I was recently talking with a friend who spent the past decade in an operations role at a large enterprise in the telecommunication sector. He has a matter-of-fact personality that likes to cut through the smoke and mirrors to find the fire.
I explained to him my role of having to filter through the dozens of entities that my market research team at R3 speaks with each month. And the formal process that our small team uses to look and find organizations that would be a good fit for R3’s Lab project pipeline.
For instance, because we typically act as the first part of the funnel for our organization, we end up listening to a great deal of startup pitches. And we are continually bombarded by endless “blockchain” and DLT noise. The first year alone we looked at and spoke to more than 300 entities, a number that has now reached about 400.
This is not to say that there are only 400 companies/vendors/organizations/projects billing themselves as “blockchain” related entities… unfortunately that nebulous term has ballooned to encompass everything from cryptocurrencies to big data to IoT and now probably numbers in the thousands.
If you’re working in capital markets, how to tell the pretenders from the real deal?
Should you seek advice from people who never interface with enterprises or institutions and get all their wisdom from social media? Or listen to columnists whose only interaction with banks is the ATM or a cryptocurrency meetup? Or to media outlets that do not disclose their (coin) holdings? Before answering these, let’s look at a new phrase below.
Thirteen months ago I gave a short presentation talking about the “blockchain” hype cycle.
The month before that – in December 2015 – I mentioned how much of the enthusiasm surrounding “blockchains” seemed a bit similar to the exuberance around “gluten free” food: how most people at fintech conferences talking about “blockchains” really couldn’t explain why blockchains were great in much the same way that many people asking for “gluten-free” food couldn’t tell you why gluten is or is not good for you.
I explained this to my friend and he said that the euphoria surrounding blockchains – and its vertical rise on the Gartner hype cycle – is similar to what he observed and experienced in “the cloud” space earlier this decade. And more specifically, to the phenomenon called “cloudwashing”:
Cloud washing (also spelled cloudwashing) is the purposeful and sometimes deceptive attempt by a vendor to rebrand an old product or service by associating the buzzword “cloud” with it. (Source)
So with that, I’d like to coin a new phrase: “chainwashing.”
I have personally seen dozens of decks from vendors along the entire spectrum of sizes during the current hype cycle. And watched the evolution of “blockchain creep” — how over time the word “blockchain” would appear more frequently not just on each slide, but in scope and vertical.
For instance, there are couple dozen different startups that claim to have somehow built an enterprise-grade blockchain system without having to go through the arduous process of gathering the functional and non-functional requirements from the enterprises they intended to integrate with. Magic!
While startup founders should shoulder the blame for these marketing gimmicks – as should the reporters that often own but do not disclose their (coin) holdings – investors are also to blame for not just talking their book, but also obfuscating their portfolio companies by pressuring them to rebrand retail-focused cryptocurrency products as bonafide “enterprise blockchain” platforms. They are not the same thing.
So what are some evaluation criteria to help identity the signal from the noise?
If your job is to help filter vendors for financial institutions, governments, investment funds, or other large enterprises, then some of these questions may be helpful in determining whether or not your firm should engage with the vendor:
Why is the vendor using a blockchain?
What is the vendor’s definition of a blockchain?
Who has a problem that needs a blockchain in order to solve it: the vendor or the vendor’s customer?
What is it about a blockchain that solves a problem that couldn’t be solved with existing technoloogy?
If a blockchain-related infrastructure provides a solution to for the vendor, can it use any other existing technology to solve its needs?
Do the founders and management team have experience managing, building, and/or deploying enterprise-grade systems or critical infrastructure?
Does the vendor as a whole have the appropriate contacts and connections with institutions and regulators?
Does the vendor have enough run way to build through a long sales cycle?
By asking these types of questions our team has helped filter the 400 or so companies/projects into a much more manageable dozen.
We think the number of companies with legs will continue to increase over time but chainwashing will continue to be a noise pollution problem for the next few years in the enterprise world even after production systems have been integrated into institutions.
As a consequence, it is probably safe to assume vendors are trying to pull a fast one on you, especially if it involves needing your company to acquire a cryptocurrency or “permissioning off” an existing cryptocurrency.
Remember: cryptocurrencies in the vein of Bitcoin were intentionally not designed to integrate with and fulfill the requirements of regulated institutions (like settlement finality) any more than a helicopter was designed to handle long distance cargo hauling. Chainwashing is the opposite of being fit-for-purpose and we see it with marketing gimmicks like “Layer 2,” the topic of the next post.
Presenting at Bitcoin / Ethereum Meetup in Hong Kong
I ended up traveling a lot more than I expected last year, including 9 times just to East Asia. The level of interest in that region will probably increase this year — especially as more projects and companies are funded — though I probably won’t do the Trans-Pacific shuffle nine times again this year.
As of right now there are probably just a small handful of startups in APAC that have the capital, connections, and capability to execute and build the commercial products and applications that are discussed at the plethora of fintech events. And almost none of them have anything to do with a cryptocurrency itself either… because cryptocurrencies weren’t designed to solve most problems financial service organizations have.
Below are the interviews, events, and presentations I participated in the last few months of 2016.
Earlier today, with some help from the R3 research team (thanks for the grammar fixes!), I shipped a new paper to the consortium members. This paper discusses several issues and challenges facing a Bitcoin-based ETF that was originally proposed a couple years ago by the Winklevoss twins (commonly called the COIN ETF). It specifically looks at questions publicly raised by the SEC.
It bears mentioning that R3 itself is not in any shape or fashion involved with this ETF or in using the Bitcoin network. This (tangential) paper solely represents my views and not those of my employer or companies I advise. I worked on it in my spare time.
R3 typically makes research papers available 3-6 months after sending it to members, so check back here later next spring or summer to see if it has been posted.
Update 09/2017: many months later an egg tweeted that it has been posted online at Scribd and Docdroid (pdf)
[Note: The views expressed below are solely my own and do not necessarily represent the views of my employer or any organization I advise]
Why open/permissionless and closed/permissioned terminology has become a muddled red herring of totems
It is common to see startups, enthusiasts, and advocacy groups boast how they support “open,” “public,” and “permissionless” innovation. Their lollipops and rainbows narrative can be found on a multitude of websites, social media accounts, and on panels at conferences.
Similarly several well-to-do consultancies and buttoned-up fintech companies use stoic marketing terms like “permissioned,” “trusted,” and “private” to describe their platforms to what are assumedly monocle-wearing, high-brow clientele.
But very little long-form has been spent explaining what these actually mean beyond superficial warm feelings either side is trying to engender.
Both are at fault for taking a page from the politically charged play book of terms like “pro-choice” and “pro-life” — I mean who wants to be labeled as anti-choice or anti-life? Or in this case, who would want to be known as anti-open and anti-permissionless? Or as John Oliver might say, who wants to hang out in intranet sandboxes all day when there is a big fat thing called “The Internet” you can troll on all day instead?
Aside from the fact that “The Internet” is just a bunch of highly regulated, permissioned intranets tied together with KYC and peering agreements, let’s de-escalate and take a quick step back for a moment to focus on two diametrically polar opposites: anarchic and archic networks.1
Why? Because that’s ultimately what these two camps are fighting a war of words and hashtagged rhetoric about.
There are some general commonalities between anarchic and archic chains but before getting there, what does anarchic mean in this context?
An anarchic network — in this case an anarchic blockchain — simply means a chain that purposefully lacks any ties to legal institutions and nation-state infrastructure. That is to say, the architects of an anarchic chain set out to create an extralegal virtual-only entity that is divorced from governments and regulators; entities that could censor data transfers and on-chain activities. Currently, anarchic chains are euphemistically called “public blockchains” to have better marketing varnish at cocktail parties in DC.
There have been multiple attempts to build anarchic-types of networks in the past (such as Tor); perhaps the most popularly known anarchic blockchains in use are Bitcoin and Ethereum.
Anarchic can also mean that a chain, or a network layer, has no formal or de jure governance process for handling disputes. In this case, both Bitcoin and Ethereum (among others) are double-fisting anarchy.
I am a millennial, is there another way of saying all of this in less than 140 characters?
Not that there is an official marketing slogan but:
Bitcoin is supposed to be an unstoppable payment processor (title and abstract of the whitepaper)
Ethereum is supposed to be an unstoppable computer that can run and execute untrusted code (motto from Foundation’s website)
In contrast, as can be expected from its name, archic chains and networks explicitly tie into traditional legal infrastructure, into the ‘old world’ laws of physical nation-states. In addition, many archic chain creators attempt to bake-in and enable on-chain dispute mechanisms and methods for handling disputes off-chain in the event there is a problem.2
Boring laws and wet oppressive code, right?
But wait, there’s more.
I think my favorite tweet last year was along the lines of: sometimes my browser crashes, occasionally I have to restart my phone, but gosh darnit my self-driving car will always work without a hitch!
And that naïve thinking pervades a lot of the development teams in the fintech space.
Sure it’d be cool if you can automate all of the value transfer processes globally with cryptographically assured, tamper-evident mechanisms — but in case something screws up or a governance dispute occurs, you have to design for the fact that somewhere Edward Murphy is in your system with Chaos Monkey.3 And so too it will be with magic internet chains. Without explicit governance and dispute-resolution mechanisms we will just revert back to our lowest common denominator: arguing on reddit with memes.4
By their nature these two worlds are polar opposites in terms of network designs, assumptions, and goals.
With that in mind, below are three commonalities that both types of networks have but each of which is handled differently:
(1) Both have permissioning
(2) Both have cryptographic-linked data structures
(3) Both use ‘other peoples computers’
What does each of these mean?
For anarchic networks like Ethereum and Bitcoin, permissioning — that is to say, deciding who gets to change and update the log of records, or in this case digitally sign blocks, is usually handled via proof-of-work.5
Permissioning in this specific case has nothing to do with what kind of applications can be used on it, who can look at the code, who can modify the code, who can send transactions, etc. These are all tangential to the key foundational question of who gets to digitally sign and update the log of history in the first place. After all, the Bitcoin whitepaper wasn’t an exegesis on cloning software libraries and GPL versus MIT licensing maximalism now was it?6) In fact, to-date several vendors have released open-sourced versions of “private” gated chains — so you can have one without the other.7 Nor did KYCing internet access kill innovation on the internet.
While some promoters like to use terms like “dynamic” to describe the log signing / block validation process on the Bitcoin network, in practice there are roughly 15-20 ‘permissioned’ block makers / log signers on the Ethereum and Bitcoin networks at any given time.8
That is to say, the entire “membership pool” of block signers at any day of the week is fairly static. Some come and go over time but in general there is a quasi-static membership pool of block signers; and the operators of these membership pools is generally known and no longer identity-less (pseudonymous). They even sit on stage at public conferences and pose for pictures and… bring photo journalists to their actual data centers.9 There is a joke about the first two rules of Fight Club in there somewhere.
This creates some fundamental problems surrounding the goals of achieving censorship-resistance as well as the goals of routing around regulatory regimes. Recall that neither Bitcoin nor Ethereum were designed to interface with the traditional legal system which compels validators, payment processors, custodians, and financial intermediaries to comply with a bevy of identity management and consumer protection requirements.
In fact, anarchic chains were designed to do just the opposite and instead maintain a network that enables identity-less participants to move data peer-to-peer without complying with a list of external rules and governance processes. As noted above, anarchic chains set out to be their own sovereign entity, a type of virtual nation-state divorced from traditional legal infrastructure altogether.
And to achieve their objective of enabling identity-less participants to transfer data from one to another without having to be vetted by a party capable of censoring the movement of data, the network designers believed they could make their network of validators and block makers — the cloud of machines processing payments and providing digital signatures — decentralized to the extent that the overall network could maintain reliable uptime in the face of network splits as well as malicious activity from governmental and Byzantine actors.
So in summation, anarchic chains:
(1) typically achieve permissioning and log appendation by requiring (originally) identity-less participants to submit proofs-of-work that consume and irreversibly destroy real economic value (e.g., fossil fuels);
(2) the log of history and payments therein is appended via a digital signature controlled by a nominally identity-less, quasi-static participant who is able to propagate the proof-of-work first across the rest of the network;10
(3) this log of history — in both theory and practice — is propagated to other people computers in other countries in order to attempt to achieve uptime in the face of network partitions and adversaries.
In other words, checkmate statists!
So what about that cold, heartless world of closed, walled-off gardens managed by intranet builders and training wheel makers? After all, anarchic chains are supposedly too woolly for regulated institutions like banks and according to random people on social media who talk to other random people on social media about financial infrastructure in 140 characters, banks now have decided to reinvent databases… But With Blockchain™. Because banks — which collectively have built and operate the largest IT infrastructure globally — don’t understand technology and have just rebranded SQL databases to get some easy softball press releases. Right?
It’s hard to talk about archic chains in the same snarky depth as anarchic chains because there are so many different ones under development that are taking different tact’s and approaches to solving who knows what. But challenge accepted.
As Ian Grigg explains, part of the problem entrepreneurs are facing is that “permissionless” can be defined, sort of, but the opposite of permissionless is harder to define. If we accept it means “with a permission” then we could ask, what permission? How many? When, where, who, etc.
Are we talking about permission to enter (walled garden), permission to make any transaction (identified keys not pseudonyms), permission to act (approved by regulator in each instance), permission to put money in, permission to take money out? All of these permissions have regulatory, architectural, societal, and marketing success implications so it isn’t really plausible to talk about a permissioned system as a thing, it’s more an anti-thing.11
With the private/permissioned world of buzzword bingo, a lot of the platforms are ill-conceived forks of cryptocurrencies that weren’t customized at all for capital markets.
Satoshi wasn’t trying to solve for frictions in the post-trade world of clearing and settlement of regulated institutions. And Vitalik didn’t wake up 3 years ago and say, “Holy hell the $65-$80 billion in post-trade reconciliation processes could be significantly reduced tomorrow if I build an unstoppable computer program replicated across thousands of nodes!”12
So simply forking Bitcoin and gutting the PoW mining apparatus to move pre-IPO cap tables around or track airline points cannot really be called “fit for purpose” especially since it seems that you can pretty much do the same exact thing with existing off-the-shelf technology.
What can’t be done with an extant databases?
That’s a good question, and one a lot of reporters miss because they aren’t interviewing IT managers at banks — who cares what some social media app designer or Bitcoin API developer thinks about back-offices at banks, talk to actual core banking architects.
The fundamental reason that regulated financial institutions have all collectively done steeplechase into magic internet chains track & field is this: there is no such thing as an off-the-shelf system that allows them to move value from their own internal ledgers to outside of their organization without having to rely on a cornucopia of 3rd parties. There is no such thing as a global shared ledger standard designed around their operating requirements. For instance, the aggregate reconciliation process and back-office operations that exist today doesn’t make sense to those used to Gmail swiftness or HFT speeds as seen in the front-office activities of trade.
Banks (and other institutions) are looking for novel, secure solutions to reduce certain legacy costs and have been looking at an army of different technology vendors for years to do so. But as I have pointed out before, there is no such thing as a fit-for-purpose distributed ledger that can provide the type of back-office utility (yet).13
What does that mean?
Fit-for-purpose means that some team of geeks sat down with other teams of geeks at banks to talk about super unsexy things for months and years on end to solve specific issues based on a set of explicit functional and non-functional requirements at said bank.
If your team didn’t do that massively boring requirements gathering process then you’re gonna have a really bad time going to market.
If you simply just start building a blockchain app for blockchain app sake, you will likely end up like BitPay or ChangeTip. At least with anarchic chain architects themselves, to their credit, are often attempting to solve for a specific problem-set: how to enable censorship-resistant activities in the face of censorable mandates.
On the other hand: if Bitcoin or Ethereum could do the zillions of things that Bitcoin or Ethereum proponents claim it can do, then of course everyone might use it. It doesn’t, so unsurprisingly many companies and institutions don’t. And before getting all high and mighty about “not giving little poor Bitcoin a chance” — financial institutions globally have done over 200 PoCs on forks of cryptocurrencies or even cryptocurrency networks themselves. They discarded nearly all of them because — spoiler alert — anarchic chains were not built for the requirements that regulated banks have.
Archic chains are not a panacea to everything and they are certainly not the most exciting thing since the invention of the Internet: OxiClean was, and you could only originally get it by calling a 1-800 number.14
The tldr for archic chains is that they:
(1) typically achieve permissioning and log appendation by gating and white-listing the operators of the validation process; this usually involves drawing up a legal contract and service-level agreement specifying the terms of services, quality of service, and how disputes are handled. Because validators are known and legally accountable, proof-of-work is unneeded and marginal costs actually remain marginal (as opposed to MC=MV relationship in PoW networks)15
(2) the log of history and payments therein, is appended via a digital signature controlled by a known, identifiable potentially-static participant who is can propagate the transaction and block to the rest of the participants whom are permitted to interact with the transaction
(3) this log of history — in both theory and practice — is propagated to ‘other people computers.’ In the archic case, it may be a regulated cloud facility (e.g., sovereign cloud) that complies with all of the regulated data requirements of a specific jurisdiction. (This may sound like an unimportant area of interest, be sure to look at this presentation.)
Or in short, with archic chains: validation and block signing is handled by known, identifiable parties whom have the appropriate licenses to handle regulated data in the jurisdictions they operate in.
Because of laws like the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), replication of regulated data to everyone everywhere ends up in Bad News Bears territory pretty quickly.
I purposefully tried not to use the word “immutability” because the term has been bludgeoned by totem warriors on all sides this past year. It’s to the point where some cryptocurrency advocates sound like Luddites because they do not acknowledge that immutability is simply achieved by running data through a hashing algorithm, that’s it. It’s one-way and irreversible and has nothing to do with proof-of-work. All PoW effectively does is delegate who can append a log in an untrusted network.
As a matter of fact, there is oodles of immutable data that predates cryptocurrency networks like Bitcoin, housed on a sundry of databases worldwide. And on the other hand, you have consultancies wearing out the word “immutability” as if it about to go out of fashion and they get a year-end bonus for saying it three-times fast.
We are nearing the end of year two of the grand totem wars, of the nonsensical permissioned versus permissionless wannabe debate. There is no versus. Fundamentally Sams’ Law is empirically valid: anything that needs censorship-resistance will gravitate towards censorship-resistant systems and anything that does not will gravitate towards systems that can be censored.16
There are ironclad trade-offs: a network cannot simultaneously be censorship-resistant and tied into legal infrastructure. A chain cannot be both anarchic and archic. One set of utilities has to have a priority over the other (e.g., definitive settlement finality versus probabilistic finality) otherwise it all begins to look like the chimera that is the permissioned-on-permissionless ecosystem.17
As a consequence, anarchic chains continue to act as testnets for archic chains. That is to say, both the Bitcoin and Ethereum ecosystems are effectively providing free R&D to network designers who will learn from the mistakes and incorporate the relevant solutions into their own future systems. After all, why use an anarchic chain in which governance is handled by anonymous eggs on Twitter and (ironically) censorship-happy moderators on reddit? Perhaps things will change and the great expectations promised by anarchic chains will come to fruition. In fact, if Boltzmann brains can exist then that is always in the realm of possibilities.
In the meantime, it’s worth reflecting on what Dave Birch recently pointed out: there is no such thing as a cloud, just other people’s computers.18 And each jurisdiction regulates the activities of what can and cannot be processed and serviced on certain machines. Perhaps those laws will change, but they might not. It will be worth checking in on the Emochain and Statistchain caricatures in the coming months: maybe the State will wither and die like Zerohedge has predicted 7,934 times in the past. Or maybe Panoptichain will be built instead. Or both simultaneously as the consultants behind Schrödingerchain would have you believe.
