed) would have complete oversight. That was shot down and the proposal evolved further the past year.
For example, it initially involved pegging to a basket of currencies (including SGD) kind of like an SDR, but without FSB or IMF oversight. This put commercial banks at risk in part because of non-existent AML controls. Thus the entire proposal was scrapped and a new narrative created through the use of a commercial bank-backed stablecoin similar to USDC.
There are other bits and bobs that we can dive into – such as the older generation of algorithmically “stabilized” coins Nubits or BitUSD – but that’s a separate, mostly irrelevant category of faux stablecoins.
What would happen if issuers of collateral-backed stablecoins had to obtain something akin to a bank charter?58 Last month Paxos (PAX) applied for a national charter in the United States, will other issuers do the same?
While there may be rigorous surveillance at the on-and-off ramps of USDC or USDT today, the same cannot be said for on-chain activity where the “Travel Rule” is ignored or compliance with the BSA is non-existent.
If the self-reported volumes at coin exchanges is accurate, then tens of billions (measured in USD) of these stablecoins are traded each day likely in a non-compliant manner. This undersurveilled activity is part of the motivation behind a new draft rule from the U.S. Treasury department.
For perspective, according to The Block in the first 11 months of 2020 stablecoins hit some hockey stick growth:
Supply grew 322%
Transaction volume grew 316%
Daily active addresses grew 332%
And as mentioned in the first section above, total stablecoin on-chain volume surpassed $1 trillion during 2020.59
If payment processors are held liable for the activities (e.g., knowingly processing payments for scams) that take place on their networks, the argument goes, so should stablecoin issuers. In the past, both Tether and USDC have frozen funds and blacklisted addresses due to law enforcement orders, so at a minimum they should be held to the same standard as a payment processor (but are not).
Either way, it is clear that from trading activity and total-value-locked up (TVL), that the DeFi ecosystem (and all coin worlds really), are reliant on maintaining frictionless U.S. banking access.
Is this DeFi-in-name-only (DeFi-ino)? Without the on-and-off ramps into U.S. banks and most importantly – parasitic access to a stable unit-of-account, arguably the middle (TVL) activity would be a lot less than it is today.60
If the (end) goal or ethos of the DeFi world — and broader anarchic cryptocurrency universe — is to be self-sovereign and enable self-custody and not reliant on U.S. commercial banks or the Federal Reserve, the exact opposite has occurred.61
A quick DAIdiversion
It is not a full barnacle however some have previously argued that DAI could become a victim of its own success. 62
How’s that? Maker’s current governance leans heavily on identifiable humans and VCs which would be hard to quickly anonymize/decentralize. Recall that its human-led governance process modified the collateralization process, allowing new types of coins and tokens to be included.63
As a result:
Often more than half its collateral are other USD stablecoins (none of which have bank charters), so if these are shut down or liquidity severely restricted, this could impact DAI stability and/or liquidity64
Dependence on humans to manage governance and reliance on oracles for exogenous info; these are a single-point-of-failure.
What are some solutions for Maker (DAI), whose investors and developers are identifiable?
Act like cypherpunks, “disappear,” and go fully anonymous making enforcement more difficult65
Eschew the current crop of oracle architecture because it is arguably a single-point-of-failure
Remove collateral whitelists, which is something prominent developers have suggested in the past
Regarding that last point, here’s an example:
Let us check back next year to see what Maker, Compound, and Aave do with their formal governance and collateralization processes.
Worth noting that USDT, USDC, and DAI have either broken their pegs with the USD or at some point dramatically drifted from their pegs. There are multiple reasons why.
For example, in April 2017, USDT dropped below $1.00 and traded at $0.91.
Why the sudden drop?
As mentioned in a previous post, a lawsuit revealed that Bitfinex sued WellsFargo because the bank had refused to process Bitfinex’s international wires. Over a span of a few months, tens of millions of USD had been wired through WellsFargo into and out of four different banks in Taiwan which Bitfinex, Tether Ltd, and other affiliated subsidiaries had bank accounts with. At some point prior to March 2017, someone on the compliance side of WellsFargo noticed this large flow of USD and for one reason or other (e.g., fell within the guidelines of a SAR?), placed a hold on the funds. In early April 2017 Bitfinex’s parent company filed a lawsuit for WellsFargo to release these funds.
WellsFargo eventually returned the USD-denominated funds but without those funds, the peg was unable to withstand sell pressure. In other words, WellsFargo was integral to Tether Ltd’s correspondent banking relationships. About a week later Bitfinex withdrew its lawsuit but not before causing a Streisand Effect.
This was not the first time Bitfinex has been “debanked.” Phil Potter, then-CFO of Bitfinex, gave an interview and explained that whenever Bitfinex had lost accounts in the past, they would do a number of things to get re-banked. In his words:
“We’ve had banking hiccups in the past, we’ve just always been able to route around it or deal with it, open up new accounts, or what have you… shift to a new corporate entity, lots of cat and mouse tricks that everyone in Bitcoin industry has to avail themselves of.”
With this blasé attitude, it is any wonder they are under active investigations from the Department of Justice, the CFTC, and the NY AG.
The ethos of blockchainology is supposedly: “don’t trust, verify.” Above is a tweet from Paolo Ardoino, current CTO of Bitfinex and Tether.
Because no reputable firm will provide regular audits of Tether Ltd, we are left having to trust a non-credible actor.66 For instance, in April 2019, during its legal proceedings with the New York Attorney General, Stuart Hoegner, the general counsel for Tether Ltd admitted that USDT was not backed 1:1 as was claimed on their website. Instead it was running an undisclosed fractional reserve operation that was only uncovered due to this ongoing lawsuit.
“As of the date [April 30] I am signing this affidavit, Tether has cash and cash equivalents (short term securities) on hand totaling approximately $2.1 billion, representing approximately 74 percent of the current outstanding tethers.”
Executives at the parent company (iFinex) would not even acknowledge ownership of Tether Ltd until an exposé from The New York Timesrevealed it was the case due to leaks from the Paradise Papers (be sure to also read Amy Castor’s timeline).
We know historically that other intermediaries have lied or misled users (and investors) of what they do with deposits. For instance, during a series of investigations in 2017 in China, at least two major domestic cryptocurrency exchanges (Huobi and OKCoin) were found to have secretly re-invested customer deposits into other financial instruments.
This type of abuse is the reason why at a minimum regular audits from reputable, independent firms are required for financial service providers. Let us check in next year to see if Tether Ltd gives us more than tweets to audit.
We briefly mentioned this topic at the beginning of the article but worth looking at this closer.
In the early 2010s, several prominent VC-backed fintech efforts insisted they needed carve-outs for what they knew were highly regulated activities.67 Some even hired lobbying organizations to push the “don’t suffocate innovation” meme which persists today in the form of “deregulated finance.”68
For instance, in 2014 the New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS) proposed a new virtual currency regulation dubbed the “BitLicense.” Prior to its enactment in 2015, the same sort of “everyone will leave the US” argument was made by its opponents. Throughout the second half of 2014, DFS held multiple public comment periods, the responses of which were made public. Among others, the EFF submission included the word “innovation” thirteen times. 69 Upon its enactment, a few coin-related companies claim to have left, some vowing never to return.
From a systemic risk standpoint, is society worse off because of the small handful of coin companies that had no intention of becoming compliant with a stricter MSB, let alone a banking license, left New York? No. Is the BitLicense perfect or flawless? No.
But contrary to views of partisans, entrepreneurs continue to seek it out as a stamp of approval: as of this writing there are 25 entities that have been approved for a BitLicense (although a couple overlap).70
Three years after its enactment, in May 2018, coin-focused media gave softball interviews to the “refugees” that left New York, notably Shapeshift and Kraken. Both are cryptocurrency exchanges and had (have?) legal and regulatory issues.