It’s actually not necessarily the first — as blocks can become orphaned — but rather which block ends up being built on by other block makers [↩]
“So maybe the debate is over comparing an apple to a citrus fruit – mandarins, tangerines, grapefruits, lemons etc, and everyone is assuming their particular flavour.” Many thanks to Ian Grigg for this passage. [↩]
Consequently I am somewhat puzzled by news stories that still refer to a “blockchain” as “Bitcoin technology.” After all, we don’t refer to combustion engines in cars as “horse-powered technology” or an airplane turbine engine as “bird-powered technology.”
A more accurate phrase would be to say something like, “a blockchain is a type of data structure popularized by cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Ethereum.” After all, chronologically someone prior to Satoshi could have assembled the pieces of a blockchain into a blockchain and used it for different purposes than censorship-resistant e-cash. In fact, both Guardtime and Z/Yen Group claim to have done so pre-2008, and neither involves ‘proof-of-work.’
Fun fact: Corda is not a blockchain, but is instead a distributed ledger.
Note: all of the references and citations can be found within the notes section of the slides. Also, I first used the term “anarchic chain” back in April 2015 based on a series of conversations with Robert Sams. See p. 27.
Special thanks to Ian Grigg for his constructive feedback.
[Note: I neither own nor have any trading position on any cryptocurrency. The views expressed below are solely my own and do not necessarily represent the views of my employer or any organization I advise.]
If you’re bored of catching Pokemon and happen to have a lot of butter stored up, now is the time to break out the premium organic popcorn kernels and enjoy Fork Wars: Summer 2016 Edition.
As mentioned in the previous post: last week many miners, exchanges, and developers coordinated a hardfork of Ethereum. At the time there were lots of celebrations for having done something that flew in contrast to the views prominently held by the Bitcoin Core development community: namely that a fast hardfork can’t be done safely on a public blockchain.
Well, it has been done, but there were also some consequences. Some intended and others unintended. The biggest consequence — which was touched on in my last post too — was that there were now parallel universes: Ethereum Core (ETH) and Ethereum Classic (ETC).
What does this mean?
If you owned a coin on pre-hardfork Ethereum, you now own not just the ETH facsimile but also the Classic coin (ETC) too. Two for the price of one!1
This also opens up the very real possibility of replay attacks which was also a possibility when Ethereum moved from Olympic to Frontier.
A replay attack predates cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Ethereum:
[I]s a form of network attack in which a valid data transmission is maliciously or fraudulently repeated or delayed. This is carried out either by the originator or by an adversary who intercepts the data and re-transmits it, possibly as part of a masquerade attack by IP packet substitution.
In this case, it is the retransmission of a transaction (not IP packet). Or in the Ethereum world, a replay attack would be to take a transaction from one Ethereum fork and maliciously or fraudulently repeating it on another Ethereum fork.
At first most of the Ethereum community assumed that Classic would effectively become deprecated and fade away into history much like Olympic. After all, so went the argument, who would want to use or support a network in which at least one participant owned/controlled roughly ~10% in now “hot” ether?
Sidebar: recall that the main motivating force behind the hardfork was spurred on by the successful attack on The DAO, an investment fund created by Slock.it who did not adequately test the smart contract for security vulnerabilities (among other issues).
Well, it seems that Classic will not go silent into the night, at least not yet.
From a technical integration standpoint, while all of the large exchanges initially supported ETH, one altcoin exchange based in Montana — Poloniex — began supporting both forks.2
Traders — seeing a potential arbitrage opportunity — began doing what they do best: speculating and driving up demand for ETC via posts on social media. As a consequence of their marketing efforts, the price of ETC dramatically rose over 380% in one 24-hour period alone. In return, some of the miners that had abandoned the original Ethereum chain (ETC) to mine on the ETH hardfork have now begun mining on both which means that the original ETC network actually has once again begun seeing an increase in its hashrate (recall that it had dramatically dropped a week ago).
This is an interesting twist because less than 3 days ago, Chandler Guo an executive at BW.com — a large mining pool — announced he would undertake a 51% attack on the ETC blockchain because of the decision by Poloniex to support it. Chandler later announced he would not carry it out.
Incidentally, it is likely that the noise that was created from this threat actually drew more attention to the Poloniex arbitrage opportunity, creating a type of Streisand Effect.3
Above is a line graph that is auto-generated and reflects the past 48 hours of two types of ratios: the Ethereum Classic (ETC) to Ethereum Core (ETH) price; and the ETC to ETH hashrate. Price is derived from the two largest exchanges in terms of ether liquidity (Bitfinex and Poloneix).
This is actually not surprising behavior, we empirically observe the same type of trend with other cryptocurrencies: when price increases more hashrate comes on-board and vice-versa.45
Over the past several days there has been much guessing as to which chain will live or die, but rarely do people suggest that both will live on in the long-run.
And I think that is short-sighted. While not a fully direct comparison, even though they’re effectively based on the same code, we have seen how Litecoin and Dogecoin have permanently conjoined at the hip via merged mining: they co-exist via the Scrypt Alliance. In addition, we have seen for years the continued existence of multiple multipools, which automatically direct GPU-miners to the most profitable cryptocurrency usually with a payout in bitcoin.
I cannot predict who which chain outlasts the other. Perhaps now that ethcore has said it will also support Ethereum Classic, the two (or more!) chains will both continue to exist and grow. Either way, we do know that the maximalist thesis, that there is a “coming demise of altcoins,” continues to be empirically incorrect and I suspect that it will remain incorrect for as long as there is continued speculative demand for cryptocurrencies in general. This includes both ETH and ETC.
Other winners and losers
Who else gains from this phenomenon? In the short run, anyone interested in trading will probably be able to find some kind of arbitrage — assuming demand grows or at least stays at the same level.
Other cryptocurrency communities that see Ethereum as a competitor could believe they now have an incentive to support multiple forks too, as it draws hashrate and potential mindshare away one chain at the expense of the other. And the more that the Ethereum community is painted as being “chaotic” the less of a threat it is seen to other public blockchains. But maybe this is shortsighted too and will simply enlarge the Ethereum community because they now end up as ETC holders and want it to appreciate in value.
Either way, it sounds like the makings of some kind of TV miniseries staring Jean-Luc Bilodeau as Vitalik Buterin (they’re both Canadian).
Ignoring the above quasi-illustration of the many-worlds interpretation, surprisingly not much has been discussed regarding the analog world of when fiat currencies are created or even removed at certain exchange rates and the unintended consequences therein.
For instance, in the comedy Good Bye, Lenin! we see the repercussions for those who were unable to convert East German marks for West German marks after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
More recently we have seen multiple Iraqi dinar scams, in which individuals were deceived and conned into acquiring pre-war dinar (a deprecated fiat currency) with the fraudulent pitch that at some point in the future, the previous pre-war exchange rate would somehow be reached.
However, one of the biggest differences with the Ethereum-based chains above is that cryptocurrencies are anarchic — without terms of service or ties to the legal system. Therefore it is difficult (impossible even?) to say which chain is the de jure legitimate chain. Consequently it is unclear if anyone has a legal claim to prevent or create additional forks in the future and because of this, it is hard to see who has liability for past, present or future forks on these chains.
Whether that is a risk organizations and regulated institutions are willing to take is a topic for another post. Perhaps if or when this is done, there will be even more chances to consume warm buttery popcorn as we watch and learn from the trials and tribulations of anarchic blockchains.
It is closer to a spinoff than a stock-split. Similar to the Ebay/Paypal spinoff, where a company that once had single market capitalization (EBAY) now trades under two different symbols (EBAY/PYPL) that trade and move independently. [↩]
Note: by this I mean that the existing exchanges that had already on-boarded ether, not that all large cryptocurrency exchanges had on-boarded ether. [↩]
Guo wanted to remove something (a chain in this case) but by advertising his intention to do so, only drew more interest and activity back into the very chain he intended to remove. [↩]
[Note: the views expressed below are solely my own and do not necessarily represent the views of my employer or any organization I advise.]
Yesterday, at block height 1920000, many elements of the Ethereum community coordinated a purposeful hardfork.
After several weeks of debate and just over a couple weeks of preparation, key stakeholders in the community — namely miners and exchanges — attempted to create a smooth transition from Ethereum Prime (sometimes referred to as Ethereum Classic) into Ethereum Core (Ethereum One).1
Users of exchange services such as Kraken were notified of the fork and are now being allowed to withdraw ETH to Ethereum Core, which many miners and exchanges now claim as “mainnet.”
Was the hardfork a success? To answer that question depends on which parallel universe (or chain) you resided on. And it also depends on the list of criteria for what “failure” or “success” are measured by.
For instance, if you ended up with ETH on the “unsupported” fork (Classic), who was financially responsible for this and who could attempt to file a lawsuit to rectify any loses?
Maybe no one. Why? Because public blockchains intentionally lack terms of service, EULA, and service level agreements, therefore it is difficult to say who is legally liable for mistakes or loses.
For instance, if financial instruments from a bank were sent to miners during the transition phase and are no longer accessible because the instruments were sent to the “unsupported” chain, who is to blame and bears responsibility? Which party is supposed to provide compensation and restitution?
De facto versus de jure
This whole hardfork exercise visualizes a number of issues that this blog has articulated in the past.
Perhaps the most controversial is that simply: there is no such thing as a de jure mainnet whilst using a public blockchain. The best a cryptocurrency community could inherently achieve is a de facto mainnet.2
What does that mean?
Public blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, intentionally lack any ties into the traditional legal infrastructure. The original designers made it a point to try and make public blockchains extraterritorial and sovereign to the physical world in which we live in. In other words, public blockchains are anarchic.
As a consequence, lacking ties into legal infrastructure, there is no recognized external authority that can legitimately claim which fork of Bitcoin or Ethereum is the ‘One True Chain.’ Rather it is through the proof-of-work process (or perhaps proof-of-stake in the future) that attempts to attest to which chain is supposed to be the de facto chain.3
However, even in this world there is a debate as to whether or not it is the longest chain or the chain with the most work done, that is determines which chain is the legitimate chain and which are the apostates.45
And this is where, fundamentally, it becomes difficult for regulated institutions to use a public blockchain for transferring regulated data and regulated financial instruments.
For instance, in March 2013 an accidental, unintended fork occurred on what many participants claimed as the Bitcoin mainnet.
To rectify this situation, over roughly four hours, operators of large mining pools, developers, and several exchanges met on IRC to coordinate and choose which chain they would support and which would be discarded. This was effectively, at the time, the largest fork-by-social-consensus attempted (e.g., proof-of-nym-on-IRC).
There were winners and losers. The losers included: OKPay, a payment processor, lost several thousand dollars and BTC Guild, a large mining pool who had expended real capital, mined some of the now discarded blocks.
In the Bitcoin world, this type of coordination event is slowly happening again with the never ending block size debate.
One team, Bitcoin Classic, is a small group of developers that supports a hardfork to relatively, quickly increase the block size from 1 MB to 2 MB and higher. Another group, dubbed Bitcoin Core, prefers a slower role out of code over a period of years that includes changes that would eventually increase the block size (e.g., segwit). 6
Yet as it lacks a formal governance structure, neither side has de jure legitimacy but instead relies on the court of public opinion to make their case. This is typically done by lobbying well-known figureheads on social media as well as mining pools directly. Thus, it is a bit ironic that a system purposefully designed for pseudonymous interactions in which participants were assumed to be Byzantine and unknown, instead now relies on known, gated, and trusted individuals and companies to operate.
Note: if the developers and miners did have de jure legitimacy, it could open up a new can of worms around FinCEN administrative requirements. 7 Furthermore, the miners are always the most important stakeholders in a proof-of-work system, if they were not, no one would host events just for them.
I think the confusion comes from thinking of cryptocurrency chains as ledgers at all. A cryptocurrency blockchain is (an attempt at) a decentralised solution to the double spending problem for a digital, extra-legal bearer asset. That’s not a ledger, that’s a log.
That was the point I was trying to make all along when I introduced the permissioned/permissionless terminology!9 Notice, I never used the phrase “permissionless ledger” — Permissionless’ness is a property of the consensus mechanism.
With a bearer asset, possession of some instrument (a private key in the cryptocurrency world) means ownership of the asset. With a registered asset, ownership is determined by valid entry in a registry mapping an off-chain identity to the asset. The bitcoin blockchain is a public log of proofs of instrument possession by anonymous parties. Calling this a ledger is the same as calling it “bearer asset ledger”, which is an oxymoron, like calling someone a “married bachelor”, because bearer assets by definition do not record their owners in a registry!
This taxonomy that includes the cryptocurrency stuff in our space (“a public blockchain is a permissionless distributed ledger of cryptocurrency”) causes so much pointless discussion.
I should also mention that the DLT space should really should be using the phrase “registry” instead of “ledger”. The latter is about accounts, and it is one ambition too far at the moment to speak of unifying everyone’s accounts on a distributed ledger.
As I have discussed previously, public blockchains intentionally lack hooks into off-chain legal identification systems.
Why? Because as Sams noted above: a KYC’ed public blockchain is effectively an oxymoron. Arguably it is self-defeating to link and tie all of the participants of the validation (mining) process and asset transfer process (users) to legal identities and gate them from using (or not using) the network services. All you have created is a massively expensive permissioned-on-permissionless platform.
But that irony probably won’t stop projects and organizations from creating a Kimberely Process for cryptocurrencies.
I cannot speak on behalf of the plethora of “private chain” or “private ledger” projects (most of which are just ill-conceived forks of cryptocurrencies), but we know from public comments that some regulators and market structures might only recognize blockchains and distributed ledgers that comply with laws (such as domestic KYC / AML regulations) by tying into the traditional legal infrastructure.10 This means tying together off-chain legal identities with on-chain addresses and activity.
There are multiple reasons, but partly due to the need to reduce settlement risks: to create definitive legal settlement finality and identifying the participants involved in that process.11
As illustrated with the purposeful Ethereum One hardfork and the accidental Bitcoin fork in 2013, public blockchains by design, can only provide probabilistic settlement finality.
Sure, the data inside the blocks itself is immutable, but the ordering and who does the ordering of the blocks is not.
What does this mean? Recall that for both Ethereum and Bitcoin, information (usually just private keys) are hashed multiple times by a SHA algorithm making the information effectively immutable.12 It is unlikely given the length of time our star is expected to live, that this hash function can be reversed by a non-quantum computer.
However, blocks can and will be reorganized, they are not immutable. Public blockchains are secured by social and economic consensus, not by math.
As a consequence, there are some fundamental problems with any fork on public blockchains: they may actually increase risks to the traditional settlement process. And coupled with the lack of hooks for off-chain identity means that public blockchains — anarchic blockchains — are not well-suited or fit-for-purpose for regulated financial institutions.
After all, who is financially, contractually, and legally responsible for the consequences of a softfork or hardfork on a public blockchain?
If it is no one, then it might not be used by regulated organizations because they need to work with participants who can be held legally accountable for actions (or inactions).
If it is someone specifically (e.g., a doxxed individual) then you have removed the means of pseudonymous consensus to create censorship resistance.
In other words, public blockchains, contrary to the claims of social media, are not “law” because they do not actually tie into the legal infrastructure which they were purposefully designed to skirt. By attempting to integrate the two worlds — by creating a KYC’ed public blockchain — you end up creating a strange hydra that lacks the utility of pseudonymity (and censorship resistance) yet maintains the expensive and redundant proof-of-work process.
These types of forks also open up the door for future forks: what is the criteria for forking or not in the future? Who is allowed and responsible to make those decisions? If another instance like the successful attack and counter-attack on The DAO takes place, will the community decide to fork again? If 2 MB blocks are seen as inadequate, who bears the legal and financial responsibility of a new fork that supports larger (or smaller) blocks? If any regulated institution lose assets or funds in this forking process, who bears responsibility? Members of IRC rooms?
If the answers are caveat emptor, then that level of risk may not be desirable to many market participants.
Who are you going to sue when something doesn’t go according to plan? In the case of The DAO, the attacker allegedly threatened to sue participants acting against his interests because he claimed: code is law. Does he have legal standing? At this time it is unclear what court would have accepted his lawsuit.
But irrespective of courts, it is unclear how smart contract code, built and executed on an anarchic platform, can be considered “legal.” It appears to be a self-contradiction.
As a consequence, the fundamental need to tie contract code with legal prose is one of the key motivations behind how Richard Brown’s team in London approached Corda’s design. If you cannot tie your code, chain, or ledger into the legal system, then it might be an unauthoritative ledger from the perspective of courts.13
And regulated institutions can’t simply just ignore regulations as they face real quantifiable consequences for doing so. To paraphrase George Fogg, that’s akin to putting your head in the sand.
We continue to learn from the public blockchain world, such as the consequences of forks, and the industry as a whole should try to incorporate these lessons into their systems — especially if they want anyone of weight to use them. Anarchic blockchains will continue to co-exist with their distributed ledger cousins but this dovetails into a conversation about “regtech,” which is a topic of another post.
This doesn’t mean that regulators and/or financial institutions won’t use public blockchains for various activities; perhaps some of them will be comfortable after quantifying the potential risks associated with them. [↩]
Ethereum developers plan to transition Ethereum from proof-of-work to proof-of-stake within the next year. [↩]
See Arthur Breitman’s interview on Epicenter Bitcoin and Mike Hearn’s interview on Money & Tech [↩]
Philosophically when Bob connects to “The Bitcoin Network” — how does Bob know he is actually connected to the “real” Bitcoin network? One method is to look at the block header: it should take a specific amount of time to recreate the hash with that proof-of-work. This proves which network has the most work done. However, in the meantime, Bob might connect to other ‘pretenders’ claiming to be “The Bitcoin Network.” At this time, there does not appear to be any legal recognition of a specific anarchic chain. [↩]
The Bitcoin Core fork, which is euphemistically called a softfork, is basically a hardfork spread over a long period of time. [↩]
For proof-of-work mining, Ethereum uses ethash instead of SHA256. For hashing itself, Ethereum uses SHA-3 which is part of the Keccak family (some people use the terms interchangeably but that isn’t technically correct). [↩]
[Note: the views expressed below are solely my own and do not necessarily represent the views of my employer or any organization I advise.]
It’s the beginning of a new quarter so that means its time to look at the last quarter and find out where public blockchain traction and usage is taking place, or not. After all, we are continually bombarded by cryptocurrency enthusiasts each day telling us that exponential growth is occurring. Or as GIF party posters like to say, “It’s Happening!” — so in theory it should be easy to find.
For more background, see previous posts from January and April.
P2SH usage: above are two charts from P2SH.info which illustrates the movement of bitcoins into what most assume are multi-sig wallets of some kind. There has been a visible increase over the past quarter, with about 200,000 or so more bitcoins moving into P2SH addresses. Year-on-year, bitcoins held in P2SH addresses has increased from 8% to 13%.
OP_RETURN: above is a line chart from Opreturn.org which illustrates various 3rd party applications that typically use the OP_RETURN field in Bitcoin as a type of datastore (e.g., watermarked tokens). It is hard to see it on this time scale but the average transactions during Q1 were roughly 1,500-2,500 per day whereas in Q2 it was a bit higher, between 2,500 to 3,500 per day.