At the time Shapeshift allowed KYC’less transfers to take place. That changed in September 2018 after The Wall Street Journal did an investigation discovering that Shapeshift was being used to launder proceeds of crime such as the infamous WannaCry ransomware.
Perhaps publicly telling the world that you are not going to comply with the BitLicense was a redflag?71
The other prominent “departure” from New York was Kraken, another U.S.-based cryptocurrency exchange.73 The CEO publicly has written multiple articles and posts on social media for why the organization would no longer cater to New York residents. But upon closer examination, in September 2018 the New York Attorney General announced that it had evidence that Kraken was still operating in New York. While that investigation simmers in the background, a year later a lawsuit was filed by Jonathan Silverman, who had run Kraken’s OTC desk in NYC for a couple of years. He sued the exchange because they had stiffed bonus payments. It is unclear what the current status of Kraken’s business is in New York, however, a number of employees appear to reside there.74
Likewise many prominent ICO promoters made similarly grandiose statements after the SEC released its report on The DAO in 2017. That capital pooling and investments would move off-shore and the U.S. would be left behind. Regulatory arbitrage certainly did take place, with hundreds of ICOs being registered in Singapore, Taiwan, and other island nations (such as The Caymans).75 But we also saw that in practice, coin-focused developer teams continue to be hired here in United States.
Shadow banks have always sold themselves as providing competition to the regular banking system. And to a certain extent, they do. But its an undesirable form of competition which causes a race to the bottom.
If other nations want to put their own financial infrastructure at risk due to underaccountable shadow banking – so the argument goes – that is not a great outcome but not a terrible outcome for the U.S. banking system in terms of systemic risk.76 For example, the aim of the STABLE Act is not to globally enforce a regime: it is to prevent systemic risk in the U.S. and this can be done by strictly enforcing existing laws or enacting new laws on entities such as stablecoin issuers reliant on U.S. commercial banks.
This may sound repetitive, one cannot overstress systemic risk in the context of an underaccountable IOU layer, as Tankus once more explains:
The [STABLE Act] is aiming at systemic risk. leaving unlicensed stablecoins as a fringe financial product offered in other jurisdictions unlisted or on minor exchanges that can survive not being able to interact with the U.S. legal system accomplishes the goal
Recall that in the U.S., the only entities that have access (accounts) at the Central Bank are commercial banks. And we empirically know that the credit risk of commercial banks is worse than a Central Bank because there is just one type of money: reserves at the central bank.
Everything beyond coins, notes, and money equivalents is arguably a credit risk. Thus, not only should we want Narrow Banks and FedAccounts created, but from a resiliency standpoint at the very least we should require stablecoin-issuers to stop piggybacking on other commercial banks due to their modus operandi.
Miners and block makers
We have touched on this topic more than a dozen times on just this site alone. Let us look at this issue from a different angle.
Visa and other payment providers are liable for certain activities that take place on their networks, hence why they on-board certain merchants and off-board others that are deemed “higher risk” or whom have violated some law.77 Similarly all FMIs have various binding agreements (MSA, TOS, EULA, SLA), and the penalty for violating them could result in a participant being removed (e.g., Fedwire has a terms of service that is effectively passed on to the users of commercial bank wiring services). ISPs and telecoms are also regulated and permissioned and they can (and do) kick users off for violating their TOS.
Proof-of-work chains like Bitcoin intentionally did not include a ‘terms-of-service’ and by design did not include hooks into any legal agreement or, for that matter, attempt to integrate AML screening of participants.78
But this is just RICO theater: in an “even Steven” world, miners should be held to the same standard as other processors. Assuming some or just one of the frameworks mentioned at the top of this article is ratified, issuers can be held accountable for additional disputes that arise.79 What then of the block makers who process transactions that fail to comply with a specific jurisprudence?
For example, in terms of proof-of-work chains – in practice – nearly all of the mining pools for both Bitcoin and Ethereum are operated by identifiable entities. FinCEN’s 2013 guidance gave miners a carve-out based on the assumption that mining pools were neutral, but in practice they are not and do manually add (or censor) transactions.
For instance, at a public event in 2019, Roger Ver and Tone Vays (aka Anthony Vaysbrod) made a bet on stage regarding sending transactions – and importantly the associated fees – across both the Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash blockchains. To aide Vays’ attempt to send a below-market transaction fee, Slush (a mining pool), manually included it despite the below-market fee. They were not neutral the opposite to how miners are often portrayed to regulators.
During the frenzy of ICO mania, the rush to get into a “capped” raise meant that some speculators would “bribe” mining pools to guarantee that their transaction could be included in a specific block. For example, in May 2017, a principal at a Canadian-listed fund successfully paid more than $6,000 to an Ethereum mining pool so that his transaction could be included during the sale of the Basic Attention Token (BAT).
We could spend a couple of posts just walking through the subreddit /r/bitcoin in what is basically the de facto customer service forum in the event that a user accidentally sends a mining fee that is too big or small.
What these human-run chains independently highlight are some of the lessons from 2015. How can validators become BSA compliant or apply for a MSB license?80
Why would they need to?
In what became the “permissioned chain” or “enterprise chain” vendor world, startups like Symbiont and Digital Asset first looked at using Bitcoin mining pools to process transactions for regulated financial institutions (e.g., banks) but ultimately walked back for a couple of reasons:8182
transaction fees or payments could be going to sanctioned entities
The discussions surrounding identifiable validators (this paper uses the term “KYM” – know your miner) – and the legal and regulatory buckets they fall under – has been an ongoing topic since at least 2013. The STABLE Act potentially fixes that loophole.83
Why hasn’t law enforcement prosecuted mining pool operators in the past? Partly because of coin lobbying organizations have successfully pushed a one-sided agenda on behalf of their donors and rallied external support by fear mongering about criminalizing node operators.8485
This is a red herring and is not the aim of the STABLE Act; in fact its co-authors believe that would be a bad strategy. But a bigger issue has been a lack of resources. Agencies like FinCEN have in general been underresourced and went after the lower hanging fruit (e.g., ransomware profiteers in Iran).8687 It is an open question whether they will have more resources under a new administration to look at miners.88
With the roll out of real-time transaction monitoring from many different vendors, intermediaries such as cryptocurrency exchanges and mining pools can identify and flag suspicious or illicit activity before participants can fully realize their gains.
For instance, almost four-and-a-half years ago, Bitfinex was hacked and lost 119,756 bitcoins. At the time this was worth about $65 million of actual money. Today that is around $4 billion. The hacker(s) have never been (publicly) caught. Proportionally, this would be equivalent to a large commercial bank losing $20 – $30 billion USD. There have been Congressional hearings for much less.
As I have pointed in previous posts and presentations (slides 10-12), at the time 9 out-of-the-first 10 mining pools that processed the stolen Bitfinex tokens operate outside of the U.S. (specifically in China).89 If a U.S.-based financial intermediary was hacked and $4 billion in customer deposits was stolen, the fine print in the terms-of-service kicks into high gear to protect customers. Despite the billions in VC funding and headline-grabbing coin prices, similar consumer protections do not exist in the coin world.90
Even with the existence of real-time monitoring from multiple vendors, intermediaries including miners have gotten away with profiteering from processing illicit transactions that would have shook up FMIs or PSPs. Ransomware, a blight on critical public infrastructure, and the processing of its transactions are something that well-resourced prosecutors could disgorge.91
The motivation behind anarchic chains, such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, was about creating an alternative, sovereign economy that was independent of any nation-state. But if your alternative economy uses USD (or any other fiat-linked cryptocurrency) as its unit-of-account, it is not really an alternative economy, but a subsystem subordinate to the monetary policy and pricing system of the nation that the system is supposed to be independent of.
If the aim or ethos of anarchic cryptocurrencies is to truly reduce moral hazard (e.g. taxpayer funded bailouts of banks) and systemic risks that unfortunately occur during a financial crisis, the DeFi ecosystem has a long way to reverse the current trend.92 It is not too late and in fact, client pluralism (in Ethereum) is one way to reduce systemic risk.93
“Pegged coins” are clearly fragile because they rely on an exogenous judiciary system to resolve disputes and an exogenous banking system to maintain a unit-of-account. Much of the proposed legislation above should serve as a motivation for building a more resilient on-chain U-o-A.
Perhaps the one call to action is to encourage education around “narrow banks” which could be viewed as a ‘middle ground’ between a bank charter and a MSB.94 If you are interested in learning more on the short history of commercial bank-backed stablecoins, worth re-reading the prequel from 2018 to see what has changed.
I would like to thank the following people for their feedback: AC, RG, RS, RR, CW, MW, LR, JM, PE, FC, JG, JK, KV, DZ, AV, JW, and VB
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Regarding terminology, one reviewer noted: “By necessity, a stable coin is either subsidized or fictional. Dollars cost money to hold and transact in, so the only way a stable coin can be stable is if the sponsor takes risk on the underlying or uses it as a loss leader. The term has come to imply backing. Which not only is probably not true, it doesn’t necessarily need to be true. Have you ever tried to redeem a “stable coin”? Any stability of a “stable coin” is derived not from the assets backing the coin but by the ability to sell (not redeem) for a fixed amount. Which is of course true until it isn’t.” [↩]
One commenter explained: “In the E.U., MiCA will take a while to be implemented by member states. As a result, some member states are trying to get ahead of the E.U. itself by releasing their own related laws with the aim of attracting market participants; at least until the E.U. comes to a consensus of what it will want to do. Even if being ahead of the E.U. could have short term benefits, it is also extremely important to not deviate from E.U.-wide consensus, so part of this is identifying areas that the E.U. would obviously regulate. One approach, which has been seen in Hong Kong as well, has been a phased approach to regulating cryptocurrencies by first regulating the areas that are easier to regulate (e.g. funds and fund managers, applying existing requirements to those who want to invest in cryptocurrencies), and waiting for things to develop before trying to regulate areas that are hard to regulate (e.g. custody). There is a key difference between a directive and a regulation in the E.U. A directive has to be transposed into law by the member states, which have to update their own legal systems. And when a member state is behind in transposing, like Cyprus for AMLD5, they get put in special working groups and the E.U. can even take legal action toward them. A regulation is already a law that is automatically enforceable across member states.” [↩]
The PWG uses a broad definition: “For the purposes of this statement, “stablecoins” are the digital assets themselves. A “stablecoin arrangement” includes the stablecoin as well as infrastructure and entities involved in developing, offering, trading, administering or redeeming the stablecoin, including, but not limited to, issuers, custodians, auditors, market makers, liquidity providers, managers, wallet providers, and governance structures.” [↩]
Most industry-driven commentary thus far seems to use the term “stablecoin” as if it is a well-defined concept. As one reviewer noted: “Assuming that there is a case for regulating a non-custodial coin, if you push the analysis to try to clearly characterize the type of coin that should be regulated, there is no other way to draw the boundary other than to say: coin that’s designed to track the unit-of-account of any currency that’s considered to be money under the law in question.” [↩]
It could be argued that coin promoters are looking at engagement the wrong way: the onus is not on any government to bend to the needs of coin efforts. Governments should not necessarily be accommodating since it is not a reciprocal or equitable relationship. For example, Satoshi intentionally did not architect Bitcoin to be compliant with any surveillance regime, it has been an one-way conversation — mostly a monologue — from day 1. [↩]
Recall that in both the U.S. and E.U., access to central bank accounts are restricted to commercial banks and handful of non-banks. Rather than create narrow banks themselves or seek central bank access, stablecoin issuers are arguably de-stabilizing the highly concentrated U.S. banking system by building underaccountable shadow banks on top of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). If an aim for “DeFi” is protecting consumers and investors, concentrating more activity onto SIFIs is not the way to go. [↩]
One reviewer who previously worked at a central bank noted: “We need to understand narrow banks and think through what they would look like. Even I have skipped this because ‘The Federal Reserve won’t approve them so why bother.'” [↩]
In his November 2020 speech, Andy Haldane, chief economist at the Bank of England, said: “On financial stability, a widely-used digital currency would change the topology of banking in a potentially profound way. It could result in the emergence of something closer to narrow banking, with safe payments-based activities to some extent segregated from banks’ riskier credit-provision activities. In other words, the traditional model of banking would be disrupted.” [↩]
Ironically by vocally defending Tether or USDC, partisans that do not like the Federal Reserve or JP Morgan are actually defending the very entities they claim to dislike, because commercial bank-backed stablecoins are just tokenized deposits sitting in a bank. And each of those banks rely on dollar-clearing services provided by the New York Federal Reserve. In other words, the aspiration of “anarcho-capitalism” is in direct conflict with how all settlement, clearing, and payment FMIs operate today; to use a stablecoin necessarily involves needing an exogenous U-o-A maintained by the Fed. [↩]
Quizzically, the “moral hazard” issue – that taxpayers are once more on the line to bailout commercial banks – has been glossed over by many DeFi and CeDeFi proponents. Again, the benefits of commercial bank-backed stablecoins largely accrue to issuers, traders, and speculators. These are privatized gains. Unless issuers move to a different banking model, they are ultimately relying on socialized losses by taxpayers via FDIC. [↩]
Worth pointing out that the article above is about specific groups of people, not technology. Several years ago Steve Waldman authored the memorable “soylent blockchain” presentation. It is germane because chains – in practice – are (often) run by identifiable humans. [↩]
One reviewer commented: “There probably needs to be a new regulatory framework, such as a narrow bank or something enabled by the STABLE Act because stablecoin issuers do not fit well in existing models. In the U.S., issuers are stuck between obtaining a bank charter versus an MSB so the current framework might accidentally muzzle innovation. If stablecoins grow to a size where meaningful risk – shadow banking, systemic risk, reduced consumer protection – are visible then how to achieve regulatory outcomes without stifling innovation? On the one hand you have the argument ‘if it looks or talks like a bank it should be regulated as one’ and on the other extreme you have ‘if it is involves a blockchain it shouldn’t be regulated.’ Both those polar extremes are wrong. Blockchain advocacy is often full of hyperbole where the centralized implementation doesn’t really follow the decentralization thesis. On the other hand, the financial industry’s default position often is: technology companies that do what we do should be as heavily regulated we are. And then financial institutions use this to curb innovation and secure their moat. The question is: how to have an enlightened discussion without interference from lobbyists in the VC-backed tech world versus the banking industry? There is probably a middle ground approach that does not result in us having to take sides. Narrow banks are one approach although it also could become political.” [↩]
One area that cryptocurrency promoters often claim “innovation” is taking place is in the cross-border or remittance arena. Yet little more than anecdotes are provided to back up that narrative. For a detailed explanation for why this narrative is probably false, see: Does Bitcoin/Blockchain make sense for international money transfers? One reviewer commented: “This is not to dismiss the very real demand for banking services in underserved markets. The majority of companies around the world are SMEs and they provide the majority of global jobs, yet in many cases they have historically had trouble accessing banking services. This dovetails into “open banking” – access to APIs and bank data – which is a different approach from what the cryptocurrency-focused narrative often seeks to market.” Another reviewer explained: “The argument that stablecoins are not inherently as stable because they depend on the underlying creditworthiness of the backing institution is hard to argue against. At first glance, the current generation of stablecoins allow value to reach areas of new economic interest – inclusion – that traditional banks seem to ignore, yet this is likely accomplished by eschewing strict KYC gathering, AML, and CFT compliance that banks are required to conduct.” [↩]