While Blockstack (Onename) still rules the roost, Colu has jumped ahead of the other users. This is slightly interesting because the Colu team has publicly stated it will connect private chains that they are developing, with the Bitcoin network. The term for this is “anchoring” and there are multiple companies that are doing it, including other Bitcoin/colored coin companies like Colu. It is probably gimmicky but that’s a topic for a different post.
Incidentally the 5 largest OP_RETURN users account in Q2 for 75.8% of all OP_RETURN transactions which is roughly the same as Q1 (76%).
Above is a weekly volume chart denominated in USD beginning from March 2013 for LocalBitcoins.com. As discussed in previousposts, LocalBitcoins is a site that facilitates the person-to-person transfer of bitcoins to cash and vice versa.
While there is a lot of boasting about how it may be potentially used in developing countries, most of the volume still takes place in developed countries and as shown in other posts, it is commonly used to gain access to illicit channels because there is no KYC, KYCC, or AML involved. Basically Uber for cash, without any legal identification.
Over the past 6 months, volumes have increased from $10 million and now past $13 million per week. For comparison, most VC-backed exchanges do several multiples more in volume during the same time frame.1
In April, several Bitcoin promoters were crowing about how “stable” Bitcoin was. Not mentioned: cryptocurrencies can’t simultaneously be stable and also go to the moon. People that like volatility include: traders, speculators, GIF artisans, pump & dumpers. And people who don’t like volatility: consumers and everyday users.
What articles and reporters should do in the future is actually talk to consumers and everyday users to balance out the hype and euphoria of analysts who do not disclose their holdings (or their firms holdings) of cryptocurrencies.2
As we can see above, volatility measured relative to both USD and EUR hit a five month high this past quarter. The average user probably would not be very happy about having to hedge that type of volatility, largely because there are few practical ways to do so. Consumers want boring currencies, not something they have to pay attention to every 10 minutes.
And ether (ETH) was even more volatile during the same time frame: doubling relative to USD during the first half of the quarter then dropping more than 50% from its all-time high by mid-June.
Counterparty is a watermarked token platform that, as shown in previous quarters, has hit a plateau and typically just sees a few hundred transactions a day. Part of this is due to the fact that the core development team has been focused on other commercial opportunities (e.g., building commercial products instead of public goods).3
Another reason is that most of the public interest in “smart contract” prototyping and testing has moved over to Ethereum.
As shown in the chart above, on any given day in Q2 the Ethereum blockchain processed roughly 40,000 transactions. In Q1 that hovered between 15,000-30,000 transactions. Note: the large fluctuations in network transactions during the spring may coincide with issues around The DAO (e.g., users were encouraged to actively ‘spam’ the network during one incident).
In addition, according to CoinGecko, Counterparty has lost some popularity — falling to 14th from 10th in its tables from last quarter. Ethereum remained in 2nd overall.
Another trend observed in the last quarterly review remains constant: Ethereum has significantly more meetups than Counterparty and is 2nd only to Bitcoin in that measure as well.
We’ve discussed “long chain” transactions ad nausem at this point but I have noticed on social media people still talk about the nominal all-time high’s in daily transactions as if it is prima facie evidence that mega super traction is occurring, that everyday users are swarming the Bitcoin network with commercial activity. Very few (anyone?) digs into what those transactions are. Perhaps there is genuine growth, but what is the break down?
As we can see from the chart above, while non-long chain transactions have indeed grown over the past quarter, they are still far outpaced by long chain transactions which as discussed in multiple articles, can be comprised of unspendable faucet rewards (dust), gambling bets and a laundry list of other non-commercial activity.
Furthermore, and not to wade into the massive black hole that is the block size debate: even with segwit, there will be an upperbound limit on-chain transactions under the current Core implementation. As a consequence some have asked if fee pressure would incentivize moving activity off-chain and onto other services and even onto other blockchains.
This may be worth looking into as the block size reaches its max limit in the future. As far as we can tell right now, it doesn’t appear users are moving over to Litecoin, perhaps they are moving to Ethereum instead? Or maybe they just pack up and leave the space entirely?
We have looked at wallets here multiple times. They’re a virtually meaningless metric because of how easy it is to inflate the number. What researchers want to know is Monthly Active Users (MAU). To my knowledge no one is willing to publicly discuss their monthly or daily user number.
For instance, two weeks ago Coinbase reached 4 million “users.” But it is almost certain that they do not actually have 4 million daily or monthly active users. This number is likely tied to the amount of email-based registrations they have had over the past four years (circa May 12, 2012).
Similarly, Blockchain.info has seen its “users” grow to just over 7.8 million at the time of this writing. But this is a measure of wallets that have been created on the site, not actual users.
Any other way to gauge usage or traction?
Let’s look in the Google Play Store and Apple App Store.
Source: GoAbra / Google Play
Last October Abra launched its GoAbra app and initially rolled it out in The Philippines. This past May, when CoinDesk ran a story about the company, I looked in the Google Play Store and it says the app had been downloaded 5,000 times. Last week, Abra announced it was officially launching its app into the US. As of this writing, it was still at 5,000 downloads.
“Wait,” you might be thinking to yourself, “Filipinos may prefer the iOS app instead.”
Perhaps that is the case, but according to data as of October 2015, Android has a ~81.4% market share in The Philippines. Furthermore, the iOS version for some reason doesn’t appear on App Annie. So it is unlikely that Abra has seen traction that isn’t reflected in these download numbers yet, perhaps it will in the future.
Anything else happening in the stores?
As of this writing, the top 5 Bitcoin wallets in the Google Play Store in order of appearance are:
Andreas Schildbach’s Bitcoin Wallet (1 million downloads)
Mycelium Bitcoin Wallet (100,000 downloads)
Coinbase (500,000 downloads)
Blockchain.info (100,000 downloads)
Airbitz (10,000 downloads)
The Apple App Store does not publicly state how many times an application has been downloaded. It does rank apps based on a combination of user ratings and downloads. The top 6 on the iPhone in order of appearance:
Interestingly however, the order is slightly different in the App Store on an iPad. The top 6 are:
It may be worth revisiting these again next quarter. If you want to burn some time, readers may be interested in looking at specific rank and activity via App Annie.
Most new cohorts and batches at startup accelerators and incubators usually only stay 3-4 months. A typical intake may see 10-15 companies each get a little bit of seed funding in exchange for a percentage of the equity. During the incubation period the startup is usually provided mentorship, legal advice, office space, access to social networks and so forth. It is common place to hear people of all stripes in Silicon Valley state that 9 out of 10 of these startups will burn out within a couple years — that the incubator relies on one of them having a big exit in order to fund the other duds.4
500 Startups, Boost.VC, Plug and Play, YCombinator and other incubators have added and removed startups from their websites and marketing material based on the traction startups have had. And cryptocurrency startups are not too different from this circle of life. 5
For instance, at YCombinator, Bitcoin-specific mentions on applications has declined by 61% over the past year.
Based on pubic information, as of this writing, it appears that out of the roughly 100 Bitcoin-related startups that have collectively come and gone through the incubators listed above, just a handful have gone on to raise additional funding and/or purportedly have active users and customers. Unfortunately, no one has consistently published user numbers, so it is unclear what the connection between funding and growth is as this time.
In fact, in an odd twist, instead of measuring success by monthly active users, customers, or revenue, many Silicon Valley-based companies are measuring success based on how much money they raised. That’s probably only a good idea if the business model itself is to always be raising.
For example, 21inc regularly boasts at being the “best funded company in Bitcoin” — but has not stated what traction four separate rounds of funding have created. How many bitcoins did it mine prior to its pivot into consumer hardware? How many 21 computers were sold? How many users have installed 21? And what are its key differences relative to what Jeremy Rubin created in 2014 (Tidbit)?
Again, this is not to single out 21inc, but rather to point out if companies in the public blockchain space were seeing the traction that they generally claim to on social media and conferences — then as discussed in previous posts, they would probably advertise those wins and successes.
With funding comes hiring. Since it is very difficult to find public numbers, there is another way to gauge how fast companies are growing: who and how many people they are publicly hiring.
The last Bitcoin Job Fair was last held in April 2015. Of its 20 sponsors, 6 are now dead and ~7 are either zombies and/or have have done major pivots. It is unclear how many people that were hired during that event still work for the companies they worked for.
Where else can we look?
Launched in 2014, Coinality is a job matching website that connects employers with prospective employees with the idea that they’d be compensated in cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin and dogecoin. Fun fact: Coinality is one of the few companies I interviewed for Great Chain of Numbers that is still alive today and hasn’t pivoted (not that pivoting in and of itself is a bad thing).
It currently lists 116 jobs, 105 of which were posted in the past 2 months.
A number of VC-backed companies and large enterprises (or head hunters recruiting on their behalf) have listed openings in the past month. For example: WellsFargo, Blockchain.info, Circle, Fidelity, IBM, KeepKey, itBit, BNYMellon and SAP logos pop up on the first couple pages of listings.
Among the 67 job listed in June, twenty-six of the positions were freelance positions cross-listed on Upwork (formerly known as Elance / oDesk).
Notable startups that are missing altogether: many cryptocurrency-centered companies whose executives are very vocal and active on social media. Perhaps they use LinkedIn instead?
According to CoinATMRadar there are now 690 Bitcoin ATMs installed globally. That is an increase of 78 ATMs since Q1. That comes to around 0.86 ATM installations per day in Q2 which is a tick higher than Q1 (0.84).
Bitwage launched in July 2014 starting out with zero signups and zero payroll.
Fast-forward to January 2016: Bitwage had 3,389 cumulative user signups and cumulative payroll volumes of $2,456,916
Through June 2016 it has now reached 5,617 cumulative signups and cumulative payroll volumes of $5,130,971
While growing a little faster than ATM installations, this is linear not exponential growth.
Open Bazaar is a peer-to-peer marketplace that officially launched on April 4, 2016. It had been in beta throughout the past year. The VC-backed team operates a companion website called BazaarBay which has a stats page.
It may be worth looking at the “New Nodes” and “New Listings” sections over the coming quarters as they are both currently declining.6
It is unclear what the root cause(s) of the volatility were above. According to social media it can be one of two dozen things ranging from Brexit to the upcoming “halvening.” Because we have no optics into exchanges and their customer behavior, speculation surrounding the waxing and waning will remain for the foreseeable future.
Based on process of elimination and the stats in this post, the likely answer does not appear to be consumer usage (e.g., average Joe purchasing alpaca socks with bitcoins). After all, both BitPay and Coinbase have stopped posting consumer-related stats and they are purportedly the largest merchant processors in the ecosystem.
Most importantly, just because market prices increase (or decreases), it cannot be inferred that “mass adoption” is happening or not. Extraordinary claims requires extraordinary evidence: there should be ample evidence of mass adoption somewhere if it were genuinely happening.
For instance, the price of ether (ETH) has increased 10x over the past 6 months but there is virtually no economy surrounding its young ecosystem. Mass consumer adoption is not happening as GIF artisans might says. Rather it is likely all speculation based — which is probably the same for all other cryptocurrencies, including Bitcoin.
About a year ago we began seeing a big noticeable pivotaway from cryptocurrencies to non-cryptocurrency-based distributed ledgers. That was largely fueled by a lack of commercial traction in the space and it doesn’t appear as if any new incentive has arisen to coax those same businesses to come back. After all, why continue building products that are not monetizable or profitable for a market that remains diminutive?
Let’s look again next quarter to see if that trend changes.
For instance, Mirror closed its Series A round 18 months ago, but was removed from Boost’s website because it no longer is involved in Bitcoin-related activities. Boost currently lists the following companies out of the 50+ Bitcoin-companies it has previously incubated: BlockCypher, BitPagos, Abra, Stampery, Fluent, SnapCard, Verse. 500 Startups has removed a number of startups as well and currently lists the following on its website: HelloBit, Melotic, Coinalytics, BTCJam, Bonafide, CoinPip. [↩]
Since it has only been “launched” for a quarter, it is probably a little unfair to pass judgement at this time. But that hasn’t stopped me before. OpenBazaar has a lot of growing pains that its developers are well aware of including UX/UI issues. But beyond that, it is unclear that the average consumer is actually interested in using peer-to-peer marketplaces + cryptocurrencies versus existing incumbents like Alibaba, Amazon and eBay — all of whom have customer service, EULAs, insurance policies and accept traditional currencies. I had a chance to speak with one of their investors at Consensus in May and do not think their assumptions about network operating costs were remotely accurate. Furthermore, where is the market research to support their thesis that consumers will leave incumbents for a platform that lacks insurance policies and live customer service? Note: OB1 developers and investors insist that their reputation management and arbitration system will increase consumer confidence and customer protection. [↩]
[Note: the views expressed below are solely my own and do not necessarily represent the views of my employer or any organization I advise.]
I have spent the past few weeks in East Asia, primarily in China visiting friends and relatives. Because the connection to the outside world was limited, the upside was that the cacophonous noise of perma cryptocurrency pumpers was relatively muted. I have had a chance to reflect on a number of ideas that are currently being discussed at conferences and on social media.
The first idea is not new or even unique to this blog as other companies, organizations and individuals have proposed a type of digital signature analytics + KYC tracking process for cryptocurrencies. A type of Kimberley Process but for cryptocurrencies.1
For instance, the short lived startup CoinValidation comes to mind as having the first-to-market product but was notably skewered in the media. Yet its modus operandi continues on in about 10 other companies.2
A Formal Kimberley Process
For those unfamiliar with the actual Kimberley Process, it is a scheme enacted in 2003 to certify where diamonds originated from in order to help prevent conflict diamonds from entering into the broader mainstream diamond market.
The general idea behind proving the provenance of diamonds is that by removing “blood diamonds” from the market, it can cut off a source of funding of insurgencies and warlord activity.3
What does this have to do with cryptocurrencies? Isn’t their core competency allowing non-KYC’ed, pseudonymous participants to send bearer assets to one another without having to provide documentation or proof of where those assets came from? Why would anyone be interested in enabling this?
Some may not like it, but a de facto Kimberley Process is already in place.
For instance, in many countries, most of the on-ramps and off-ramps of venture-backed cryptocurrency exchanges are actively monitored by law enforcement, compliance teams and data analytic providers who in turn look at the provenance of these assets as they move across the globe.4
On the fiat side, while many jurisdictions in North America and Western Europe currently require domiciled cryptocurrency exchanges and wallets to enforce KYC and AML compliance requirements, several areas of Asia are less strict because the local governments have not defined or decided what buckets cryptocurrencies fall into.5
There are some other noticeable gaps in this system involving crypto-to-crypto exchanges. Irrespective of regions: implementing harmonized KYC/AML standards on the non-fiat side of exchanges appears to be missing altogether. That is to say that very few, if any, exchange does any kind of KYC/AML on crypto-to-crypto.6
What are some examples of why a Kimberley Process would be helpful to both consumers and compliance teams?
Below are three examples:
(1) During my multi-country travel I learned that there are several regional companies that sell debit cards with pre-loaded amounts of cryptocurrency on them. Allegedly two of of the popular use-cases for these cards is: bribery and money laundering. The example I was provided was that it is logistically easier to move $1 million via a thin stack of debit cards than it is to carry and disperse bags of cash with.7
Attaching uniform KYC and legal identities to each asset would aid compliance teams in monitoring where the flow of funds originated and terminated with cryptocurrencies. And it would help consumers shy away from assets that could be encumbered or were proceeds of crime.
(2) Affinity fraud, specifically housewives (家庭主妇), are common targets of predators. This has been the case for long before the existence of computers let alone cryptocurrencies, but it came up several times in conversations with friends. According to my sources, their acquaintances are repeatedly approached and some actually took part in Ponzi schemes that were presented as wealth management products.
The new twist and fuel to these schemes was that there is some kind of altcoin or even Bitcoin itself were used as payout and/or as rails between parties. We have already seen this with MMM Global — which is still an active user of East Asia’s virtual currency exchanges — but two questionable projects that I was specifically shown were OctaCoin and ShellCoin.8
Note: in January 2016 multiple Chinese governmental bodies issued warnings about MMM Global and other Ponzi schemes.
[Video of MMM Global operations in The Philippines. Is that really Manny Pacqiauo?]
Victims who were not tech savvy and lied to, have no recourse because there is no universal KYC / KYCC / AML process to identify the culprits in these regions. Similarly, when these illicit virtual assets are re-sold to exchanges, customers of those exchanges such as Alice and Bob, may receive potentially encumbered assets that are then resold to others who are unaware of the assets lineage (much like a stolen motorcycle being resold multiple times). This creates a massive lien problem.
But property theft is not a new or unknown problem, why is it worth highlighting for cryptocurrencies?
Many of the original victims in East Asia are not affluent, so these scams have a material impact on their well being. The average working adult in many provinces is still less than $500 per month. Thus not only do they lack a cushion from scams but any price volatility — such as the kind we continue to see in cryptocurrencies as a whole, can wipe out their savings.
(3) Due to continual usage of botnets and stolen electricity — which is still a problem in places like China — the lack of identification from coin generation onward results in a environment in which ‘virgin coins’ sell at a premium because many exchanges don’t investigate where machines are located, who owns them, who paid for the opex and capex of those operations (e.g., documentation of electric bills).9
Unfortunately, the solutions proposed by many cryptocurrency enthusiasts isn’t to create more transparency and identification standards enabling better optics on coin provenance but rather to make it even harder to track assets via proposals like Confidential Transactions.10
Heists, thefts and encumbered coins
I am frequently asked how is it possible to know who received potentially encumbered cryptocurrencies? For amateur sleuths, there is a long forum thread which lists out some of the major heists and thefts that occurred early on in Bitcoinland.
Above is a video recording of a specific coin lineage: transactions that came from the Bitcoinica Theft that ended up in the hands of Michael Marquardt (“theymos”) who is a moderator of /r/bitcoin and owner of Bitcoin Talk.11
Recall that in July 2012, approximately 40,000 bitcoins were stolen from the Bitcoinica exchange.12 Where did those end up? Perhaps we will never know, but several users sued Bitcoinica in August 2012 for compensation from the thefts and hacks.
How are consumer protections handled on public blockchains?
In short, they do not exist by design. Public blockchains intentionally lack any kind of native consumer protections because an overarching goal was to delink off-chain legal identities from the pseudonymous interactions taking place on the network.
Thus, stolen cryptocurrencies often recirculate, even without being mixed and laundered.13
Consequently a fundamental problem for all current cryptocurrencies is that they aren’t exempt from nemo dat and have no real fungibility because they purposefully were not designed to integrate with the legal system (such as UCC 8 and 9).14 Using mixers like SharedCoin and features like Confidential Transactions does not fundamentally solve that legal problem of who actually has legal title to those assets.1516
Why should this matter to the average cryptocurrency enthusiast?
If market prices are being partially driven by predators and Ponzi schemes, wouldn’t it be in the best interest of the community to identity and remove those?17
Perversely the short answer to that is no. If Bob owns a bunch of the a cryptocurrency that is benefiting from this price appreciation, then he may be less than willing to remove the culprits involved of driving the prices upward.
For example, one purported reason Trendon Shavers (“pirateat40”) was not immediately rooted out and was able to last as long as he did — over a year — is that his Ponzi activity (“Bitcoin Savings & Trust”) coincided with an upswing in market prices of bitcoin.18 Recall over time, BS&T raised more than 700,000 bitcoins. Why remove someone whose activity created new demand for bitcoins? 19
But this incentive is short-sighted.
If the end goal of market participants and enthusiasts is to enable a market where the average, non-savvy user can use and trust, then giving them tools for provenance could be empowering. Ironically however, by integrating KYC and provenance into a public blockchain, it removes the core — and very costly — characteristic of pseudonymous, censorship-resistant interaction.