This article does not explore projects like USC or JPM Coin, the latter of which is ultimately backed by the balance sheet of the bank itself. [↩]
Generally speaking, most stablecoins are issued as USD. As one commenter noted: “Recently a subsidiary of GMO, a Japanese IT giant, was authorized to issue a USD and a JPY stablecoin under New York State regulations. I think we’ll see much more of these cross-border combinations. And I don’t see regulators in New York State bowing to an emerging market central bank that doesn’t want to see its currency being wrapped into a stablecoin.” [↩]
One reviewer noted: “Instead of saying ‘e-cash’ I would say ‘e-banknotes’ or ‘shadow deposits’. I think ‘cash’ has specific properties that most of these blockchain/account-based payments systems don’t have. It is too generous to call them cash and for the banking laws, it is the deposit-equivalent that’s the real issue.” [↩]
Another reviewer commented: “In one scenario you effectively end up with a regulatory regime where any stablecoin issuer has to whitelist (or blacklist) the supported chains and then only custodial wallets or KYC’ed wallets can hold coin. An alternative is having to monitor activity and while this can become “theater,” compliance is still robust and the team can point to “we are doing something” that can be tweaked and tightened up. Monitoring obligations may be the route otherwise you end up having to authenticate every address as a stringent requirement. Mandatory KYC’ed addresses could make certain “digital cash” impossible to use.” [↩]
The terms within the STABLE Act also provide latitude for U.S. regulators to create ‘narrow bank’-like structures for these types of issuers. [↩]
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve oversees two FMUs in the United States: CLS and CHIPS. CLS was launched about 20 years ago in part to reduce Herstatt Risk. In all cases, users of FMIs and FMUs have large MSAs to agree to. [↩]
The term “Tether” itself connotes a purposeful tie to actual money. And like the term “smart contracts,” stablecoins are neither stable and nor coins. Just a risk disguised as a rational ‘crypto safe haven.’ [↩]
One reviewer commented: “‘1-1 fiat-backed at the Central Bank’ stablecoins are close to narrow banks but far from full license banks. Lending is the risky part of the license. The Ant Group IPO debacle is in part around this distinction. We need to think through what a “just lending” bank looks like.” [↩]
Some of these exchanges allow users to trade a variety of other financial instruments and even add leverage. [↩]
Promoters often claim that these protocols are just tools that help the unbanked but that is another way of saying the ends justify the means. [↩]
The observation around illicit deposit-taking is not new, I even wrote about it more than five years ago. [↩]
One reviewer noted: “The best argument stablecoin issuers have is “Paypal got to do it, why cant we?” the response to which is: Paypal shouldn’t have been allowed to do it, and we certainly shouldn’t repeat this mistake now when we have a real chance to fix up all of this mess.” [↩]
Another reviewer noted: “For stablecoin issuers this ‘fix’ could become a slippery slope resulting in a bifurcation of blacklisted versus white listed addresses (or coins). Today physical cash transactions are not KYC’ed but intermediaries have KYC obligations for a reason: because they are an intermediary engaged in regulated activities (e.g., holding client deposits). One of the innovations with cryptocurrencies was getting rid of account-based money but creating white and blacklisted addresses brings account-based money back in so if that happens why bother using it versus PayPal?” [↩]
State intervention already occurs via taxpayer subsidies to proof-of-work miners removing a raison d’être for proof-of-work mining. [↩]
We know empirically that the credit risk of commercial banks is not zero, hence why the supervisory departments at central banks regularly perform not just audits, but stress tests to see how financial institutions would weather systemic events. [↩]
It is quite common to hear professional coin traders claim that a governmental organization like FinCEN or SEC would never shut down an entity like Tether because the knock-on effect would be devastating… that Tether was “too important to fail.” Concentration of risk this early in the game is not a good thing. [↩]
The FDIC has a history of stepping in and protecting uninsured deposits as well. Do stablecoin issuers believe this is an implicit guarantee for future crises? [↩]
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s guidance from October permits national banks to hold fiat stablecoin reserves. This supports the argument that these “projects” are inextricably linked sovereign currencies. And while it is likely that Acting Commissioner Brooks is replaced under the upcoming Biden administration, changing that guidance may not happen. While it can be rescinded it is probably not a high priority and it is clear that some banks were already holding stablecoin reserves and the guidance just gave them more cover. A major caveat comes in its footnote #5 regarding a 1:1 ratio for collateralization that we know, for example, Tether Ltd has lied about before. [↩]
As noted in the Appendix: “Other relevant issues to maintaining the stability, or even basic credibility of a stablecoin relate to legal and operational issues. If the issuer of a stablecoin fails, the assets ideally should be in a legal structure that is “bankruptcy remote” i.e. the holders of the coins can claim the reserves in preference to other creditors of the issuer. The bankruptcy remoteness of the Libra foundation, or even the general recourse Libra holders would have to the reserves of the Libra foundation are currently unclear. For the stablecoins used in cryptocurrency trading such as Tether and the Gemini Dollar there are varying degrees of bankruptcy remoteness. JPM Coin (or almost any commercial bank-issued stablecoin) is supported by the overall balance sheet of the bank. Holders of JPM Coins would most likely be treated like any other bank account holder.” [↩]
Another reviewer commented: “The argument for exchanges and stablecoins to have direct Fed access to my mind is about protecting retail investors. Exchanges and stablecoin issuers encourage retail investors to make fiat deposits. These deposits are uninsured and there is no guarantee that the investor will ever get the money back. Tether specifically says in its legal documentation that it doesn’t guarantee to redeem USDT in actual dollars. Retail deposits can be lent to margin traders with or without the knowledge of the depositor, and they can also be leveraged up and traded by exchanges themselves, since exchanges seem to have no shame whatsoever about commingling funds. Fees can also be high, and naïve retail investors can be vulnerable to hacking if they leave their coins in hot wallets, as I suspect many do. This whole area desperately needs the sort of consumer protection that banks are forced to provide to their depositors. To my mind exchanges and stablecoin issuers should not be allowed to take retail fiat deposits at all unless they are licensed depository institutions, which would give them access to Fed liquidity. And retail fiat deposits on crypto exchanges should have FDIC insurance.” [↩]
A third systemic-like risk that a users faces is if and when a blockchain partitions and forks. Each issuer has a different view on handle these. For instance, according to the USDC User Agreement: “In the event of a fork of USDC, Circle shall, in its sole discretion, determine which fork of USDC it will support, if any.” [↩]
Note that Raphael Auer from the BIS wrote in response: “Interesting but that’s not what we know about the project.” Even if it turns out that the highly esteemed ex-PBoC source was wrong, the tweet still confirms that several things we call CBDCs are not direct claims on the Central Bank. And if they are not, maybe we should just call them e-money or similar terms for new forms of commercial bank money. [↩]
Projects like USC from Fnality are attempting to tokenize reserves at the central bank. While formal approvals have not been made, there is a possibility that non-banks are provided a pathway to opening an account at the central bank. For example, in July 2017, the Bank of England announced that it would allow direct access to RTGS accounts to non-bank payment service providers; this was followed up with a detailed information pack in December 2019. [↩]
There are several parallels between CeDeFi and permissioned-on-permissionless chains. For instance, introducing regulated intermediaries that collect KYC removes the raison d’etre for proof-of-work (as P-o-W was used to make Sybil attacks costly). [↩]
From a technical perspective, if these anarchic systems were fully resilient and sufficiently decentralized, it should not matter what laws are passed or enforced. Why? Because the assumption in 2008 and 2009 was that these proof-of-work networks would be operating in an adversarial environment. Currently the end-points (on-and-off ramps) act as weak, fragile links that can be compromised. As one reviewer quipped: “Based on the outcry on social media, cypherpunks seems to have gotten soft and forgot why proof-of-work is used.” [↩]
‘Nominalism‘ and why it is important to legally enforceable contracts and debt is a tangential point to this. As is nemo dat. [↩]
Some analysts and lawyers refer to a stablecoin as a “pegged coin.” [↩]
Note: TrueUSD (TUSD) was operating for an extended period without registering as a MSB. As of this writing, TrueCoin LLC (a subsidiary of TrustLabs) is now registered with FinCEN. [↩]
One reviewer commented: “Any system that involves trusting some central actor (a bank, an issuer) is not embracing the core element to cryptocurrency innovation, and is mostly just a way of using money over the internet. Since stablecoins (or coins issued by tokenized deposits at banks) fall into that category, I don’t think they’re fundamentally different from the banking I can already do today. I know some people disagree—they think the openness of the ledger still means something important—but I tend to think that’s not that big a deal if you have to rely on centralized actors again.” [↩]
Several of the “rebasing” tokens seem to be replicating the ‘Hayek Money‘ proposal from 2014. Whereas a number of the Seigniorage Shares projects frequently cite a paper authored by Robert Sams. Note: since rebase and Seigniorage Shares tokens do not custody any commercial bank-backed stablecoins, they may not be directly impacted by some of the proposed legislation. [↩]
Silvergate’s total cryptocurrency-related USD balances were up $500 million (39% QOQ) as of Q3 2020. Note: the Silvergate Exchange Network (SEN) is administered and operated by a single entity and is not a distributed ledger (blockchain). [↩]
There were several spikes for USDC beyond that amount, including one $24.1 billion spike on January 3, 2021. [↩]
Tether Ltd is incorporated in Hong Kong and registered with FinCEN, but in searching the Wyoming’s banking regulator, Tether Ltd is currently not listed. To be registered as a U.S.-based MSB, typically Tether Ltd would have to have a license with one of the state banking departments. What this means is: Tether Ltd is a foreign business that has chosen to register with FinCEN but Wyoming does not require MSBs that deal in cryptocurrency to get a state license. So Tether Ltd is operating in Wyoming as a transmitter, but does not have a license. That does not mean that the foreign jurisdiction where they reside regulates them. Many jurisdictions lack any sort of MSB framework. For instance, Canada does not have licenses for MSBs. So a Canadian business that transmits money does not operate by a separate set of rules from any other business, unlike in the U.S. where the state banking departments put limits on what sorts of assets MSBs and transmitters can hold. [↩]
There were several spikes for USDT beyond that amount, including one $211.3 billion spike on January 4, 2021. [↩]
There is leverage in the traditional foreign exchange marketplace too. Statista has a relevant chart showing average daily turnover in the global FX market. [↩]
One reviewer commented: “Credit is a huge part of the current monetary system. We would be wrong to ignore it when we talk about stablecoins, which are interconnected with the financial system. Stablecoin promoters who intend to disrupt this system often don’t understand the very system they are disrupting. For example, some issuers wouldn’t be able to answer how their stablecoins would account for potential inflation or deflation, how supply and demand for these coins would be stabilized, or what happens during a crisis. This also ties back to an understanding of interest rates, which is so often lacking among stablecoin disrupters and is an integral part of the current system. [↩]
Note: one of the common misconceptions of the STABLE Act is that stablecoin issuers would necessarily have to get a bank charter but the language of the actual bill provides lots of flexibility to regulators. [↩]
We do not want to conflate velocity with TVL or rehypothecation either. Without the ability to see an exchanges books, the leverage facilitated by on-chain lending protocols is likely a magnitude order less than the leverage provided by off-chain exchanges. [↩]
One reviewer commented: “The rapid growth in DeFi is directly correlated with the developments of the current generation of stablecoins, and this has been used to justify DeFi’s current value proposition. As a result, I do not see that as a sustainable way to create real value because of the dependency on these types of stablecoins. Programmable money and programmable assets is where the real innovation is and ideally neither should be reliant on pegged coins.” [↩]
In other words: if large portions of “DeFi” applications rely on USDC or USDT, arguably this is incompatible with cypherpunkism or the decentralize-all-the-things meme. [↩]
One reviewer noted that: “Cryptocurrency, like Bitcoin, was supposed to be sui generis. But if you peg or wrap to a fiat currency you are going to fall into regulatory problems. Even if DAI itself was just cryptocollateral they have a human-run governance mechanism and it is pegged to the dollar so it could fall under Securities law or Exchange regulations. If DAI remained entirely crypto, would be less problematic.” [↩]
Maker maintains a public forum in which new types of collateral are proposed and voted on. [↩]
In contrast, RAI only uses ETH as collateral and Seigniorage Shares is re-based solely on endogenous info. It is arguably hard to do but using endogenous data from the chain itself to rebase the coin value leads to a more resilient app and system (e.g. hard to switch off). [↩]
Coin promoters – some of whom call themselves as cypherpunks – can ignore whatever regulations they want but that doesn’t prevent regulators and law enforcement from attempting to regulate and enforce activities in their remit. Over time the modus operandi of some coin promoters has shifted away from an endogenous engineering effort: ‘we have built an anti-fragile sovereign network and exited, so who cares what the government does.’ It has shifted towards an exogenous model, wherein coin promoters ask their followers to write to policy makers and donate to coin lobbyists because a popular “dApp” relies on something that the government regulates. [↩]
Friedman LLP was the most recent auditor and they publicly walked away from Tether Ltd in 2018. See also research from professor John Griffin. [↩]
One germane social media comment: “Stablecoins are IOUs with collateral in state-issued money. You can not expect non-intervention from State if you peg your asset to money issued from State. Stablecoins are Statecoins.” Another said: “If your coin is pegged to the USD, I don’t think you’re sticking it to The Man quite as much as you think you are.” [↩]
Felix Salmon arguably had the most adroit take on the pushback against the STABLE Act. [↩]
Another example: during the summer of 2014, rumors circulated that the BitLicense was about to be enacted (it wasn’t until the following year). During one of these periods, billionaire Tim Draper and his son, Adam, hosted a public meetup at their “university” in San Mateo. Multiple speakers repeated the same erroneous claims that the license would stymie “innovation.” Another memorable exchange was an reddit AMA with Ben Lawsky (then-Superintendent of Financial Services and architect of the BitLicense) in which the word “innovation” was flung around a lot as well. [↩]
Executives from overseas cryptocurrency exchanges used to tell investors and potential investors that they had submitted paperwork to receive a BitLicense. This “impressive feat” was meant to show how “legit” the exchange was. One story involved Bobby Lee, then the CEO of BTC China, telling potential investors in the U.S. that BTC China had filed the paperwork with DFS. But what was left unsaid was that the application was mostly left blank and may actually have never been sent at all. [↩]
Following the WSJ exposé, ShapeShift implemented identification checks for all trading activity. [↩]
Note: I did say something similar to that on stage at the American Banker event. It was a panel that included Barry Silbert, who coincidentally was helping ShapeShift fundraise the next round at that time. It was the only panel whose video was not published online because not all of the panelists would give A/V permission to do so. The funding round was announced two months later. [↩]
Payward Inc is d/b/a Kraken. It is registered with FinCEN as a MSB and has licenses in more than 50 territories and states. Strangely, Kraken’s Chief Legal Officer – Marco Santori – recently said Kraken is not a MSB: “Kraken is not a money transmitter. We haven’t sought licenses in the U.S. This is an alternative path to that, speaking purely from the regulatory perspective. The SPDI charter will help us to satisfy those rules as we seek to bring more and more of the payments flow in-house.” Technically speaking, a MTL is a subset of the MSB but unclear what that means in the context of Kraken or Tether Ltd. [↩]
One of Kraken’s vocal investors, Caitlin Long, lobbied on their behalf in Wyoming and helped them gain approval for an SPDI. It will be interesting to see which bank(s) in New York handle the correspondence wiring between the two states. [↩]
Dozens, perhaps a couple hundred, ICOs have registered in Singapore. The accommodative stance from MAS stems in part due to political influence from senior leaders, some of whom are believed to own ICO tokens. [↩]