Thus there will likely be push back for implementing a Kimberley Process: doxxing every step of provenance back to genesis (coin generation) with real world identities removes pseudonmity and consequently public blockchains would no longer be censorship-resistant. And if you end up gating all of the on-ramps and off-ramps to a public chain, you end up just creating an overpriced permissioned-on-permissionless platform.
Despite this, Michael Gronager, CEO of Chainalysis, notes that:
Public ledgers are probably here to stay – difficult KYC/AML processes or not. I probably see this as a Nash equilibrium – like in the ideal world all trees would be low and of equal height but there is no path to that otherwise optimal equilibrium. We believe that fighting crime on Blockchains will both build trust and increase their use and value.
One way some market participants are trying to help law enforcement fight crime is through self-regulating organizations (SRO).
For instance, because we have seen time and time again that the market is not removing these bad actors from the market, several companies have created SROs to help stem the tide. However, as of right now, efforts like the US-based “Blockchain Alliance” — a gimmicky name for a group of venture-backed Bitcoin companies — has limited capabilities.20 They have monthly calls to discuss education with one another in the West (e.g., what is coin mixing and how does it work?) but currently lack the teeth to plug the KYC/AML gaps in Asia. Perhaps that will change over time.
And as one source explained: consider this, has any Bitcoin thief been caught? Even when there is decent evidence, we are not aware of a Bitcoin thief that was actually found guilt of stealing bitcoin, yet.21 Thus an open to question to people who argue that cryptocurrencies are great because of transparency: a lot of bitcoin has been stolen, and no one has been found guilty for that crime. Why not?
Process of elimination
Over the past six weeks, there has been very little deep research on why market prices have risen and fallen. Usually it is the same unfounded narratives: emerging market adoption; hedge against inflation; hedge against collapse of country X, Y or Z; hedge against Brexit; etc. But no one provides any actual data, least of all the investors financing the startups that make the claims.
Perhaps the research that has been done on the matter was from Fran Strajnar’s team at BNC. For instance, on June 1st they noted that:
I reached out to Fran and according to him, in early June, “Somebody dropped many many millions ($) across 4 different Chinese Exchanges in a 2 hour period, without moving price – 4 days before the price rise started last week. Because it was over multiple exchanges and these trades were filled, we are digging into it further.”
If there was a standardized Kimberley Process used by all of these exchanges, it would be much easier to tell who is involved in this process and if those funds were based on proceeds of illicit activity.
Furthermore, barring such a Process, we can only speculate why journalists haven’t looked into this story:
(1) many of them do not have reliable contacts in East Asia
(2) those that do have contacts with exchange operators may not be getting the full story due to exchanges lacking KYC / KYCC / AML standards themselves
(3) some reporters and exchange operators own a bunch of cryptocurrencies and thus do not want to draw any negative attention that could diminish their net worth
Third parties such as Wedbush Securities and Needham have also published reports on price action, but these are relatively superficial in their analysis as they lack robust stats needed to fully quantify and explain the behavior we have seen.
Strangely enough, for all the pronouncements at conferences about how public blockchains can be useful for data analysis, very few organizations, trade media or analysts are publishing bonafide stats.
After all, who are the customers of these virtual currency exchanges? Because of reporting requirement we know who uses Nasdaq and ICE, why don’t we know who uses virtual currency exchanges still?
Two months ago I had a chance to speak with Marcus Swanepoel, CEO of BitX, about his experiences in Africa. BitX coordinates with a variety of compliance teams to help block transactions tied to scams and Ponzi schemes. In the past, BitX has managed to help kill off two ponzi schemes and has tried to block MMM Global which has spread to Africa.
Earlier this spring, some MMM users that were blocked by BitX just moved to another competing local exchange that didn’t block such transactions. As a result, over the course of 8 weeks this exchange did more than 3x volume than BitX during same time frame.22 BitX has subsequently regained part of this market share partly due to MMM fading in popularity.
Why is MMM so successful? Users are asked to upload videos onto Youtube of why MMM Global is great and why you should join and are then paid by MMM as a reward. This becomes self-reinforcing in large part because of the unsavvy victims who are targeted.
But MMM isn’t to blame for everything.
For instance, in China there have been a variety of get-rich-quick Ponzi schemes that rose and blew up, such as an ant farm scheme in 2007. And earlier this year, Ezubao, the largest P2P lending platform in China fell apart as a $7.6 billion Ponzi scam.23 No cryptocurrency was involved in either case.
Yet as Emin Gün Sirer pointed out, some of the activities such as The DAO, basically act as a naturally arising Ponzi.
In fact, one allegation over the past couple weeks is that The DAO attacker placed a short of 3,000 bitcoin on Bitfinex prior to attacking The DAO (which was denominated in ether).24 If there was a Kimberley Process in which all traders on all exchanges had to comply with a universal KYC / KYCC / AML standard, it would be much easier to identify the attackers as well as compensate the victims.
Similarly, because ransomware remains a “killer app” of cryptocurrencies such that companies, police stations, hospitals, elementary schools and even universities are now setting up Coinbase accounts and stockpiling cryptocurrencies to pay off hackers. What is the aggregate demand of all of this activity? If it is large, does it impact the market price? And how would a Kimberley Process help provide restitution to the victims of this ransom activity?
A strawman Kimberley Process
How can you or your organization get involved in creating a Kimberley Process for cryptocurrencies?
Right now there is no global, industry standard for “best practices” in mutualizing, implementing, or carrying out KYC / AML provisions for cryptocurrencies.25
In writing this post, several sources suggested the following process to kick-start an effort:
(1) organize an industry-level event(s) which brings together:
(a) AML analytics companies
(b) representatives from regulatory bodies and law enforcement (e.g., FATF, FinCEN)
(c) KYC/AML practitioners
(d) existing market structures and utilities such as SIFMA, ROC, Swift (e.g., KYC registry, LEI)
(e) compliance teams from cryptocurrency exchanges and wallets
(2) at the event(s) propose a list of baseline standards that exchanges and wallets can try to implement and harmonize:
(a) what documentation is required for KYC / KYCC / AML
(b) other financial controls and accountability standards that can assist exchange operators (e.g., remove the ability for an operator to naked short against its own customer base)
(3) tying these standards together with a uniform digital identity management system could be the next step in this process.
On that last point, Fabio Federici, CEO of Skry (formerly Coinalytics), explained:
In general I believe the biggest unsolved problem is still identity and information sharing. Obviously you don’t want all your PII and transaction meta data on a public blockchain, as this information could not only be leveraged by profit seeking organizations, but also malicious actors. So the question becomes what’s the right framework for sharing the right amount of information with only the people that need access to it (maybe even only temporarily).
PII stands for personal identifying information. In theory, Zcash (or something like it) has the potential to solve some of Fabio’s concerns: relevant info can be encoded in the transaction, and only the relevant parties can read it. But this delves into “regulated data” which is a topic for another post.26
Similarly, Ryan Straus, an attorney at Riddell Williams and adjunct professor at Seattle University School of Law explained that:
Identity is central to the legal concept of property. Property systems are information systems: they associate identified entities with identified rights. With the sole exception of real currency, possession or control is not conclusive indicia of ownership.
Factual fungibility simply makes it harder to prove that you have a better claim to a specific thing than the person who now possesses or controls it. The hard part about what you have written about is that it is difficult to avoid conflating KYC (which involves identity of people) and the Kimberley Process (which involves identifying things).
In order to enable participants to share information without being unduly hounded by social media, it was also suggested that the presence of: investors, cryptocurrency press and cryptocurrency lobbying groups should kept to a minimum for the initial phase.
In addition to implementing additional financial controls and external audits, cryptocurrency exchanges and wallets adopting a Kimberley Process would help provide transparency for all market participants.
While it is probably impossible to remove all the bad actors from any system, reducing the amount of shadows they have to hide could provide assurances and reduce risks to market participants of all shapes and sizes.
However, the trade-off of implementing such a Process is that it negates the core utility that public blockchains provide, turning them into expensive permissioned gateways. And if you are permissioning activity from the get-go, you might as well use a permissioned blockchain which are cheaper to manage and operate and also natively bake-in the KYC, KYCC and AML requirements. But that is a topic for another post as well.
One reviewer argued that analytics may be superior to KYC. In the event of a compromised account — so goes the argument — analytics can help provide linkage between the flow of funds whereas KYC of compromised accounts would be “illusory.” [↩]
This includes but is not limited to: Chainalysis, Blockseer, Skry, Elliptic, Netki and ScoreChain. [↩]
Incidentally there is a UK-based startup called Everledger which works with insurance companies and tracks a catalogue of diamonds vis-à-vis a blockchain. [↩]
See: Flow of Funds; KYSF; KYSF part 2; and bitcoin movements. To actively monitoring transactions at these entry and exit points, based on anecdotes, up to 20% of all nodes on the Bitcoin network may be managed and operated by these same set of participants as well. [↩]
Note: it bears mentioning that as of this writing, no country has recognized cryptocurrencies as actual legal tender and consequently cryptocurrencies are not exempt from nemo dat. This is important as it means the provenance of the cryptocurrencies actually does matter because those assets could be encumbered. [↩]
I asked around and my sources do not know of a single exchange that does KYC/AML on cryptocurrencies that are directly exchanged for other cryptocurrencies (e.g., Shapeshift). Furthermore, as highlighted in the past, there are gaps in compliance when it comes to certain fiat-to-cryptocurrency exchanges such as BTC-e and LocalBitcoins. [↩]
This is in USD equivalence, usually not in USD itself. [↩]
OctaCoin is interesting in that the operators behind it claim that it is financed from revenue streams of 3 online casinos who purportedly payout users on a regular basis. Note: gambling in China is a bit like golf in China: it’s illegal but everywhere. It is only legal in a few internal jurisdictions such as Hainan and Macau and elsewhere on the mainland only a couple of state-run lotteries are given legal status. [↩]
Note: stealing electricity to mine bitcoins has occurred in other areas of the world too, including in The Netherlands. [↩]
The official motivation for developing Confidential Transactions is to enable more user privacy which then leads to more fungibility. As one source pointed out: “At the end of the day it’s a balance between privacy and security. Basically the story goes ‘just because I don’t what anyone to know what I’m buying, doesn’t mean I’m a drug dealer.'” [↩]
Marquardt also allegedly co-owns both Bitcoin.org and Blockexplorer.com, and co-manages the Bitcoin Wiki. [↩]
The Craig Wright / Satoshi saga is interesting because in a recent interview Craig admittedly used Liberty Reserve which was an illicit exchange based in Costa Rica shut down by the US government. According to the interview he also had ties to Ross Ulbricht, the convicted operator of Silk Road. [↩]
See The Law of Bitcoin, Section 1.5 in the United States chapter from Ryan Straus. There are exceptions, see UCC Article 2 – sale of goods. [↩]
Interestingly, SharedCoin.com (sometimes referred to as Shared Send) used to be a mixer run by Blockchain.info, a venture-backed startup. It was recently shutdown without any notice and the domain now redirects to the CoinJoin wiki entry. They also pulled the SharedCoin github repo and any material that links it back to Blockchain.info. [↩]
One reviewer mentioned that: “Ponzi schemes will always exist and should probably be fought not just in the crypto space but where in other industries too; requiring continuous education. It would be way simpler and more effective to shut down domains owned by MMM than it would to be to do anything else, but here you actually meet the pseudonymity feature of the Internet. Try to do that internationally – it is not easy!” [↩]
Note: this is a similar argument that Rick Falkvinge made three years ago. [↩]
There are probably several dozen advocacy groups and non-profit working groups scattered across the world. Each has different goals. For instance, ACCESS in Singapore works with some regulators in SEA. While others are merely trying to create technical standards. [↩]
Most of the criminals that are convicted are found guilty of money laundering and interaction with illicit trade, not theft of bitcoins themselves. [↩]
Two months ago, the Financial Timesbriefly covered this story and Marcus wrote about some of it in March as well. [↩]
There were some early warning signs for that industry. For instance, according to a Bloomberg story in February 2015: “The value of China’s peer-to-peer lending transactions surged almost 13-fold since 2012 to $41 billion last year, according to Yingcan Group, which tracks the data,” notes Bloomberg. However, 275 of the more than 1,500 lending went bankrupt or had trouble repaying money in 2014, an increase from 76 just a year earlier, according to Yingcan. [↩]
[Note: the views expressed below are solely my own and do not necessarily represent the views of my employer or any organization I advise.]
One oft-repeated claims from venture capitalists, such as Fred Wilson at Union Square Ventures who have gone “all in” with cryptocurrency-specific investments, is that “banks need to give bitcoin a chance.”
The problem with this claim is that it shows a lack of market intelligence. Over the past 24 months, banks and many other types of financial institutions have worked on more than 200 proof-of-concepts (PoCs) and pilots with dozens of companies big and small. Most of these experiments were conducted using a fork or clone of a public blockchain or even a cryptocurrency such as bitcoin or ether itself.
In other words banks and other financial institutions have given Bitcoin many chances and probably many more in the future.
But nearly all of the PoCs have been rejected and will continue to be rejected not because banks have a reflexive knee-jerk reaction due to Bitcoin’s perceived stigmas, but because Bitcoin was intentionally not designed to solve problems that banks have.
Typewriters and airplanes
Consider the typewriter analogy. At one point in the mid-20th century, there were dozens of typewriter manufacturers shipping millions of kit each year. Yet irrespective of the anachronistic enthusiasm that VCs who like typewriters may have, it is unlikely that banks will acquire large quantities of typewriters in 2016. Not because banks don’t like typewriters or haven’t given typewriters a chance, but rather, typewriters as they currently exist, do not solve many problems that banks actually have.
As a consequence, there is a visible misalignment between the supply of startups funded by many of the VC firms that advocate cryptocurrency-specific solutions, with the services and solutions actually needed by regulated financial institutions. For instance, Wilson’s current USV current portfolio consists of several Bitcoin companies whose business models largely depend on:
(1) continued price appreciation of bitcoin; and/or
(2) massive adoption of bitcoin demand itself.
While I certainly do not speak for the financial service industry, over the past year I have spoken to hundreds of directors and managing directors at highly regulated financial institutions. And by and large, their pain points and problems are not solved by a cryptocurrency. After all, they already have access to dozens and in many cases, hundreds of different financial instruments and assets. As a consequence, cryptocurrencies alone do not provide the utility that certain VCs think it does for the financial industry.
For instance, at R3, we have spent over a year sitting down with many disparate financial institutions to find out what their internal problems are, gathering copious amounts of functional and non-functional requirements along the way. We have done our homework on what various platforms can and cannot do, publishing many of the findings to our members and to the public as well.
In contrast, Satoshi probably did not conduct that type of sector specific due diligence in 2007-2008, the time frame he purportedly worked on Bitcoin. Or if he did, he didn’t publish it; nor have VCs since. In point in fact, the original white paper was not an architectural design document to rework back office, post-trade systems for banks. Rather, it was a design document explaining how pseudonymous participants could try to become their own sovereign banks without the need for using existing institutional or legal infrastructure.
Another salient analogy are heavier-than-air aircraft. Neither Airbus nor Boeing reuse the same design or materials that the Wright Brothers did in 1903 in order to build planes in 2016.
Instead, these modern aerospace companies build customized, fit-for-purpose vehicles that specialize in certain tasks, conditions and environments — and are often made of materials that didn’t exist 100 years ago. Consequently, enthusiastic VCs that fund startups which build copies of the Wright Flyer are probably not going to find much market demand outside of museums.
What does this have to do with the world of blockchains?
Public blockchains, such as Bitcoin, were designed for an environment in which unknown and untrusted parties could attempt to interact in an anarchic system. Bitcoin, through its intentionally expensive mining process, allows it to route around regulated gateways and purposefully eschewed any native method for complying with KYC, AML and other government mandated provenance requirements.
In contrast, banks and other financial institutions must, by law, know who all parties of a transaction are as all interactions are tied back into the traditional legal environment. And if you know who the participants to a transaction are — by connecting legal identities to them — then the tools and processes needed for this compliant environment are completely opposite to the design constraints and threats that cryptocurrencies are built around.
Training wheels and open fields
While a recent Bloombergop-ed used a false equivalence – equating public and private blockchains as being able to provide the same utility – the bigger flaw with the op-ed was that it described private blockchains as “training wheels” for banks.
Public and private blockchains, as described above, were designed for different discrete purposes.
To use another aerospace example: calling private blockchains as a type of “training wheel” would be like saying that an A380 is a “training wheel” for commercial cargo air fleets that should instead, for some reason, be solely comprised of F-18s. Both types of planes were built for different purposes, for different environments and with different operational constraints. Because of tradeoffs, neither plane can do it all and there is no shame in that.
Similarly, the usage of the word “open” is being misused by Mr. Wilson and others. Public blockchains are not “open” like the internet. In fact, the internet is an amalgamation of intranets (ISPs) with peering agreements and a patchwork set of governance mandates which typically includes fulfilling some kind of gating and KYC mandate. Yet despite the fact that the on-ramps and off-ramps of the internet are permission-based, creative inclusion continues to flourish because all participants leverage the utility of an open, shared standard: TCP/IP. Bitcoin is not TCP/IP, rather, it is one instantiation, one application of what a blockchain can be look like.
Similarly, once a common shared ledger standard and fit-for-purpose platform is created for financial institutions, after the permissioning of users and most importantly — validators — is done, the ecosystem that plugs into it could see the flourishing of innovation including increased financial inclusion due to harmonized and mutualized utilities. In other words, rather than having to spend $450 million a year to operate a network of miners to create unneeded pseudonymous consensus, financial institutions can and will participate in robust platforms that solve their business cases and simultaneously align with traditional legal requirements.
Cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin do not and cannot do many of the things that many VCs and vocal enthusiasts claim it can. For instance, public blockchains weren’t designed to provide definitive legal settlement finality anymore than F-18s were designed for crop dusting. Bitcoin wasn’t designed to provide the types of utility regulated financial institutions require and changing Bitcoin to be customized for this relatively alien environment, not only breaks its pseudonymous utility but also its anarchic security assumptions.
Instead of haranguing prospective customers for not buying a product they don’t want or need – or attempting to shoehorn everything onto one niche blockchain – why not cultivate and partner with those who build solutions that solve business cases for a known customer base? Other VC and strategic investment firms familiar with the pain points of financial institutions are now cultivating startups based on market demand, the fruits of their labor will begin to blossom in the coming years.
[Disclaimer: I do not own any cryptocurrencies nor have I participated in any DAO crowdfunding.]
This post will look at the difference between a decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) and a project called The DAO.
The wikipedia entry on DAOs is not very helpful. However, Chapters 2 through 5 may be of some use (although it is dated information).
In terms of the uber hyped blockchain world, at its most basic kernel, a DAO is a bit of code — sometimes called a “smart contract” (a wretched name) — that enables a multitude of parties including other DAOs to send cryptographically verifiable instructions (such as a digitally signed vote) in order to execute the terms and conditions of the cloud-based code in a manner that is difficult to censor.
One way to think of a simple DAO: it is an automated escrow agent that lives on a decentralized cloud where it can only distribute funds (e.g., issue a dividend, disperse payroll) upon on receiving or even not receiving a digital signal that a task has been completed or is incomplete.
For instance, let us assume that a small non-profit aid organization whose staff primarily work in economically and politically unstable regions with strict capital controls, set up a DAO — an escrow agent — on a decentralized cloud to distribute payroll each month.
This cloud-based escrow agent was coded such that it would only distribute the funds once a threshold of digital signatures had signed an on-chain contract — not just by staff members — but also from independent on-the-ground individuals who observed that the staff members were indeed doing their job. Some might call these independent observers as oracles, but that is a topic for a different post.1
Once enough signatures had been used to sign an on-chain contract, the escrow agent would automatically release the funds to the appropriate individuals (or rather, to a public address that an individual controls via private key). The terms in which the agent operated could also be amended with a predetermined number of votes, just like corporate board’s and shareholder’s vote to change charters and contracts today.
The purported utility that decentralization brings to this situation is that it makes censoring transactions by third parties more difficult than if the funds flowed through a centralized rail. There are trade-offs to these logistics but that is beyond the scope of this post.
The reason the DAO acronym includes the “organization” part is that the end-goal by its promoters is for it to provide services beyond these simple escrow characteristics such as handling most if not all administrative tasks such as hiring and firing.
Watch out Zenefits, the cryptocurrency world is going to eat your lunch! Oh wait.
A short history
It is really easy to get caught up in the euphoria of a shiny new toy. And the original goal of a DAO sounds like something out of science fiction — but these undertones probably do it a disservice.
Prior to 2014 there had been several small discussions around the topic of autonomous “agents” as it related to Bitcoin.
For instance, in August 2013, Mike Hearn gave a presentation at Turing Festival (see above), describing what was effectively a series of decentralized agents that operated logistical companies such as an autonomous car service.
Several months later, Vitalik Buterin published the Ethereum white paper which dove into the details of how to build a network — in this case a public blockchain — which natively supported code that could perform complex on-chain tasks: or what he dubbed as a decentralized autonomous organization.
The impetus and timing for this post is based on an ongoing crowdsale / crowdfunding activity for the confusingly named “The DAO” that has drawn a lot of media attention.
Over the past year, a group of developers, some of whom are affiliated with the Ethereum Foundation and others affiliated with a company called Slock.it have created what is marketed as the first living and breathing DAO on the Ethereum network.
The organizers kicked off a month long token sale and at the time of this writing just over 10 million ether (the native currency of the Ethereum blockchain) — or approximately 13% of all mined ether — has been sent to The DAO. This is roughly equivalent to over $100 million based on the current market price of ether (ETH).
In return for sending ether to The DAO, users receive an asset called a DAO Token which can be used in the future to vote on projects that The DAO wants to fund.2 It is a process that Swarm failed at doing.
I would argue that, while from a technical standpoint it is possible to successfully set up a DAO in the manner that The DAO team did, that there really isn’t much utility to do so in an environment in which censorship or the theft of funds by third parties will probably not occur.
That is to say, just as I have argued before that permissioned-on-permissionless is a shortsighted idea, The DAO as it is currently set up, is probably a solution to a problem that no one really has.3
Or in short, if you “invested” in The DAO crowdsale thinking you’re going to make money back from the projects via dividends, you might be better off investing in Disney dollars.
Putting aside securities regulations and regulators such as the SEC for a moment, most of the crowdsale “investors” probably don’t realize that:
crowdfunding in general has a checkered track record of return-on-investment4
crowdfunding in the cryptocurrency world almost always relies on the future appreciation of token prices in order to break-even and not through the actual creation of new features or tools (e.g., see Mastercoin/Omni which effectively flopped)
that the funds, when dispersed to Slock.it and other “products,” could take years, if ever to return a dividend
Why would this pool of capital provide any better expected return-on-investment than others?
My sense about The DAO is that it’s a fascinating experiment that I do not want to be part of. I also do not think that a committee of over 1,000 strangers will make wise investment decisions. Most good investment decisions are taken by courageous individuals in my opinion. Anything that can get past a big committee will probably not be the next Google. Imagine this pitch: “Hi I’m Larry and this is Sergey and we want to build the world’s 35th search engine.”
While it probably wasn’t the 35thsearchengine, tor those unfamiliar with the history of Google, Larry Page and Sergey Brin are the co-founders who created a search engine in what was then though a very crowded market.
So why the excitement?
I think part of it is quite simply: if you own a bunch of ether, there really isn’t much you can do with it right now. This is a problem that plagues the entire cryptocurrency ecosystem.
Despite all the back-patting at conferences, the market is already filled with lots of different tokens. There is a glut of tokens which do not currently provide many useful things that you couldn’t already do with existing cash systems.5
Part of it also is that most probably think they will some become rich quick through dividends, but that probably won’t happen anytime soon, if at all.
With The DAO, only the development teams of projects that are voted and approved by The DAO (e.g., the thousands of users with DAO Tokens), will see any short term gains through a steady paycheck. And it is only after they build, ship and sell a product that the original investors may begin seeing some kind of return.
Or in other words: over the past several weeks, the pooling of capital has taken place for The DAO. In the future there will be various votes as to where that capital goes. Shortly thereafter, some capital is deployed and later KPI’s will be assessed in order to determine whether or not funding should continue. All the while some type of profit is sought and dividend returned.
Why, I asked another friend, would this pool of capital offer any better risk adjusted return-on-investment than other asset classes?
In his view:
The return might be high but so is the risk. Always adjust for risk. I think The DAO is better compared to a distributed venture capital firm. Whether that’s better or worse I don’t know — I mean you have the crowd deciding on investments. Or more realistically: nerds who know how to obtain ether (ETH) get to decide on investments.
Does that make them better VCs? Probably not. However, The DAO can decide to hire people with actual credentials to manage and select the investments, admitting its own weakness which would then turn into a strength. I think this can go either way but given the regulator is not prepared for any of this it will probably not work out in the short term.
Does the ‘design-by-giant-nerd-committee’ process work?
Over the past year we have already seen the thousands, probably tens-of-thousands of man-hours dropped into the gravity well that is known as the “block size debate.” In which hundreds of passionate developers have seemingly argued non-stop on Slack, Twitter, reddit, IRC, conferences and so forth without really coming to an amicable decision any one group really likes.
So if block size-design-by-committee hasn’t worked out terribly well, will the thousands of investors in The DAO take to social media to influence and lobby one another in the future? And if so, how productive is that versus alternative investment vehicles?
Redistributing the monetary base
Assuming Ethereum has an economy (which it probably doesn’t by most conventional measures), will The DAO create a deflationary effect on the Ethereum economy?
For instance, at its current rate, The DAO could absorb about 20% of the ether (ETH) monetary base.
Does that mean it permanently removes some of the monetary base? Probably not.
For example, we know that there will be some disbursements to projects such as Slock.it, so there will be some liquidity from this on-chain entity. And that future DAOs will spend their ether on expenses and development like a normal organization.
But we also know that there is a disconnect between what The DAO is, an investment fund, with what many people see it as: a large vault filled with gold laying in Challenger Deep that will somehow appreciate in value and they will be able to somehow extract that value.
Sure, we will all be able to observe that the funds exist at the bottom of the trench, but someone somewhere has to actually create value with the DAO Tokens and/or ether.
For the same reason that most incubators, accelerators and VC funds fail, that entrepreneur-reliant math doesn’t change for The DAO. Not only does The DAO need to have a large volume of deal flow, but The DAO needs to attract legitimate projects that — as my friend point out above — have a better risk adjusted return-on-investment than other asset classes.
Will the return-on-investment of the DAO as an asset class be positive in the “early days”? What happens when the operators and recipients of DAO funds eventually confront the problem of securities regulation?
So far, most of the proposals that appear to be geared up for funding are reminiscent to hype cycles we have all seen over the past couple of years.
Let’s build a product…
2014: But with Bitcoin
2015: But with Blockchain
2016: But with DAO
Maybe the funds will not all be vaporized, but if a non-trivial amount of ETH ends up being held in this DAO or others, it could be the case that with sluggish deal flow, a large portion of the funds could remain inert. And since this ether would not touching any financial flows; it would be equivalent to storing a large fraction of M0 in your basement safe, siloed off from liquid capital markets.
Since the crowdsale / crowdfund began on April 30, the market price of ETH has increased ~30%; is that a coincidence or is there new demand being generated due to The DAO crowdsale?
A small bug has been discovered in terms of the ETH to DAO Token conversion time table
The DAO surpassed the Ethereum Foundation to become the largest single holder of ether (note: the linked article is already outdated)
In terms of concentration of wealth: according to Etherscan, the top 50 DAO Token holders collectively “own” 38.49% of The DAO
The top 500 DAO Token holders collectively “own” 71.39% of The DAO
As of this writing there are over 15,000 entities (not necessarily individuals) that “own” some amount of a DAO Token
Why is “own” in quotation marks? Because it is still unclear if controlling access to these private keys is the same thing as owning them. See also: Watermarked Tokens as well as The Law of Bitcoin
Gatecoin, which facilitated the crowdsale of both The DAO and DigixDAO was recently hacked and an estimated $2 million in bitcoins and ether were stolen
Yesterday Gavin Wood, a co-founder of Ethereum, announced that he is stepping down as a “curator” for The DAO. Curators, according to him, are effectively just individuals who identify whether someone is who they say they are — and have no other duties, responsibilities or authority.
Three days ago, the Slock.it dev team — some of whom also worked on creating The DAO — did a live Q/A session that was videotaped and attempted to answer some difficult questions, like how many DAO Tokens they individually own.
About 17 months ago I put together a list of token crowdsales. It would be interesting to revisit these at some point later this year to see what the return has been for those holders and how many failed.
For instance, there hasn’t really been any qualitative analysis of crowdsales or ICOs in beyond looking at price appreciation.6 What other utility was ultimately created with the issuance of say, factoids (Factom tokens) or REP (Augur tokens)?
Similarly, no one has really probed Bitcoin mining (and all POW mining) through the lens of a crowdsale on network security. Is every 10 minutes an ICO? After all, the scratch-off contest ties up capital seeking rents on seigniorage and in the long run, assuming a competitive market, that seigniorage is bid away to what Robert Sams has pointed out to where the marginal cost equals the marginal value of a token. So you end up with this relatively large capital base — divorced from the real world — that actually doesn’t produce goods or services beyond the need to be circularly protected via capital-intensive infrastructure.
Other questions to explore in the future include:
what are the benefits, if any, of using a centralized autonomous organization (CAO) versus decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) for regulated institutions?
how can a party or parties sue a decentralized autonomous organization? 7
what are the legal implications of conducting a 51% attack on a network with legally recognized DAOs residing on a public blockchain?8
will the continued concentration of ether and/or DAO Tokens create a 51% voting problem identified in the “Curator” section?
Still don’t fully understand what The DAO is? Earlier this week CoinDesk published a pretty good overview of it.
[Special thanks to Raffael Danielli, Robert Sams and Nick Zeeb for their thoughts]
Note: for the purposes of The DAO, “curators” are effectively identity oracles. [↩]
It appears that currently, once a quorum is achieved, a relatively small proportion of token holders can vote “yes” to a proposal to trigger a large payout. [↩]
The current line-up of goods and services are not based around solving for problems in which censorship is a threat, such as those facing an aid worker in a politically unstable region. [↩]
That is not to say that they all fail. In fact according to one statistic from Kickstarter, there was a 9% failure rate on its platform. Thus, it depends on the platform and what the reward is. [↩]
[Disclaimer: The views expressed below are solely my own and do not necessarily represent the views of my employer or any organization I advise.]
William Mougayar is an angel investor who has been investigating the cryptocurrency and broader distributed ledger ecosystem over the past several years.
He recently published a book entitled The Business Blockchain that attempts to look at how enterprises and organizations should view distributed ledgers and specifically, blockchains.
While it is slightly better than “Blockchain Revolution” from the Tapscott’s, it still has multiple errors and unproven conjectures that prevent me from recommending it. For instance, it does not really distinguish one blockchain from another, or the key differences between a distributed ledger and a blockchain.
Note: all transcription errors below are my own. See my other book reviews.
On p. xxii he writes:
“These are necessary but not sufficient conditions or properties; blockchains are also greater than the sum of their parts.”
I agree with this and wrote something very similar two years ago in Chapter 2:
While the underlying mathematics and cryptographic concepts took decades to develop and mature, the technical parts and mechanisms of the ledger (or blockchain) are greater than the sum of the ledger’s parts.
On p. xxiv he writes:
“Just like we cannot double spend digital money anymore (thanks to Satoshi Nakamoto’s invention), we will not be able to double copy or forge official certificates once they are certified on a blockchain.”
There are two problems with this:
Double-spending can and does still occur, each month someone posts on social media how they managed to beat a retailer/merchant that accepted zero-confirmation transactions
Double-spending can and is prevented in centralized architectures today, you don’t need a blockchain to prevent double-spending if you are willing to trust a party
[Note: recommend that future editions should include labeled diagrams/tables/figures]
On p. 11 he writes:
“Solving that problem consists in mitigating any attempts by a small number of unethical Generals who would otherwise become traitors, and lie about coordinating their attack to guarantee victory.”
It could probably be written slightly different: how do you coordinate geographically dispersed actors to solve a problem in which one or more actor could be malicious and attempt to change the plan? See also Lamport et al. explanation.
On p.13 he writes compares a database with a blockchain which he calls a “ledger.”
I don’t think this is an accurate comparison.
For instance, a ledger, as Robert Sams has noted, assumes ties to legal infrastructure. Some blockchains, such as Bitcoin, were intentionally designed not to interface with legal infrastructure, thus they may not necessarily be an actual ledger.
To quote Sams:
I think the confusion comes from thinking of cryptocurrency chains as ledgers at all. A cryptocurrency blockchain is (an attempt at) a decentralised solution to the double spending problem for a digital, extra-legal bearer asset. That’s not a ledger, that’s a log.
That was the point I was trying to make all along when I introduced the permissioned/permissionless terminology! Notice, I never used the phrase “permissionless ledger” — Permissionless’ness is a property of the consensus mechanism.
With a bearer asset, possession of some instrument (a private key in the cryptocurrency world) means ownership of the asset. With a registered asset, ownership is determined by valid entry in a registry mapping an off-chain identity to the asset. The bitcoin blockchain is a public log of proofs of instrument possession by anonymous parties. Calling this a ledger is the same as calling it “bearer asset ledger”, which is an oxymoron, like calling someone a “married bachelor”, because bearer assets by definition do not record their owners in a registry!
This taxonomy that includes the cryptocurrency stuff in our space (“a public blockchain is a permissionless distributed ledger of cryptocurrency”) causes so much pointless discussion.
I should also mention that the DLT space should really should be using the phrase “registry” instead of “ledger”. The latter is about accounts, and it is one ambition too far at the moment to speak of unifying everyone’s accounts on a distributed ledger.
Is this pedantic? Maybe not, as the authors of The Law of Bitcoin also wrestle with the buckets an anarchic cryptocurrency fall under.
On p. 14 he writes about bank accounts:
“In reality, they provided you the illusion of access and activity visibility on it. Every time you want to move money, pay someone or deposit money, the bank is giving you explicit access because you gave them implicit trust over your affairs. But that “access” is also another illusion. It is really an access to a database record that says you have such amount of money. Again, they fooled you by giving you the illusion that you “own” that money.”
This is needless inflammatory. Commercial law and bankruptcy proceedings will determine who owns what and what tranche/seniority your claims fall under. It is unclear what the illusion is.
On p. 14 he writes:
“A user can send money to another, via a special wallet, and the blockchain network does the authentication, validation and transfer, typically within 10 minutes, with or without a cryptocurrency exchange in the middle.”
Which blockchain is he talking about? If it is not digital fiat, how does the cash-in/cash-out work? To my knowledge, no bank has implemented an end-to-end production system with other banks as described above. Perhaps that will change in the future.
On p. 18 he writes:
“Sometimes it is represented by a token, which is another form of related representation of an underlying cryptocurrency.”
This isn’t very well-defined. The reason I went to great lengths in November to explain what a “token” is and isn’t is because of the confusion caused by the initial usage of a cryptographic token, a hardware device from companies like RSA. This is not what a “token” in cryptocurrency usage means. (Note: later on p. 91 he adds a very brief explanation)
On p. 18 he cites Robert Sams who is quoting Nick Szabo, but didn’t provide a source. It is found in Seigniorage Shares.
On p. 18 he also writes:
“As cryptocurrency gains more acceptance and understanding, its future will be less uncertain, resulting in a more stable and gradual adoption curve.”
This is empirically not true and actually misses the crux of Sams’ argument related to expectations.
On p. 20 he writes:
“As of 2016, the Bitcoin blockchain was far from these numbers, hovering at 5-7 TPS, but with prospects of largely exceeding it due to advances in sidechain technology and expected increases in the Bitcoin block size.”
This isn’t quite correct. On a given day over the past year, the average TPS is around 2 TPS and Tradeblock estimates by the end of 2016 that with the current block size it will hover around just over 3 TPS.
What is a sidechain? It is left undefined in that immediate section. One potential definition is that it is a sofa.
On p. 20 he writes:
“Private blockchains are even faster because they have less security requirements, and we are seeing 1,000-10,000 TPS in 2016, going up to 2,000-15,000 TPS in 2017, and potentially an unlimited ceiling beyond 2019.”
This is untrue. “Private blockchains” do not have “less” security requirements, they have different security requirements since they involve known, trusted participants. I am also unaware of any production distributed ledger system that hits 10,000 TPS. Lastly, it is unclear where the “unlimited ceiling” prediction comes from.
On p. 20 he writes:
“In 2014, I made the strong assertion that the blockchain is the new database, and warned developers to get ready to rewrite everything.”
Where did you warn people? Link?
On p. 21 he writes:
“For developers, a blockchain is first and foremost a set of software technologies.”
I would argue that it is first and foremost a network.
On p. 22 he writes:
“The fact that blockchain software is open source is a powerful feature. The more open the core of a blockchain is, the stronger the ecosystem around it will become.”
Some, but not all companies building blockchain-related technology, open source the libraries and tools. Also, this conflates the difference between code and who can validate transactions on the network. A “private blockchain” can be open sourced and secure, but only permit certain entities to validate transactions.
On p. 24 he writes:
“State machines are a good fit for implementing distributed systems that have to be fault-tolerant.”
On p. 25 he writes:
“Bitcoin initiated the Proof-of-Work (POW) consensus method, and it can be regarded as the granddaddy of these algorithms. POW rests on the popular Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerant algorithm that allows transactions to be safely committed according to a given state.”
There are at least two problems with this statement:
The proof-of-work mechanism used in Bitcoin is apocryphally linked to Hashcash from Adam Back; however this does not quite jive with Mougayar’s statement above. Historically, this type of proof-of-work predates Back’s contribution, all the way to 1992. See Pricing via Processing or Combatting Junk Mail by Dwork and Naor
“One of the drawbacks of the Proof-of-Work algorithm is that it is not environmentally friendly, because it requires large amounts of processing power from specialized machines that generate excessive energy.”
This is a design feature: to make it economically costly to change history. It wasn’t that Satoshi conjured up a consensus method to be environmentally friendly, rather it is the hashrate war and attempt to seek rents on seigniorage that incentivizes the expenditure of capital, in this case energy. If the market price of a cryptocurrency such as bitcoin declined, so too would the amount of energy used to secure it.
On p. 29 he writes:
“Reaching consensus is at the heart of a blockchain’s operations. But the blockchain does it in a decentralized way that breaks the old paradigm of centralized consensus, when one central database used to rule transaction validity.”
Which blockchain is he talking about? They are not a commodity, there are several different unique types. Furthermore, distributed consensus is an academic research field that has existed for more than two decades.