One reviewer commented: “It is probably too extreme to requires cryptocurrency exchanges and stablecoin issuers to become licensed banks. I think exchanges and stablecoin issuers that don’t deal with retail investors should be allowed to do what they like on the understanding that if they get into trouble, they will have no help whatsoever from the Fed Reserve or the U.S. government. But exchanges and stablecoin issuers that take retail deposits must be licensed and subject to banking regulation, and there may also need to be legislation to enforce structural separation of retail deposit-taking from crypto trading – something like a modern Glass-Steagall Act.” [↩]
Technically speaking Visa is a card association that provides products to intermediaries, including access to VisaNet. Visa directly competes with China UnionPay and Mastercard. They operate tangentially to Square or Stripe who operate payment gateways on behalf of merchants. In his debate hosted by The Block, Jeremy Allaire conflated USDC issuance with activity on PayPal and Venmo. This is apples-to-oranges because USDC issuance and redemption happens at the very edge. And unlike PayPal and Venmo (who can continuously surveil internal accounts), USDC via Centre cannot on Ethereum. In fact, PayPal will not allow cryptocurrency-related transfers because the organization would be unable to comply with the “Travel Rule” or other FinCEN reporting requirements which by definition would mean USDC operates under a less strict framework relative to commercial banks. Note: other brokers such as Robinhood, Sofi, and Webull also do not allow users to transfer coins. [↩]
There is some irony in how proof-of-work (P-o-W) chains have evolved. Initially P-o-W was used because Satoshi wanted to make Sybil attacks expensive in an adversarial environment with unknown participants including governments. Over time, as the dependency on U.S. and E.U. banks has grown, many promoters are now stating that governments better not (properly) regulate commercial bank backed-tokens despite some of these same promoters linking their KYC’ed wallets to other intermediaries. In theory, anarchic chains maneuver around The Man, by decentralizing and pseudonymizing the set of parties responsible for processing transactions. But in practice, most activity — more than 80% — still takes place between trusted intermediaries. [↩]
From a systemic standpoint holding specific parties (issuers) responsible for activities they permitted (or were involved in) is a positive development. Why? Because, like banks or even payment processors, stablecoin issuers would have to monitor malignant behavior more closely than it does today. [↩]
For perspective, at the state level there are MSB and/or MTO licenses that the entity such as a cryptocurrency exchange has to apply for. A couple of states don’t license this activity, hence why a few large cryptocurrency exchanges have 47 or 48 licenses. At the federal level the entity also registers with FinCEN (and then complies with the BSA). [↩]
I wrote the most widely cited paper on “permissioned chains,” the creation of which was spurred by the inability of P-o-W chains to provide settlement finality or meet other requirements of the PFMIs. [↩]
Bears mentioning that if any anarchic chain has to rely on exogenous legal or financial support then it is not sovereign or anarchic. For example, each day somewhere there are multiplecourts around the world in which aggrieved parties sue one another because of activities involving cryptocurrencies. While some of the outcomes remain as judicial precedent, others could become codified as statutes by legislatures. In either case, the disputes are not being handled on-chain. This off-chain dispute handling is another example of the “parasitic” reliance that anarchic chains continue to have on exogenous legal systems. [↩]
For example, Coin Center published an article scaremongering readers into thinking the STABLE Act would – among other allegations – criminalize node operators. Vocal maximalists did the same thing. Not only are these claims unfounded but neither of these groups are focused on consumer or taxpayer protections. Commercial entities involved in money transmission, payment services, and/or using financial market infrastructure have to comply with a sundry of requirements in each jurisdiction they operate in. Irrespective of how mining nodes or non-mining nodes are categorized in the U.S. (or elsewhere), a “sufficiently decentralized” network should be resilient in an adversarial environment, including one with State-sponsored law enforcement snooping around. No one but faux “crypto lawyers” are talking about outlawing anonymous ledgers or chains. In other words, non-neutral critics are dwelling on remote edge cases that are outside the Overton Window. No law enforcement is going to go door to door searching for a Raspberry Pi node. [↩]
One reviewer explained: “At both the state and federal level, governmental bodies in the U.S. have done a lot of heavy lifting and diligence to understand the cryptoasset and blockchain space. They have given it space to grow and develop, much more so than other innovations like drone deliveries which are just now being approved. For instance, the SEC created FinHub in 2018 which has its own permanent office; and in 2020 the SEC released a safe harbor proposal for special purpose broker dealers for custody of digital assets. If U.S. regulators wanted to kill the cryptoasset space, they could always go to the extent of cutting the cables, and destroying the servers, or using physical force and throwing everyone involved in jail, but what they have done was the opposite. It may have taken a couple of years to build capabilities and get it right, but they have devoted real resources and staff to make sure they understand what cryptoassets and blockchains are.” [↩]
According to a recent article from Politico, the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence is one of the few areas at Treasury under Secretary Mnuchin that has seen a resource bump. This trend could continue under the Biden administration as the recently passed NDAA included provisions (Section 6102) to enhance FinCEN’s capabilities and widen the definition of what a financial institution and money service transmitter are to broadly include other entities such as all virtual asset service providers (VASPs). [↩]
A savvy prosecutor could probably make an easier case for why a mining pool / block maker is legally liable for say, knowingly processing ransomware payments because they are the “issuers” of coins. Whereas it may be harder to build a case against a vanilla non-mining node operator who merely performs non-administrative tasks. [↩]
Run-of-the-mill “validating” nodes are not equivalent to actual miners who process transactions and build blocks. Without re-earthing the multitudinal debates around UASF / SegWit2x circa 2016-2017, mining pools are objectively in a different league. Non-mining nodes are often (but not always) overstated in importance on anarchic chains. With Deadcoins.com as evidence, proof-of-work chains live and die by miner participation. [↩]
Of the ten pools, the sole exception was Bitfury, who uses its political connections in the Republic of Georgia to receive taxpayer subsidies for its massive mining operations. About 10% of the energy production in the Republic goes towards powering Bitfury’s mining rigs. [↩]
This is not an idle thought experiment. In 2016, fraudulent wiring instructions from a compromised SWIFT account of the Central Bank of Bangladesh resulted in multi-year, multi-national investigation. Whereas the hackers attempted to transfer $1 billion to the Philippines, because of the financial controls and fraud detection framework at the New York Federal Reserve (which clears these types of transactions), only 10% of the total funds were transferred and of the stolen funds about 15% has been recovered. In contrast, throughout 2020, the hacker(s) in control of the stolen Bitfinex coins continued to peel off portions of the heist into unknown wallets. The restitution to the Bitfinex victims is itself worth looking at, as it involved the exchange self-issuing two different IOUs (BFX and RRT). Further Balkanization via more tokens by intermediaries is not the answer to hacking, oversight and accountability are. [↩]
One reviewer commented: “In theory, all prudential regulations should be proportional to the risks. In addition to payment versus lending, most stablecoins are likely too small to be categorized as “systemic.” This is not an argument to not regulate them, it is one to phase in levels of regulation on stablecoins based on design and scale. Nobody wants to hear this, but here ETFs are probably a better parallel than banks. Maybe a way out is opening access to Central Bank accounts to stablecoin issuers (not individuals directly) and regulating other types of stablecoins as securities.” [↩]
In the Ethereum world there is clear separation between a reference design (Yellow Paper) and client implementation. In practice, there are multiple independent teams working on different client implementations written in different coding languages. In the event one team disappears or one implementation has a bug and crashes, the network can continue to work. Pluralism creates resiliency. In contrast Bitcoin is developed in the opposite manner: the Bitcoin Core implementation used by block makers is also the reference design. Confusingly, a group called “Bitcoin Core” acts as a gatekeeper to the Bitcoin Improvement Proposal (BIPs) and have used their position to lobby exchanges and miners to prevent or stifle certain alternative client implementations and/or BIPs from being adopted (such as SegWit2x). See: Who are the administrators of blockchains? [↩]
More than a couple of people have asked for an update to a popular post published 14 months ago.