On p. 29 he writes:
“A decentralized scheme (which the blockchain is based on) transfers authority and trust to a decentralized network and enables its nodes to continuously and sequentially record their transactions on a public “block,” creating a unique” chain” – the blockchain.”
Mougayar describes the etymology of the word “blockchain” specific to Bitcoin itself.
Note: a block actually is more akin to a “batch” or “bucket” in the sense that transactions are bundled together into a bucket and then propagated. His definition of what a blockchain is is not inclusive enough in this chapter though because it is unclear what decentralization can mean (1 node, 100 nodes, 10,000 nodes?). Also, it is important to note that not all distributed ledgers are blockchains.
On p. 31 he writes:
“Credit card companies charge us 23% in interest, even when the prime rate is only at 1%”
Which credit card companies are charging 23%? Who is being charged this? Also, even if this were the case, how does a blockchain of some kind change that?
On p. 32 he writes:
“Blockchains offer truth and transparency as a base layer. But most trusted institutions do not offer transparency or truth. It will be an interesting encounter.”
This is just a broad sweeping generalization. What does truth and transparency mean here? Which blockchains? Which institutions? Cannot existing institutions build or use some kind of distributed ledger to provide the “truth” and “transparency” that he advocates?
On p. 33 he writes:
“The blockchain challenges the roles of some existing trust players and reassigns some of their responsibilities, sometimes weakening their authority.”
Typo: should be “trusted” not “trust.”
On p. 34 he writes:
“There is a lesson from Airbnb, which has mastered the art of allowing strangers to sleep in your house without fear.”
This is not true, there are many examples of Airbnb houses that have been trashed and vandalized.
On p. 34, just as the Tapscott’s did in their book, Mougayar talks about how Airbnb could use a blockchain for identity and reputation. Sure, but what are the advantages of doing that versus a database or other existing technology?
On p. 37 he writes:
“Enterprises are the ones asking, because the benefits are not necessarily obvious to them. For large companies, the blockchain presented itself as a headache initially. It was something they had not planned for.”
First off, which blockchain? And which enterprises had a headache from it?
On p. 39 he writes: “Prior to the Bitcoin invention…”
He should probably flip that to read “the invention of Bitcoin”
On p. 40 he writes:
“… it did not make sense to have money as a digital asset, because the double-spend (or double-send) problem was not solved yet, which meant that fraud could have dominated.”
This is empirically untrue. Centralized systems prevent double-spending each and every day. There is a double-spending problem when you are using a pseudonymous, decentralized network and it is partially resolved (but not permanently solved) in Bitcoin by making it expensive, but not impossible, to double-spend.
On p. 41 he writes:
“They will be no less revolutionary than the invention of the HTML markup language that allowed information o be openly published and linked on the Web.”
This is a little redundant and should probably be rewritten as “the invention of the hypertext markup language (HTML).”
On p. 43 he writes:
“Smart contracts are ideal for interacting with real-world assets, smart property, Internet of Things (IoT) and financial services instruments.”
Why are smart contracts ideal for that?
On p. 46 he writes: “Time-stamping” and in other areas he writes it without a dash.
On p. 46 he writes:
“And blockchains are typically censorship resistant, due to the decentralized nature of data storage, encryption, and peer controls at the edge of the network.”
Which blockchains? Not all blockchains in the market are censorship resistant. Why and why not?
On p. 48 he mentions “BitIID” – this is a typo for “BitID”
On p. 51 he writes:
“Enter the blockchain and decentralized applications based on it. Their advent brings potential solutions to data security because cryptographically-secured encryption becomes a standard part of blockchain applications, especially pertaining to the data parts. By default, everything is encrypted.”
This is untrue. Bitcoin does not encrypt anything nor does Ethereum. A user could encrypt data first, take a hash of it and then send that hash to a mining pool to be added to a block, but the network itself provides no encryption ability.
On p. 52 he writes:
“Consensus in public blockchains is done publicly, and is theoretically subject to the proverbial Sybil attacks (although it has not happened yet).”
Actually, it has on altcoins. One notable occurrence impacted Feathercoin during June 2013.
On p. 54 he writes:
“The blockchain can help, because too many Web companies centralized and hijacked what could have been a more decentralized set of services.”
This is the same meme in the Tapscott book. There are many reasons for why specific companies and organizations have large users bases but it is hard to see how they hijacked anyone; but that is a different conversation altogether.
On p. 54 he writes:
“We can also think of blockchains as shared infrastructure that is like a utility. If you think about how the current Internet infrastructure is being paid for, we subsidize it by paying monthly fees to Internet service providers. As public blockchains proliferate and we start running millions of smart contacts and verification services on them, we might be also subsidizing their operation, by paying via micro transactions, in the form of transaction fees, smart contract tolls, donation buttons, or pay-per-use schemes.”
This is a very liberal use of the word subsidize. What Mougayar is describing above is actually more of a tax than a charitable donation.
The design behind Bitcoin was intended to make it such that there was a Nash equilibrium model between various actors. That miners would not need to rely on charity to continue to secure the network because as block rewards decline, the fees themselves would in the long run provide enough compensation to pay for their security services.
It could be argued that this will not happen, that fees will not increase to offset the decline in block rewards but that is for a different article.
As an aside, Mougayar’s statement above then intersects with public policy: which blockchains should receive that subsidy or donation? All altcoins too? And who should pay this?
“Blockchains are like a virtual computer somewhere in a distributed cloud that is virtual and does not require server setups. Whoever opens a blockchain node runs the server, but not users or developers.”
This is untrue. The ~6,400 nodes on the Bitcoin network are all servers that require setup and maintenance to run. The same for Ethereum and any other blockchain.
On p. 58 he writes:
“It is almost unimaginable to think that when Satoshi Nakamoto released the code for the first Bitcoin blockchain in 2009, it consisted of just two computers and a token.”
A couple issues:
There is a typo – “first” should be removed (unless there was another Bitcoin network before Bitcoin?)
Timo Hanke and Sergio Lerner have hypothesized that Satoshi probably used multiple computers, perhaps more than a dozen.
On p. 58 he writes:
“One of the primary differences between a public and private blockchain is that public blockchains typically have a generic purpose and are generally cheaper to use, whereas private blockchains have a more specific usage, and they are more expensive to set up because the cost is born by fewer owners.”
This is not true. From a capital and operation expenditure perspective, public blockchains are several orders of magnitude more expensive to own and maintain than a private blockchain. Why? Because there is no proof-of-work involved and therefore private blockchain operators do not need to spend $400 million a year, which is roughly the cost of maintaining the Bitcoin network today.
In contrast, depending on how a private blockchain (or distributed ledger) is set up, it could simply be run by a handful of nodes on several different cloud providers – a marginal cost.
On p. 68 he writes:
“Taken as an extreme case, just about any software application could be rewritten with some blockchain and decentralization flavor into it, but that does not mean it’s a good idea to do so.”
Yes, fully agreed!
On p. 68 he writes:
“By mid-2016, there were approximately 5,000 developers dedicated to writing software for cryptocurrency, Bitcoin or blockchains in general. Perhaps another 20,000 had dabbled with some of that technology, or written front-end applications that connect to a blockchain, one way or the other.”
Mougayar cites his survey of the landscape for this.
I would dispute this though, it’s probably an order of magnitude less.
The only way this number is 5,000 is if you liberally count attendees at meetups or all the various altcoins people have touched over the year, and so forth. Even the headcount of all the VC funded “bitcoin and blockchain” companies is probably not even 5,000 as of May 2016.
On p. 71 he writes:
“Scaling blockchains will not be different than the way we have continued to scale the Internet, conceptually speaking. There are plenty of smart engineers, scientists, researchers, and designers who are up to the challenge and will tackle it.”
This is a little too hand-wavy. One of the top topics that invariably any conversation dovetails into at technical working groups continues to be “how to scale” while keeping privacy requirements and non-functional requirements intact. Perhaps this will be resolved, but it cannot be assumed that it will be.
On p. 72 he writes:
“Large organizations, especially banks, have not been particularly interested in adopting public blockchains for their internal needs, citing potential security issues. The technical argument against the full security of public blockchains can easily be made the minute you introduce a shadow of a doubt on a potential scenario that might wreak havoc with the finality of a transaction. That alone is enough fear to form a deterring factor for staying away from public blockchain, although the argument could be made in favor of their security.”
This is a confusing passage. The bottom line is that public blockchains were not designed with the specific requirements that regulated financial institutions have. If they did, perhaps they would be used. But in order to modify a public blockchain to provide those features and characteristics, it would be akin to turning an aircraft carrier into a submarine. Sure it might be possible, but it would just be easier and safer to build a submarine instead.
Also, why would an organization use a public blockchain for their internal needs? What does that mean?
On p. 78 he writes:
“Targeting Bitcoin primarily, several governments did not feel comfortable with a currency that was not backed by a sovereign country’s institutions.”
Actually, what made law enforcement and regulators uncomfortable was a lack of compliance for existing AML/KYC regulations. The headlines and hearings in 2011-2013 revolved around illicit activities that could be accomplished as there were no tools or ability to link on-chain activity with real world identities.
On p. 87 he writes:
“The reality is that customers are not going to the branch as often (or at all), and they are not licking as many stamps to pay their bills. Meanwhile, FinTech growth is happening: it was a total response to banks’ lack of radical innovation.”
There are a couple issues going on here.
Banks have had to cut back on all spending due to cost cutting efforts as a whole and because their spending has had to go towards building reporting and compliance systems, neither of which has been categorized as “radical innovation.”
Also, to be balanced, manyh of the promises around “fintech” innovation still has yet to germinate due to the fact that many of the startups involved eventually need to incorporate and create the same cost structures that banks previously had to have. See for instance, financial controls in marketplace lending – specifically Lending Club.
On p. 88 he writes:
“If you talk to any banker in the world, they will admit that ApplePay and PayPal are vexing examples of competition that simply eats into their margins, and they could not prevent their onslaught.”
Any banker will say that? While a couple of business lines may change, which banks are being displaced by either of those two services right now?
On p. 89 he writes:
“Blockchains will not signal the end of banks, but innovation must permeate faster than the Internet did in 1995-2000.”
Why? Why must it permeate faster? What does that even mean?
On p. 89 he writes:
“This is a tricky question, because Bitcoin’s philosophy is about decentralization, whereas a bank is everything about centrally managed relationships.”
What does this mean? If anything, the Bitcoin economy is even more concentrated than the global banking world, with only about a dozen exchanges globally that handle virtually all of the trading volume of all cryptocurrencies.
On p. 89 he writes:
“A local cryptocurrency wallet skirts some of the legalities that existing banks and bank look-alikes (cryptocurrency exchanges) need to adhere to, but without breaking any laws. You take “your bank” with you wherever you travel, and as long as that wallet has local onramps and bridges into the non-cryptocurrency terrestrial world, then you have a version of a global bank in your pocket.”
This is untrue. There are many local and international laws that have been and continue to be broken involving money transmission, AML/KYC compliance and taxes. Ignoring those though, fundamentally there are probably more claims on bitcoins – due to encumbrances – than bitcoins themselves. This is a big problem that still hasn’t been dealt with as of May 2016.
On p. 95 he writes:
“The decentralization of banking is here. It just has not been evenly distributed yet.”
This is probably inspired by William Gibson who said: ‘The future is already here — it’s just not very evenly distributed.’
On p. 95 he writes:
“The default state and starting position for innovation is to be permissionless. Consequently, permissioned and private blockchain implementations will have a muted innovation potential. At least in the true sense of the word, not for technical reasons, but for regulatory ones, because these two aspect are tie together.”
This is not a priori true, how can he claim this? Empirically we know that permissioned blockchains are designed for different environments than something like Bitcoin. How can he measure the amount of potential “innovation” either one has?
On p. 95 he writes:
“We are seeing the first such case unfold within the financial services sector, that seems to be embracing the blockchain fully; but they are embracing it according to their own interpretation of it, which is to make it live within the regulatory constraints they have to live with. What they are really talking about is “applying innovation,” and not creating it. So, the end-result will be a dialed down version of innovation.”
This is effectively an ad hominem attack on those working with regulated institutions who do not have the luxury of being able to ignore laws and regulations in multiple jurisdictions. There are large fines and even jail time for ignoring or failing to comply with certain regulations.
On p. 95 he writes:
“That is a fact, and I am calling this situation the “Being Regulated Dilemma,” a pun on the innovator’s dilemma. Like the innovator’s dilemma, regulated companies have a tough time extricating themselves from the current regulations they have to operate within. So, when they see technology, all they can do is to implement it within the satisfaction zones of regulators. Despite the blockchain’s revolutionary prognosis, the banks cannot outdo themselves, so they risk only guiding the blockchain to live within their constrained, regulated world.”
“It is a lot easier to start innovating outside the regulatory boxes, both figuratively and explicitly. Few banks will do this because it is more difficult.”
“Simon Taylor, head of the blockchain innovation group at Barclays, sums it up: “I do not disagree the best use cases will be outside regulated financial services. Much like the best users of cloud and big data are not the incumbent blue chip organizations. Still their curioisity is valuable for funding and driving forward the entire space.” I strongly agree; there is hope some banks will contribute to the innovation potential of the blockchain in significant ways as they mature their understanding and experiences with this next technology.
An ending note to banks is that radical innovation can be a competitive advantage, but only if it is seen that way. Otherwise innovation will be dialed down to fit their own reality, which is typically painted in restrictive colors.
It would be useful to see banks succeed with the blockchain, but they need to push themselves further in terms of understanding what the blockchain can do. They need to figure out how they will serve their customers better, and not just how they will serve themselves better. Banks should innovate more by dreaming up use cases that we have not though about yet, preferably in the non-obvious category.
The fundamental problem with his statement is this: banks are heavily regulated, they cannot simply ignore the regulations because someone says they should. If they fail to maintain compliance, they can be fined.
But that doesn’t mean they cannot still be innovative, or that the technology they are investigating now isn’t useful or helpful to their business lines.
In effect, this statement is divorced from the reality that regulated financial institutions operate in. [Note: some of his content such as the diagram originated from his blog post]
On p. 102 he writes:
“Banks will be required to apply rigorous thinking to flush out their plans and positions vis-à-vis each one of these major blockchain parameters. They cannot ignore what happens when their core is being threatened.”
While this could be true, it is an over generalization: what type of business lines at banks are being threatened? What part of “their” core is under attack?
On p. 103 he writes:
“More than 200 regulatory bodies exist in 150 countries, and many of them have been eyeing the blockchain and pondering regulatory updates pertaining to it.”
Surely that is a typo, there are probably 200 regulatory bodies alone in the US itself.
On p. 105 he writes:
“Banks will need to decide if they see the blockchain as a series of Band-Aids, or if they are willing to find the new patches of opportunity. That is why I have been advocating that they should embrace (or buy) the new cryptocurrency exchanges, not because these enable Bitcoin trades, but because they are a new generation of financial networks that has figured out how to transfer assets, financial instruments, or digital assets swiftly and reliably, in essence circumventing the network towers and expense bridges that the current financial services industry relies upon.”
This is a confusing passage.
Nearly all of the popular cryptocurrency exchanges in developed countries require KYC/AML compliance in order for users to cash-in and out of their fiat holdings. How do cryptocurrency exchanges provide any utility to banks who are already used to transferring and trading foreign exchange?
In terms of percentages, cryptocurrency exchanges are still very easy to compromise versus banks; what utility do banks obtain by acquiring exchanges with poor financial controls?
And, in order to fund their internal operations, cryptocurrency exchanges invariably end up with the same type of cost structures regulated financial institutions have; the advantage that they once had effectively involved non-compliance – that is where some of the cost savings was. And banks cannot simply ignore regulations because people on social media want them to; these cryptocurrency sites require money to operate, hence the reason why many of them charge transaction fees on all withdrawals and some trades.
On p. 115 he mentions La’Zooz and Maidsafe, neither of which – after several years of development, actually work. Perhaps that changes in the future.
On p.118 he writes:
“There is another potential application of DIY Government 2.0. Suppose a country’s real government is failing, concerned citizens could create a shadow blockchain governance that is more fair, decentralized and accountable. There are at least 50 failed, fragile, or corrupt states that could benefit from an improve blockchain governance.”
Perhaps this is true, that there could be utility gain from some kind of blockchain. But this misses a larger challenge: many of these same countries lack private property rights, the rule of law and speedy courts.
On p. 119 he writes about healthcare use cases:
“Carrying a secure wallet with our full electronic medical record in it, or our stored DNA, and allowing its access, in case of emergency.”
What advantage do customers gain from carrying this around in a secure wallet? Perhaps they do, but it isn’t clear in this chapter.
On p. 126-127 he makes the case for organizations to have a “blockchain czar” but an alternative way to pitch this without all the pomp is simply to have someone be tasked with becoming a subject-matter expert on the topic.
On p. 131 he writes:
“Transactions are actually recorded in sequential data blocks (hence the word blockchain), so there is a historical, append-only log of these transaction that is continuously maintained and updated. A fallacy is that the blockchain is a distributed ledger.”
It is not a fallacy.
On p. 149 he writes: “What happened to the Web being a public good?”
Costs. Websites have real costs. Content on those websites have real costs. And so forth. Public goods are hard to sustain because no one wants to pay for them but everyone wants to use them. Eventually commercial entities found a way to build and maintain websites that did not involve external subsidization.
On p. 150 he writes:
“Indeed, not only was the Web hijacked with too many central choke points, regulators supposedly continue to centralize controls in order to lower risk, whereas the opposite should be done.”
This conflicts with the “Internet is decentralized” meme that was discussed throughout the book. So if aspects of the Internet are regulated, and Mougayar disagrees with those regulations, doesn’t this come down to disagreements over public policy?
On p. 153 he writes:
“Money is a form of value. But not all value is money. We could argue that value has higher hierarchy than money. In the digital realm, a cryptocurrency is the perfect digital money. The blockchain is a perfect exchange platform for digital value, and it rides on the Internet, the largest connected network on the planet.”
Why are cryptocurrencies perfect? Perhaps they are, but it is not discussed here.
On p. 153 he also talks about the “programmability” of cryptocurrencies but doesn’t mention that if fiat currencies were digitally issued by central banks, they too could have the same programmable abilities.
On p. 160 he predicts:
“There will be dozens of commonly used, global virtual currencies that will be considered mainstream, and their total market value will exceed $5 trillion, and represent 5% of the world’s $100 trillion economy in 2025.”
Perhaps that occurs, but why? And are virtual currencies now different than digital currencies? Or are they the same? None of these questions are really addressed.
This book is quick read but unfortunately is weighed down by many opinions that are not supported by evidence and consequently, very few practical applications for enterprises are explained in detail.
For regulated businesses such as financial institutions, there are several questions that need to be answered such as: what are the specific cost savings for using or integrating with some kind of blockchain? What are the specific new business lines that could be created? And unfortunately the first edition of this book did not answer these types of questions. Let us look again at a future version.
[Disclaimer: The views expressed below are solely my own and do not necessarily represent the views of my employer or any organization I advise.]
A couple weeks ago I joked that while containment is impossible, it would be nice to know who patient-zero was for using the term “blockchain” without an article preceding it. The mystery of who exactly removed the “a” before “blockchain” is probably residing on the same island that Yeti, Sasquatch, and the New England Patriot’s equipment team are now located.