What has changed?
Before we begin, a quick reminder: the basic security model behind proof-of-work (PoW) blockchains is to make it economically costly to successfully rewrite the chain’s history. Finite resources, whether it is in the form of electricity or semiconductors, have to be consumed.
Therefore, a PoW chain such as Bitcoin, cannot simultaneously be secure and inexpensive to operate. Because if it was inexpensive to operate it would also be inexpensive to successfully attack.
For Bitcoin, Bitmain announced its S17e system which can churn out 64TH/s. Each machine consumes ~2880 watts at the wall. The first of these units are scheduled to be shipped to customers in November (however other less powerful variants shipped during the summer).
The current Bitcoin hashrate has been oscillating around 100 million TH/s the past few weeks.
If the entire network was comprised of the unreleased S17e-based machines, there would be around 1.56 million of them. In a given year these would gulp down about 39.4 billion kWh. But we know that is not the case yet. Thus, this will serve as our lower bound.
Bitmain is also shipping several other newly released systems, including the T17e. Like its cousin above, the T17e also consumes about ~2880 at the wall. But it is not as efficient per hash: creating only 53 TH/s with the same amount of electricity.
Why manufacture and sell two (or more) different machines that draw roughly the same amount of power?
Cost. the T17e costs $1665 and the S17e is $2483. The target market for the T17e is supposedly for miners who have low or no electricity costs.
How many T17e’s would it take to generate the 100 million TH/s network hashrate? About 1.88 million; or an additional 300,000 more machines than the S17e.
A quick pause. these types of bulk purchases are not idle speculation. In the middle of last summer, during a two-week period of time, the equivalent of 100,000 mining machines was added to the Bitcoin network (likely early variants of the S17). This is a reversal from last November, wherein the equivalent of ~1.3 million S9s were taken offline during one month.
Again, we know that in practice that there are many more less efficient miners still online. But crunching the numbers, 1.88 million machines each pulling in 2.88 kWh over one entire year results in… ~47.6 billion kWh annually.
Another Bitmain machine purchasable today is the new T17 that generates 40 TH/s, drawing about 2200 watts at the wall. It would take about 2.5 million of these to generate the Bitcoin hashrate all while consuming… ~48.2 billion kWh per year.
To be thorough, Bitmain released the S9 SE in July which generates 16 TH/s, drawing 1280 watts. It’s unclear how many of these have been sold but if the entire network was comprised of these: 6.25 million would need to be used. And they would collectively guzzle ~70 billion kWh. This would be a plausible upper bound.
For comparison, if Bitcoin (T17) were its own country it would at minimum consume roughly the same amount of electricity as Romania or Algeria. If the network were comprised of just S9 SE’s, that’d be about the energy footprint of Austria. In either case, very little is value is produced in return… aside from memes and lots of social media posts. And no, despite historical revisionism by maximalists, “hodling” is not what Bitcoin was originally designed for.
As mentioned in the previous post: no other payment system on earth uses the same amount of electricity, let alone aggregate number of machines, as a PoW coin network. That is a dubious distinction.
In looking at my previous post you will see a similar figure. In August 2018, using the (older) S9 machine (~13 TH/s) as a baseline, the Bitcoin network consumed about ~50.5 billion kWh / year.1 Some of these types of machines (like the S9 SE) are still on.
Thus whenever you hear a PoW promoter claim that:
Bitcoin doesn’t use much electricity; or
Bitcoin’s electricity usage will naturally decline over time; or
Bitcoin is more efficient than traditional payment systems
You can rightly tell them all of those claims are empirically false. In fact, the only way for the resource demands of a PoW coin to decline is if there was a long decline in the coin price.
What do taxpayers – who underwrite the state-owned utility companies – get in return for subsidizing these energy guzzlers? New economic zones of growth and prosperity?
Nope. According to Chainalysis, in a given day more than 90% of activity on the Bitcoin network is simply movement from one intermediary to another. 2 Coin trading is by far the largest category.
And since most of these coin intermediaries increasingly require some form of KYC / AML compliance, the Bitcoin network has morphed into a expensive permissioned-on-permissionless network that has the drawbacks of both and the benefits of neither. There is no point in using PoW in a network in which all major participants are known: Sybils no longer exist.
A common refrain by PoW promoters is, Christmas lights and set-top boxes also consume huge amounts of energy!
First of all, that’s a whataboutism. But it also ignores how several Bitcoin mining manufacturers have actually tried to embed chips into these wares.
Bitmain has a couple of routers called the Antrouter that will mine either BTC or LTC for you.
As you can imagine, a fixed unit of labor eventually becomes unprofitable once difficulty levels increase. It’s the same fundamental problem that faced the 21.co toasters. Thus neither of these took off (the light bulb didn’t ship) even though retail users often keep both their home routers and living room lights on all day. Historically PoW equipment becomes e-waste fast and the last thing consumers want is embedded e-waste that guzzles electricity.3
We haven’t even touched on other PoW coins such as Ethereum, Bitcoin Cash, or Monero… but it is worth pointing out that nearly all of the money going to miners via the block reward is value leaking from the system, either to semiconductor manufacturers or state-owned utilities.
This isn’t idle speculation either, as Nvidia counted on massive consumption of its GPUs in early 2018 which didn’t materialize due to the crash in coin prices. This led to a glut of high-end GPUs in its channel partners, which hit Nvidia’s bottom line and was later reflected by a 50% decline in share prices (the same phenomenon impacted AMD too):
Apart from a couple of small investments, the value that a couple of semiconductor manufacturers or a clique of state-owned utilities receives via mining is money that is not being invested towards developing the chain itself.
And some of these mining manufacturers have privatized gains at the expense of taxpayers. For instance, Bitfury, used its political connections to obtain cheap land in the Republic of Georgia where it setup massive mining farms:
“The efforts have given Georgia, with 3.7 million people, a dubious distinction. It is now an energy guzzler, with nearly 10 percent of its energy output gone into the currency endeavor.”
In Kyrgyzstan, 45 “crypto” mining firms consumed more energy than three local regions combined:
“[They] consumed 136 megawatts of electricity, which is more than the amount consumed by three Kyrgyzstan regions: Issyk-Kul, Talas and Naryn.”
Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Energy has introduced a new bill that would dramatically increase the electricity price to miners who are viewed as being “very energy intensive.”
We could probably create an entire post on these types of stories too.
At least Bitcoin is “decentralized,” right?
While the farms may be geographically dispersed to areas with the cheapest electricity, the mining pools, mining manufacturers, and other infrastructure participants are a small and centralized enough group that they can fit into a hotel for regular conferences.
Unlike Bitcoin, Bitcoin Cash has seen a dramatic decline in hashrate since it peaked at over 5 million TH/s earlier in the summer. It is now oscillating around 2.5 million TH/s.
For Bitcoin Cash, with a Bitmain S17e system, remember it generates 64TH/s and consumes ~2880 watts at the wall. If the entire network was comprised of the unreleased S17e-based machines, there would be around 40,000 of them. In a given year these would use about 985 million kWh. This will serve as our lower bound.
Bitmain’s S9 SE generates 16 TH/s, drawing 1280 watts. It’s unclear how many of these have been sold but if the entire network was comprised of these: ~156,000 would need to be used. And they would collectively use ~1.75 billion kWh. This would be a plausible upper bound.
Not counting e-waste, that would put the energy usage of Bitcoin Cash somewhere around 150, betweenBenin and The Bahamas. Compared with last year (when it was around 122), this decline is largely due to the nearly 60% price decline in BCH. This once again illustrates that hashrate follows price (e.g., miners expend capital chasing seigniorage).