Don and Alex Tapscott, a Canada-based father-son duo, co-authored a new book entitled Blockchain Revolution that not only suffers from this grammatical faux pas but has several dozen errors and unproven assertions which are detailed in this review.
Below is a chapter-by-chapter look into a book that should have baked in the oven for a bit more time.
Note: all transcription errors are my own. See my other book reviews.
On p. 5 the authors write:
“A decade later in 2009, the global financial industry crashed. Perhaps propitiously, a pseudonymous person or persons named Satoshi Nakamoto outlined a new protocol for a peer-to-peer electronic cash system using a cryptocurrency called bitcoin.”
Ignoring the current drama surrounding Craig Wright — the Australian who claims to be Satoshi — during the initialthreads on Metzdowd, Satoshi mentioned he had been working on this project for 18 months prior; roughly mid-2007. So it was more coincidental timing than intentional.
And much like other books on the same topic, the authors do not clarify that there are more than one type of blockchain in existence and that some are a type of distributed ledger.
For instance, on p. 6 they write:
“At its most basic, it is an open source code: anyone can download it for free, run it, and use it to develop new tools for managing transactions online.”
With the ‘it’ being a ‘blockchain.’ The problem with this grammatical issue is that we know empirically that there many different types of distributed ledgers and blockchains currently under development and not all of them are open sourced. Nor does being open source automagically qualify something as a blockchain.
On p. 6 they write:
“However, the most important and far-reaching blockchains are based on Satoshi’s bitcoin model.”
That’s an opinion that the authors really don’t back up with facts later on.
In addition, on the same page they make the “encryption” error that also plagues books in this space: the Bitcoin blockchain does not use encryption.
For example, on page 6 they write:
“And the blockchain is encrypted: it uses heavy-duty encryption involving public and private keys (rather like the two-key system to access a safety deposit box) to maintain virtual security.”
Incorrect. Bitcoin employs a couple different cryptographic processes, but it doesn’t use encryption. Furthermore, the example of a ‘two-key system’ actually illustrates multisig, not public-private key pairs.
On p. 8 they write:
“Bankers love the idea of secure, frictionless, and instant transactions, but some flinch at the idea of openness, decentralization and new forms of currency. The financial services industry has already rebranded and privatized blockchain technology, referring to it as distributed ledger technology, in an attempt to reconcile the best of bitcoin — security, speed, and cost — with an entirely closed system that requires a bank or financial institution’s permission to use.”
There is a lot of assumptions in here:
(1) it is unclear which “bankers” they are speaking about, is it every person who works at a bank?
(2) the term ‘openness’ is not very well defined, does that mean that people at banks do not want to have cryptographically proven provenance?
In addition, in order for something to be privatized it must have been public at first. Claiming that the “blockchain” toolkit of ideas and libraries was privatized away from Bitcoin is misleading. The moving pieces of Bitcoin itself are comprised of no less than 6 discrete elements that previously existed in the cryptography and distributed systems communities.
The Bitcoin network itself is not being privatized by financial institutions. In fact, if anything, empirically Bitcoin itself is being carved away by entities and efforts largely financed by venture capital — but that is a topic for another article. Furthermore, research into distributed computing and distributed consensus techniques long predates Bitcoin itself, by more than a decade.
Lastly, and this is why it helps to clearly define words at the beginning of a book, it is important to note that some blockchains are a type of distributed ledger but not all distributed ledgers are blockchains.
On page 9 they write that:
“In 2014 and 2015 alone more than $1 billion of venture capital flooded into the emerging blockchain ecosystem, and the rate of investment is almost doubling annually.”
This is only true if you conflate cryptocurrency systems with non-cryptocurrency systems. The two are separate and have completely different business models. See my December presentation for more details about the divergence.
On p. 9 they write:
“A 2013 study showed that 937 people owned half of all bitcoin, although that is changing today.”
First off, this is a typo because the original article the authors cite, actually says the number is 927 not 937. And the ‘study’ showed that about half of all bitcoins resided on addresses controlled by 937 on-chain entities. Addresses does not mean individuals. It is likely that some of these addresses (or rather, UTXOs) are controlled and operated by early adopters (like Roger Ver) as well as exchanges (like Bitstamp and Coinbase).
Furthermore, it is unclear from the rest of the book how that concentration of wealth is changing — where is that data?
On p. 18 they write about Airbnb, but with a blockchain. It is unclear from their explanation what the technical advantage is of using a blockchain versus a database or other existing technology.
On p. 20 they write:
“Abra and other companies are building payment networks using the blockchain. Abra’s goal is to turn every one of its users into a teller. The whole process — from the funds leaving one country to their arriving in another — takes an hour rather than a week and costs 2 percent versus 7 percent or higher. Abra wants its payment network to outnumber all physical ATMs in the world. It took Western Union 150 years to get to 500,000 agents worldwide. Abra will have that many tellers in its first years.”
There are at least 3 problems with this statement:
the authors conflate a blockchain with all blockchains; empirically there is no “the” blockchain
Abra’s sales pitch relies on the ability to convince regulators that the company itself just make software and doesn’t participate in money transmission or movement of financial products (which it does by hedging)
Fast forward to May 2016 and according to the Google Play Store and Abra has only been downloaded about 5,000 times.
Perhaps it will eventually reach 500,000 and even displace Western Union, but the authors’ predictions that this will occur in one year is probably not going to happen at the current rate.
Furthermore, on p. 186 they write that “Abra takes a 25-basis-point fee on conversion.”
Will this require a payment processing license in each jurisdiction the conversion takes place?
On page 24 they write:
“Other critics point to the massive amount of energy consumed to reach consensus in just the bitcoin network: What happens when thousands or perhaps millions of interconnected blockchains are each processing billions of transactions a day? Are the incentives great enough for people to participate and behave safely over time, and not try to overpower the network? Is blockchain technology the worst job killer ever?”
There are multiple problems with this statement:
on a proof-of-work blockchain, the amount of energy consumed is notconnected with the amount of transactions being processed. Miners consume energy to generate proofs-of-work irrespective of the number of transactions waiting in the memory pool. Transaction processing itself is handled by a different entity entirely called a block maker or mining pool.
as of May 2016, it is unclear why there would be millions of interconnected proof-of-work blockchains. There are perhaps a couple hundred altcoins, at least 100 of which are dead, but privately run blockchains do not need to use proof-of-work — thus the question surrounding incentives is a non sequitur.
while blockchains however defined may displace workers of some kind at some point, the authors never really zero in on what “job killing” blockchains actually do?
On p. 25 they write:
“The blockchain and cryptocurrencies, particularly bitcoin, already have massive momentum, but we’re not predicting whether or not all this will succeed, and if it does, how fast it will occur.”
Nowhere do the authors actually cite empirical data showing traction. If there was indeed massive momentum, we should be able to see that from data somewhere, but so far that is not happening. Perhaps that changes in the future.
The closing paragraph of Chapter 1 states that:
“Everyone should stop fighting it and take the right steps to get on board. Let’s harness this force not for the immediate benefit of the few but for the lasting benefit of the many.”
Who is fighting what? They are presumably talking about a blockchain, but which one? And why should people stop what they are doing to get on board with something that is ill-defined?
On p. 30 they write that:
“Satoshi leveraged an existing distributed peer-to-peer network and a bit of clever cryptography to create a consensus mechanism that could solve the double-spend problem as well as, if not better than, a trusted third party.”
The word “trust” or variation thereof appears 11 times in the main body of the original Satoshi whitepaper. Routing around trusted third parties was the aim of the project as this would then allow for pseudonymous interaction. That was in October 2008.
What we empirically see in 2016 though is an increasingly doxxed environment in which it could be argued that ‘trusted’ parties could do the same job — movement of payments — in a less expensive manner. But that is a topic for another article.
On p. 33 they write:
“So important are the processes of mining — assembling a block of transactions, spending some resource, solving the problem, reaching consensus, maintaining a copy of the full ledger — that some have called the bitcoin blockchain a public utility like the Internet, a utility that requires public support. Paul Brody of Ernst & Young thinks that all our appliances should donate their processing power to upkeep of a blockchain: “Your lawnmower or dishwasher is going to come with a CPU that is probably a thousand times more powerful than it actually needs, and so why not have it mine? Not for the purpose of making you money, but to maintain your share of the blockchain,” he said. Regardless of the consensus mechanism, the blockchain ensures integrity through clever code rather than through human beings who choose to do the right thing.”
Let’s dissect this:
the process of mining, as we have looked at before, involves a division of labor between the entities that generate proofs-of-work – colloquially referred to as miners, and those that package transactions into blocks, called blockmakers. Miners themselves do not actually maintain a copy of a blockchain, pools do.
while public blockchains like Bitcoin are a ‘public good,’ it doesn’t follow how or why anyone should be compelled to subsidize them, at least the reasons why are not revealed to readers.
the only reason proof-of-work was used for Bitcoin is because it was a way to prevent Sybil attacks on the network because participants were unknown and untrusted. Why should a washing machine vendor integrate an expensive chip to do calculations that do not help in the washing process? See Appendix B for why they shouldn’t.
because proof-of-work is used in a public blockchain and public blockchains are a public good, how does anyone actually have a “share” of a blockchain? What does that legally mean?
On p. 34 they write:
“The blockchain resides everywhere. Volunteers maintain it by keeping their copy of the blockchain up to date and lending their spare computer processing units for mining. No backdoor dealing.”
There are multiple problems with this:
to some degree entities that run a fully validating node could be seen as volunteering for a charity, but most do not lend spare computer cycles because they do not have the proper equipment to do so (ASIC hardware)
to my knowledge, none of the professional mining farms that exist have stated they are donating or lending their mining power; instead they calculate the costs to generate proofs-of-work versus what the market value of a bitcoin is worth and entering and exiting the market based on the result.
this is a contentious issue, but because of the concentration and centralization of both mining and development work, there have been multiple non-public events in which mining pools, mining farms and developers get together to discuss roadmaps and policy. Is that backdoor dealing?
On p. 35 they write:
“Nothing passes through a central third party; nothing is stored on a central server.”
This may have been true a few years ago, but only superficially true today. Most mining pools connect to the Bitcoin Relay Network, a centralized network that allows miners to propagate blocks faster than they would if they used the decentralized network itself to do so (it lowers the amount of orphan blocks).
On p. 37 they write:
“The paradox of these consensus schemes is that by acting in one’s self-interest, one is serving the peer-to-peer (P2P) network, and that in turn affects one’s reputation as a member of the economic set.”
Regarding cryptocurrencies, there is currently no built-in mechanism for tracking or maintaining reputation on their internal P2P network. There are projects like OpenBazaar which are trying to do this, but an on-chain Bitcoin user does not have a reputation because there is no linkage real world identity (on purpose).
On p. 38 they write:
“Trolls need not apply”
Counterfactually, there are many trolls in the overall blockchain-related world, especially on social media in part because there is no identity system that links pseudonymous entities to real world, legal identities.
On p. 39 the authors list a number of high profile data breaches and identity thefts that took place over the past year, but do not mention the amount of breaches and thefts that take place in the cryptocurrency world each year.
On p. 41 they write:
“Past schemes failed because they lacked incentive, and people never appreciated privacy as incentive enough to secure those systems,” Andreas Antonopoulos said. The bitcoin blockchain solves nearly all these problem by providing the incentive for wide adoption of PKI for all transaction of value, not only through the use of bitcoin but also in the shared bitcoin protocols. We needn’t worry about weak firewalls, thieving employees, or insurance hackers. If we’re both using bitcoin, if we can store and exchange bitcoin securely, then we can store and exchange highly confidential information and digital assets securely on the blockchain.”
There are multiple problems with this statement:
it is overly broad and sweeping to say that every past PKI system has not only failed, but that they all failed because of incentives; neither is empirically true
Bitcoin does not solve for connecting real world legal identities that still will exist with our without the existence of Bitcoin
there are many other ways to securely transmit information and digital assets that does not involve the use of Bitcoin; and the Bitcoin ecosystem itself is still plagued by thieving employees and hackers
On p. 41 they write:
“Hill, who works with cryptographer Adam Back at Blockstream, expressed concern over cryptocurrencies that don’t use proof of work. “I don’t think proof of stake ultimately works. To me, it’s a system where the rich get richer, where people who have tokens get to decide what the consensus is, whereas proof of works ultimately is a system rooted in physics. I really like that because it’s very similar to the system for gold.”
There are multiple problems with this as well:
people that own bitcoins typically try to decide what the social consensus of Bitcoin is — by holding conferences and meetings in order to decide what the roadmap should or should not be and who should and should not be administrators
the debate over whether or not a gold-based economy is good or not is a topic that is probably settled, but either way, it is probably irrelevant to creating Sybil resistance.
On p. 42 they write:
“Satoshi installed no identity requirement for the network layer itself, meaning that no one had to provide a name, e-mail address, or any other personal data in order to download and use the bitcoin software. The blockchain doesn’t need to know who anybody is.”
The authors again conflate the Bitcoin blockchain with all blockchains in general:
there are projects underway that integrate a legal identity and KYC-layer into customized distributed ledgers including one literally called KYC-Chain (not an endorsement)
empirically public blockchains like Bitcoin have trended towards being able to trace and track asset movement back to legal entities; there are a decreasing amount of non-KYC’ed methods to enter and exit the network
On p. 43 they write:
“The blockchain offers a platform for doing some very flexible forms of selective and anonymous attestation. Austin Hill likened it to the Internet. “A TCP/IP address is not identified to a public ID. The network layer itself doesn’t know. Anyone can join the Internet, get an IP address, and start sending and receiving packets freely around the world. As a society, we’ve seen an incredible benefit allowing that level of pseudonymity… Bitcoin operates almost exactly like this. The network itself does not enforce identity. That’s a good thing for society and for proper network design.”
This is problematic in a few areas:
it is empirically untrue that anyone can just “join the Internet” because the Internet is just an amalgamation of intranets (ISPs) that connect to one another via peering agreements. These ISPs can and do obtain KYC information and routinely kick people off for violating terms of service. ISPs also work with law enforcement to link IP addresses with legal identities; in fact on the next page the authors note that as well.
in order to use the Bitcoin network a user must obtain bitcoins somehow, almost always — as of 2016 — through some KYC’ed manner. Furthermore, there are multiple projects to integrate identity into distributed ledger networks today. Perhaps they won’t be adopted, but regulated institutions are looking for ways to streamline the KYC/AML process and baking in identity is something many of them are looking at.
On p. 44 they write:
“So governments can subpoena ISPs and exchanges for this type of user data. But they can’t subpoena the blockchain.”
That is not quite true. There are about 10 companies that provide data analytics to law enforcement in order to track down illicit activity involving cryptocurrencies all the way to coin generation itself.
Furthermore, companies like Coinbase and Circle are routinely subpoenaed by law enforcement. So while the network itself cannot be physically subpoenaed, there are many other entities in the ecosystem that can be.
On p. 46 they write:
“Combined with PKI, the blockchain not only prevents a double spend but also confirms ownership of every coin in circulation, and each transaction is immutable and irrevocable.”
The public-private key technology being used in Bitcoin does not confirm ownership, only control. Ownership implies property rights and a legal system, neither of which currently exist in the anarchic world of Bitcoin.
Furthermore, while it is not currently possible to reverse the hashes (hence the immutability characteristic), blocks can and have been reorganized which makes the Bitcoin blockchain itself revocable.
On p. 47 they write:
“No central authority or third party can revoke it, no one can override the consensus of the network. That’s a new concept in both law and finance. The bitcoin system provides a very high degree of certainty as to the outcome of a contract.”
This is empirically untrue: CLS and national real-time gross settlement (RTGS) systems are typically non-reversible. And the usage of the word contract here implies some legal standing, which does not exist in Bitcoin; there is currently no bridge between contracts issued on a public blockchain with that of real world.
On p. 50 they write:
“That was part of Satoshi’s vision. He understood that, for people in developing economies, the situation was worse. When corrupt or incompetent bureaucrats in failed states need funding to run the government, their central banks and treasuries simply print more currency and then profit from the difference between the cost of manufacturing and the face value of the currency. That’s seigniorage. The increase in the money supply debases the currency.”
First off, they provide no evidence that Satoshi was actually concerned about developing countries and their residents. In addition, they mix up the difference between seigniorage and inflation – they are not the same thing.
In fact, to illustrate with Bitcoin: seigniorage is the marginal value of a bitcoin versus the marginal cost of creating that bitcoin. As a consequence, miners effectively bid up such that in the long run the cost equals the value; although some miners have larger margins than others. In contrast, the increase in the money supply (inflation) for Bitcoin tapers off every four years. The inflation or deflation rate is fully independent of the seigniorage.
On p. 56 they quote Erik Vorhees who says:
“It is faster to mail an anvil to China than it is to send money through the banking system to China. That’s crazy! Money is already digital, it’s not like they’re shipping palletes of cash when you do a wire.”
This is empirically untrue, according to SaveOnSend.com a user could send $1,000 from the US to China in 24 hours using TransFast. In addition:
today most money in developed countries is electronic, not digital; there is no central bank digital cash yet
if new distributed ledgers are built connecting financial institutions, not only could cross-border payments be done during the same day, but it could also involve actual digital cash
On p. 59 they write:
“Other blockchain networks are even faster, and new innovations such as the Bitcoin Lightning Network, aim to dramatically scale the capacity of the bitcoin blockchain while dropping settlement and clearing times to a fraction of a second.”
This is problematic in that it is never defined what clearing and settlement means. And, the Bitcoin network can only — at most — provide some type of probabilistic settlement for bitcoins and no other asset.
On p. 67 they write:
“Private blockchains also prevent the network effects that enable a technology to scale rapidly. Intentionally limiting certain freedoms by creating new rules can inhibit neutrality. Finally, with no open value innovation, the technology is more likely to stagnate and become vulnerable.”
Not all private blockchains or distributed ledgers are the same, nor do they all have the same terms of service. The common theme has to do with knowing all the participants involved in a transaction (KYC/KYCC) and only certain known entities can validate a transaction.
Furthermore, the authors do not provide any supporting evidence for why this technology will stagnate or become vulnerable.
On p. 70 they write:
“The financial utility of the future could be a walled and well-groomed garden, harvested by a cabal of influential stakeholders, or it could be an organic and spacious ecosystem, where people’s economic fortunes grow wherever there is light. The debate rages on, but if the experience of the first generation of the Internet has taught us anything, it’s that open systems scale more easily than closed ones.”
The authors do not really define what open and closed means here. Fulfilling KYC requirements through terms of service at ISPs and governance structures like ICANN did not prevent the Internet from coming into existence. It is possible to have vibrant innovation on top of platforms that require linkage to legal identification.
On p. 72 the authors quote Stephen Pair stating:
“Not only can you issue these assets on the blockchain, but you can create systems where I can have an instantaneous atomic transaction where I might have Apple stock in my wallet and I want to buy something or you. But you want dollars. With this platform I can enter a single atomic transaction (i.e., all or none) and use my Apple stock to send you dollars.”
This is currently not possible with Bitcoin without changing the legal system. Furthermore:
this is probably not safe to do with Bitcoin due to how colored coin schemes distort the mining incentive scheme
from a technological point of view, there is nothing inherently unique about Bitcoin that would enable this type of atomic swapping that several other technology platforms could do as well
On p. 73 they write:
“Not so easy. Banks, despite their enthusiasms for blockchain, have been wary of these companies, arguing blockchain businesses are “high-risk” merchants.”