Coupled with “the thirdening” in February (in which block rewards declined from 3 to 2 ETH), and an overall decline in ETH prices, hashrate also declined over the past year:
According to Coinwarz, the hashrate is oscillating around 200 TH/s, about 1/3 it was when the previous article was written.
A proposed ASIC from Linzhi that hasn’t been built or shipped aims to generate 1400 MH/s with an electricity consumption level of 1 kWh. As the story goes:
To put those figures in perspective, NVIDIA’s GTX TitanV 8 card is now one of the most profitable piece of equipment on the ethash algorithm, able to compute 656 MH/s at an energy consumption level of 2.1 kWh, according to mining pool f2pool’s miner profitability index.
There are a couple of other ASICs on the market including one from Innosilicon and another from Bitmain. The previous post looked at the same Innosilicon A10 on the market, so to simplify things and because the Bitmain machine is roughly just as efficient, let’s reuse it here.
The A10 generates 485 MH/s and consumes ~850 W. The Ethereum network is around 200,000,000 MH/s. That’s the equivalent of 412,371 A10 machines.
Annually these would consume about 3.1 billion kWh per year. Around 132, about as much as Senegal or Papua New Guinea.
If we used the GTX TitanV 8 card, as described in the article above, we find that 304,878 GPUs would be used. These would consume 5.6 billion kWh per year. That’d be around the same amount that Mongolia does annually.
This is one of the reasons why Ethereum is transitioning over to proof-of-stake. As Vitalik Buterin said last year:
I would personally feel very unhappy if my main contribution to the world was adding Cyprus’s worth of electricity consumption to global warming.
Will the nebulously defined “DeFi” on an actual proof-of-stake system change the usage dynamics in the future?4
Litecoin, better known as Bitcoin’s other testnet, has seen its hashrate decline along with its price.
For simplicity sake, let’s call it an even 300 TH/s which coincidentally it was at 14 months ago too. CoinWarz says it is also currently around that, who are we to argue with them?
As mentioned in the previous article, Bitmain’s L3+ is still around. It generates ~500 MH/s with ~800 watts. A slightly more powerful L3++ is on the market as well.
There are the equivalent of about 600,000 L3+ machines generating hashes.
As an aggregate:
A single L3+ will consume 19.2 kWh per day
600,000 will consume 11.5 million kWh per day
Annually: 4.2 billion kWh per year
It would be placed around 124th, between Moldova and Cambodia.
According a distributor, the Antminer L3++ specifications:
Hash Rate: 580 MH/s ±5%
Power Consumption: 942W + 10% (at the wall, with APW3 ,93% efficiency, 25C ambient temp)
If only L3++’s were used, the outcome would be about the same. 5
This consumption is pretty absurd once we factor in things like how there is only a couple of active developers who basically just merge changes from Bitcoin into Litecoin.6 In other words, one of the largest PoW networks has very few users or developers, yet consumes the same amount of energy as Moldolva. How is that a socially useful innovation?
Note: an easy way to double-check our math on this specific one: the price of LTC is nearly the same today as it was 14 months ago. Ceteris paribus, miners will expend capital no higher than the coin price, to ‘win’ the seigniorage.
In terms of mining, it appears that several decisions makers (administrators?) in the Monero world really dislike ASICs. So much so that they routinely coordinate forks that include “ASIC-resistant” hashing algorithms. Stories like this are mostly just PR because we know that any PoW coin with a high enough value, will eventually become the target of an ASIC design team.7
From the chart above, you can clearly see when the forks occurred that added “ASIC-resistance.”
Compared with the previous article, the hashrate has declined by about 1/3rd to about 325 MH/s. And it is believed that most of this hashrate is generated by GPUs and CPUs.
There are lots of how-toguides for building a Monero mining rig. Rather than getting into the weeds, based on this crazy 12-card Vega build, the user was able to generate 28,100 hashes/sec and consume 1920 watts. That’s about 2341 hashes per card (more than 10% faster than the one used in the previous article).
That’s about 138,829 GPUs each sipping 160 watts. Altogether these consume 194 million kWh annually. That’s likely a lower bound for GPU mining.
If we reused the Vega 64 mentioned in the previous article, there would be about 162,500 GPUs at the current hashrate. These would consume around 228 million kWh annually.
Not surprisingly, coupled with the “ASIC-resistant” fork and a coin price decline of nearly 50%, this resulted in about 1/3 energy used from the previous year. But this is still not an upper bound because it is likely that CPUs contribute to a non-insignificant portion of the hashrate via persistent botnets and cryptojacking.
Based on the same electricity consumption chart as the others, Monero would be placed somewhere above Grenada and the Mariana Islands. Perhaps a bit higher if lots of CPUs are used. Remember, this is called CPU-cycle theft for a reason.8
In aggregate, based on the numbers above, these five PoW coins likely consume between 56.7 billion kWh and 81.8 billion kWh annually. That’s somewhere around Switzerland on the low end to Finland or Pakistan near the upper end. It is likely much closer to the upper bound because the calculations above all assumed little energy loss ‘at the wall’ when in fact there is often 10% or more energy loss depending on the setup.
This is a little lower than last year, where we used a similar method and found that these PoW networks may consume as much resources as The Netherlands. Why the decline? All of it is due to the large decline in coin prices over the preceding time period. Again, miners will consume resources up to the value of a block reward wherein the marginal cost to mine equals the marginal value of the coin (MC=MV).9
This did not include other PoW coins such as Dash, Ethereum Classic, or Bitcoin SV… although it is likely that based on their current coin value they each probably consume less than either Litecoin or Bitcoin Cash.
Thus to answer the original question at the beginning, the answer is no.
PoW networks still consume massive amounts of electricity and semiconductors that could otherwise have been used in other endeavors. Some of these power plants could be shut down entirely. PoW-based cryptocurrencies crowd out and bid up the prices of semiconductor components.10 Apart from a few stories designed to pull on our heartstrings, little evidence exists (yet) for PoW coins creating socially useful economic output beyond moving coins from one intermediary to another.
And because most coins are mined via single-use ASICs, they generate large amounts of e-waste which leaks value from towards a small clique of semiconductor manufacturers and (mostly) state-owned utilities, neither of whom typically contribute back to the coin ecosystem.11 Will this change in the next 14 months?
I – and many others – have written about this before. PoW mining is a Red Queen’s race — miners are incentivized via block rewards to expend additional capital on mining, but the total reward available to miners is fixed. Thus while chip efficiency may increase each generation, miners as a whole increase capital outlays for equipment rather than reduce. [↩]
According to The Token Analyst, nearly 7% of all mined bitcoins reside in exchanges. [↩]
Another way some have used to describe Bitcoin is an ASIC-based proof-of-stake. But really it is DPOS but not with the “D” that you may be thinking. Since mining equipment rapidly depreciates (with a typical lifespan of less than 18 months), Bitcoin arguably uses depreciating proof-of-stake. [↩]
According to both DappRadar and State of the Dapps, there has been about a marketed increase in “users” and Dapps (although they combine all Dapp platforms, not just Ethereum). [↩]
Although obviously, as in all examples above, there are loses in efficiency as the energy travels from the power plant all the way through the grid and into a home or office. [↩]
If there is only one actual developer maintaining the Litecoin codebase, how is this ‘sufficiently decentralized’ or not an administrator under FinCEN’s definition? Even the “official” foundation is basically out of funds. [↩]
Wouldn’t it be interesting if a few botnet operators or sites like The Pirate Bay were moonlighting as Monero developers, so they could directly benefit from CPU mining? [↩]
Outright theft continually takes place. For instance, a Singaporean allegedly stole $5 million worth of computing power to mine bitcoin and ether, and “for a brief period, was one of Amazon Web Services (AWS) largest consumers of data usage by volume.” [↩]