Once again this shows how the authors conflate “blockchain” with “Bitcoin.” The passage they spoke about Circle, a custodian of bitcoins that has tried to find banks to partner with for exchanging fiat to bitcoins and vice versa. This is money transfer. This type of activity is different than what a “blockchain” company does, most of whom aren’t exchanging cryptocurrencies.
On p. 74 they write:
“Third, new rules such as Sarbanes-Oxley have done little to curb accounting fraud. If anything, the growing complexity of companies, more multifaceted transactions, and the speed of modern commerce create new ways to hide wrongdoing.”
This may be true, but what are the stats or examples of people violating Sarbanes-Oxley, and how do “blockchains” help with this specifically?
On p. 78 they write:
“The blockchain returns power to shareholders. Imagine that a token representing a claim on an asset, a “bitshare,” could come with a vote or many votes, each colored to a particular corporate decision. People could vote their proxies instantly from anywhere, thereby making the voting process for major corporate actions more response, more inclusive, and less subject to manipulation.”
First off, which blockchain? And how does a specific blockchain provide that kind of power that couldn’t otherwise be done with existing non-blockchain technology?
On p. 80 they quote Marc Andreessen who says:
“PayPal can do a real-time credit score in milliseconds, based on your eBay purchase history — and it turns out that’s a better source of information than the stuff used to generate your FICO score.”
But what if you do not use eBay? And why do you need a blockchain to track or generate a credit rating?
On p. 81:
“This model has proven to work. BTCjam is a peer-to-peer lending platform that uses reputation as the basis for extending credit.”
BTCjam appears to have plateaued. They currently have a low churn rate on the available loans and they exited the US market 2 months ago.
On p. 83 they write:
“The blockchain IPO takes the concept further. Now, companies can raise funds “on the blockchain” by issuing tokens, or cryptosecurities, of some value in the company. They can represent equity, bonds, or, in the case of Augur, market-maker seats on the platform, granting owners the right to decide which prediction markets the company will open.”
From a technical perspective this may be possible, but from a legal and regulatory perspective, it may not be yet. Overstock has been given permission by the SEC to experiment with issuance.
On p. 86 they write:
“Bitcoin cannot have bail-ins, bank holidays, currency controls, balance freezes, withdrawal limits, banking hours,” said Andreas Antonopoulos.
That’s not quite true. Miners can and will continue to meet at their own goals and they have the power to hard fork to change any of these policies including arbitrarily increasing or decreasing the issuance as well as changing fees for faster inclusion. They also have the ability to censor transactions altogether and potentially — if the social value on the network increases — “hold up” transactions altogether.
Also, this doesn’t count the subsidies that miners receive from the utilities.
On p. 98 they write:
“To this last characteristic, Antonopoulos notes: “If there is enough financial incentive to preserve this blockchain into the future, the possibility of it existing for tens, hundreds, or even thousands of years cannot be discounted.”
It can arguably be discounted. What evidence is presented to back up the claim that any infrastructure will last for hundreds of years?
On p. 100 they write:
“And just imagine how the Uniform Commercial Code might look on the blockchain.”
Does this mean actually embedding the code as text onto a blockchain? Or does this mean modifying the UCC to incorporate the design characteristics of a specific blockchain?
On p. 102 they write:
“What interests Andreas about the blockchain is that we can execute this financial obligation in a decentralized technological environment with a built-in settlement system. “That’s really cool,” he said, “because I could actually pay you for the pen right now, you would see the money instantly, you would put the pen in the mail, and I could get a verification of that. It’s much more likely that we can do business.”
I assume that they are talking about the Bitcoin blockchain:
there is no on-chain settlement of fiat currencies, which is the actual money people are settling with on the edges of the network
since it is not fiat currency, it does not settle instantly. In fact, users still have a counterparty risk involving delivery of the pen versus the payment.
if a central bank issued a digital currency, then there could be on-chain settlement of cash.
On p. 103 they write:
“If partners spends more time up front determining the terms of an agreement, the monitoring, enforcement, and settlement costs drop significantly, perhaps to zero. Further, settlement can occur in real time, possibly in microseconds throughout the day depending on that deal.”
The DTCC published a white paper in January that explains they can already do near real-time settlement, but T+3 exists due to laws and other market structures.
On p. 105 they write that:
“Multisig authentication is growing in popularity. A start-up called Hedgy is using multisig technology to create futures contracts: parties agree on a price of bitcoin that will be traded in the future, only ever exchanging the price difference.”
As an aside, Hedgy is now dead. Also, there are other ways to illustrate multisig utility as a financial control to prevent abuse.
On p. 106 they wrote that:
“The trouble is that, in recent business history, many hierarchies have not been effective, to the point of ridicule. Exhibit A is The Dilbert Principle, most likely one of the best-selling management books of all time, by Scott Adams. Here’s Dilbert on blockchain technology from a recent cartoon…”
The problem is that the cartoon they are citing (above) was actually a parody created by Ken Tindell last year.
The original Scott Adam’s cartoon was poking fun of databases and is from November 17, 1995.
On p. 115 they write:
“But the providers of rooms receive only part of the value they create. International payments go through Western Union, which takes $10 of every transaction and big foreign exchange off the top.”
Western Union does not have a monopoly on international payments, in fact, in many popular corridors they have less than 25% of market share. In addition, Western Union does not take a flat $10 off every transaction. You can test this out by going to their price estimator. For instance, sending $1,000 from the US to a bank account in China will cost $8.
On p. 117 they write about a fictional blockchain-based Airbnb called bAirbnb:
“You and the owner have now saved most of the 15 percent Airbnb fee. Settlements are assured and instant. There are no foreign exchange fees for international contracts. You need not worry about stolen identity. Local governments in oppressive regimes cannot subpoena bAirbnb for all its rental history data. This is the real sharing-of-value economy; both customers and service providers are the winner.”
The problem with their statement is that cash settlements, unless it is digital fiat, is not settled instantly. Identities can still be stolen on the edges (from exchanges). And, governments can still issue subpoenas and work with data analytics companies to track provenance and history.
On p. 119 they write:
“Along comes blockchain technology. Anyone can upload a program onto this platform and leave it to self-execute with a strong cryptoeconomical guarantee that the program will continue to perform securely as it was intended.”
While that may have been the case when these cryptocurrency systems first launched, in order to acquire ether (for Ethereum) or bitcoin, users must typically exchange fiat first. And in doing so, they usually dox themselves through the KYC requirements at exchanges.
On p.123-124 they write about a ‘Weather decentralized application’ but do not discuss how its infrastructure is maintained let alone the Q-o-S.
On p.127 they write:
“Using tokens, companies such as ConsenSys have already issued shares in their firms, staging public offerings without regulatory oversight.”
The legality of this is not mentioned.
On p. 128 they write:
“Could there be a self-propagating criminal or terrorist organizations? Andreas Antonopolous is not concerned. He believes that the network will manages such dangers. “Make this technology available to seven and a half billion people, 7.499 billion of those will use it for good and that good can deliver enormous benefit to society.”
How does he know this? Furthermore, the Bitcoin network itself is already available to hundreds of millions, but many have chosen not to use it. Why is this not factored into the prediction?
On p.131 they write:
“What if Wikipedia went on the blockchain — call it Blockpedia.”
The total article text of English Wikipedia is currently around 12 gigabytes. If it is a public blockchain, then how would this fit on the actual blockchain itself? Why not upload the English version onto the current Bitcoin blockchain as an experiment? What utility is gained?
From p. 129-144 they imagine seven ideas that are pitched as business ideas, but in most instances it is unclear what the value proposition that a blockchain provides over existing technology.
On p. 148 they write that:
“The Internet of Things cannot function without blockchain payment networks, where bitcoin is the universal transactional language.”
What does that mean? Does that mean that there are multiple blockchains and that somehow bitcoin transactions control other blockchains too?
On p. 152 they write:
“Last is the overarching challenge of centralized database technology — it can’t handle trillions of real-time transactions without tremendous costs.”
What are those costs? And what specifically prevents databases from doing so?
On p. 153 they write:
“Other examples are a music service, or an autonomous vehicle,” noted Dino Mark Angaritis, founder of Smartwallet, “each second that the music is playing or the car is driving it’s taking a fraction of a penny out of my balance. I don’t have a large payment up front and pay only for what I use. The provider runs no risk of nonpayment. You can’t do these things with a traditional payment networks because the fees are too high for sending fractions of a penny off your credit card.”
Depositing first and having a card-on-file are types of solutions that currently exist. “Microtipping” doesn’t really work for a number of reasons including the fact that consumers do not like to nickel and dime themselves. This is one of the reasons that ChangeTip had difficulties growing.
Furthermore, the tangential market of machine-to-machine payments may not need a cryptocurrency for two reasons:
M2M payments could utilize existing electronic payment systems via pre-paid and card-on-file solutions
The friction of moving into and out of fiat to enter into the cryptocurrency market is an unnecessary leg, especially if and when central bank digital currency is issued.
On pages 156-169 nearly all of the examples could use a database as a solution, it is unclear what value a blockchain could provide in most cases. Furthermore, on p. 159 they discuss documentation and record keeping but don’t discuss how these records tie into current legal infrastructure.
On p. 172 they write:
“We’re talking billions of new customers, entrepreneurs, and owners of assets, on the ground and ready to be deployed. Remember, blockchain transactions can be tiny, fractions of pennies, and cost very little complete.”
Maybe some transactions on some blockchains cost fractions of pennies, but currently not Bitcoin transactions.
On p.177 they write that “David Birch, a cryptographer and blockchain theorist, summed it up: “Identity is the new money.”
“Financing a company is easier as you can access equity and debt capital on a global scale, and if you’re using a common denominator — like bitcoin — you need not worry about exchange rates and conversation rates.”
Unless everyone is using one currency, this is untrue.
On p.185 they write:
“Sending one bitcoin takes about 500 bits, or roughly one one-thousandth the data consumption of one second of video Skype!”
But users still need to cash out on the other side which requires different infrastructure than Skype, namely money transmitter licenses and bank accounts.
On p. 192 they write that:
“Second, it can mean better protection of women and children. Through smart contracts, funds can be donated into escrow accounts, accessible only by women, say, for accessing food, feminine products, health care, and other essentials.”
How can a smart contract itself detect what gender the user is?
On p.194 they write:
“In jurisdictions like Honduras where trust is low in public institutions and property rights systems are weak, the bitcoin blockchain could help to restore confidence and rebuild reputation.”
How does Bitcoin do that? What are the specific ways it can?
On p. 202 they write:
“People can register their copyrights, organize their meetings, and exchange messages privately and anonymously on the blockchain.”
Which blockchain does this? There are external services like Ascribe.io that purportedly let creators take a hash of a document (such as a patent) and store it into a blockchain. But the blockchain itself doesn’t have that feature.
On p.214 they write:
“But surely a more collaborative model of democracy — perhaps one of that rewards participation such as the mining function — could encourage citizens’ engagement and learning about issues, while at the same time invigorating the public sector with the keen reasoning the nation can collectively offer.”
On p. 255 they mention that Greek citizens during 2015 would’ve bought more bitcoins if they had better access to ATMs and exchanges. But this is not true, empirically people typically try to acquire USD because it is more universal and liquid. Perhaps that changes in the future, but not at this time.
On p. 260 they write:
“The cost for having no central authority is the cost of that energy,” said Eric Jennings, CEO of Filament, an industrial wireless sensor network. That’s one side of the argument. The energy is what it is, and it’s comparable to the cost incurred in securing fiat currency.”
Where is the citation? The reason the costs of securing the Bitcoin network are currently around $400 million a year is because that is roughly the amount of capital and energy expended by miners to secure a network in which validators are unknown and untrusted. If you know who the participants are, the costs of securing a network drop by several orders of magnitude.
On p. 261 they write about the BitFury Group, a large mining company:
“Its founder and CEO, Valery Vavilov, argued the view that machines and mining operations overall will continue to get more energy efficient and environmentally friendly.”
Actually what happens is that while the ASIC chips themselves become more energy efficient, miners in practice will simply add more equipment and maintain roughly the same energy costs as a whole. That is to say, if a new chip is 2x as efficient as before, miners typically just double the acquisition of equipment — maintaining the same amount of energy consumption, while doubling the hashrate. There is no “environmental friendliness” in proof-of-work blockchains due to the Red Queen Effect.
On p. 274 they write:
“There will be many attempts to control the network,” said Keonne Rodriguez of Blockchain. “Big companies and governments will be devoted to breaking down privacy. The National Security Agency must be actively analyzing data coming through the blockchain even now.”
With thousands of copies being replicated around the world, it’s unclear who actually is storing it, perhaps intelligence agencies are. We do know that at least 10 companies are assisting compliance teams and law enforcement in tracking the provenance of cryptocurrency movements.
On p. 282 they write:
“Indeed, Mike Hearn, a prominent bitcoin core developer, caused a quite a stir in January 2015 when he wrote a farewell letter to the industry foretelling bitcoin’s imminent demise.”
“Licensed exchanges, such as Gemini, have gained ground perhaps because their institutional clientele know they’re now as regulated as banks.”
Actually, Gemini hasn’t gained ground and remains relatively flat over the past ~5 months. Even adding ether to their list of assets didn’t move the dial.
Overall the book was published a little too early as there hasn’t been much real traction in the entire ecosystem.
The content and perspective is currently skewed towards telling the cryptocurrency narrative and seemingly downplays the important role that institutions and enterprises have played over the past year in the wider distributed ledger ecosystem.
If you are looking for just one book to read on the topic, I would pass on this and wait for a future edition to rectify the issues detailed above. See my other book reviews.
There are currently two popular interrelated narratives on social media surrounding participation of the block making process on a public blockchain. The stories are most pronounced within the Bitcoin community but are also reused by Litecoin, Ethereum and other cryptocurrencies too.
This includes the unchallenged statements that:
(1) anyone can still participate in block making, it is ungated and “permissionless”
(2) following a reward halving (“halvening”), networks become more decentralized because large, centralized farms and actors split apart due to economic pressures
This post looks at both of these and show that in practice neither is really true as of April 2016.
Named block makers
A year ago I reflected on some of the debate surrounding permissioned and permissionless blockchains. Part of that post involved looking at how the mining market actually evolved in practice; not just based on the generalized claims made by enthusiasts at conferences.
For instance, based on block height below is a list of the first time a pool self-doxxed and signed a coinbase transaction, courtesy of Organ of Corti. Only the first 50 are chronologically included:
Recall that even though it didn’t initially sign coinbase transactions, Slush began publicly operating at the end of November 2010. Eligius was announced on April 27, 2011. DeepBit publicly launched on February 26, 2011 and at one point was the most popular pool, reaching for a short period in July 2011, more than 50% of the network hashrate.
While many enthusiasts claim that “anyone can mine,” in practice, very few choose to for a number of reasons that will be discussed below.
But more to the point, the reason cryptocurrencies allegedly have a “permissionless” characteristic in the first place has to do exclusively with the fact that there is no administrative gating or vetting process for allowing actors on the network to participate in the block making process. In 2009 there was no whitelist, blacklist, KYC or KYM (know your miner) process.
That is to say, those wanting to create a block did not need permission from a network administrator.1 That is the sole context of the term “permissionless.”
It is not related to developing other platforms that plug into the network. It is not related to whether the network codebase is open source or not. It is not related to being able to build software products that somehow utilize the network. It is not related to being able to view or not view transactions.
Yet due to how the market evolved, today in 2016 while everyone is still paying for the high marginal costs to maintain a network designed for pseudonymous and anonymous interaction, few participants, specifically block makers, are actually capitalizing off of that utility.
(1) Acquiring the necessary hardware to become a profitable miner invariably leaves a paper trail. If instead you acquire the hardware on the second-hand market — in order to remain anonymous — you will still likely leave a paper trail with your legal identity in order to pay for the large energy bill and property taxes. This is one of the reasons why miners in locations such as China do not publicize their fundraising activities or annual revenue: they don’t want to leave a paper trail to pay any extra taxes.2
(2) The other main mechanism for vetting miners now is through the use of data science itself. Roughly 10 companies globally provide law enforcement, compliance teams and regulators access to relatively robust analytics tools to track provenance of bitcoins (or other cryptocurrencies) back to coin generation itself. And in order to sell these mined bitcoins (e.g., to pay for the electricity and the mining hardware), nearly every bitcoin conversion to fiat marketplace now requires some compliance of local KYC and AML regulations.
While there are workarounds such as LocalBitcoins and SharedCoin, generally speaking the pseudonymous network itself in 2016 has largely become doxxed. Yet the high costs of maintaining pseudonymity, via proof-of-work, still remain.
Above is a pie chart that estimates the hashrate distribution among mining pools over the past 4 days (as of late April 2016). The 10 largest pools collectively made 97% of the blocks during that time period.3
Above is the pool distribution of the past year based on coinbase data aggregated by Blocktrail.
The 10 largest pools collectively account for roughly 91.6% of all block making activity. There is also a relatively long tail that includes roughly another 60 entities (some of whom do sign coinbase transactions) that represent the remaining 8.4% of all block making the past year.
Why do any actors sign transactions at all, after all, isn’t a core characteristic of a public blockchain pseudonymous consensus? To my knowledge, no one has formally published a thorough explanation for the reasons why. But one repeated rationale is that pools do so in order to prove to the miners (hashers) connected to the pool what the provenance of the block reward income is.
What does that mean?
For those who have never partaken in the mining process before, a quick history lesson: within the first two years of Bitcoin’s existence a division of labor arose in which block making became separated from hashing itself (e.g., generating proofs-of-work).
That is to say, the security of network security was outsourced to entities who create proofs-of-work and who are colloquially referred to as miners.4 Miners, in return for steady payouts of income, send their work to a pool operator who subsequently batches transactions together into blocks and pays workers based on a pre-arranged agreement (usually proportional, share-based).5
Today, if average Joe buys ASIC mining equipment, he typically does not connect them to his own pool but instead connects them to a pool run by Bob the devops professional.6 And how can Joe trust Bob not to shave off pennies from each share of work that Joe submits?
Block signing in theory provides some semblance of transparency: letting the hashers know if pool operators are skimming off the proceeds by not accurately reporting blocks found (e.g., income).
For instance, if a pool operator makes a block based off of the proof-of-work submitted by one of the hashers connected to a pool, such as Joe, but does not sign the coinbase, the pool operator can try to pretend that it didn’t win the block reward in the first place and therefore would not have to pay the workers (hashers). This was allegedly more commonplace prior to 2013, before the advent of VC financed farms and pools.7 Now many of the medium and large hashing farm operators want to know the exact revenue number and hear good reasons for why some is missing or if the pool was just “unlucky.”8
Why doesn’t everyone become a block maker, after all, the process is billed as being “open” to all?
There are multiple reasons why, but the most important reason boils down to economics. Dave Hudson has written about 10 different articles on the baked-in variance (inhomogenous Poisson process) that motivates individuals to continually pool their mining effort versus solo mine.9 Spoiler alert: you are likely to be struck by lightning before you will ever create a block and reap a block reward by solo mining off of your laptop at home.
Other reasons for why few decide to become block-makers include: the added costs of providing DOS protection to your pool and the need to hire competent staff that can prevent and be on the lookout for problems like BGP hijacking which results in lost revenue.
This has not changed for multiple years and will likely not change for reasons discussed below.
With the upcoming Bitcoin block reward halving that is expected to take place in mid-July, there is a growing chorus of ‘hope’ that it will somehow lead to fewer large mining farms and pools.
This probably won’t occur for several simple reasons, namely due to economic incentives.
Recall that the major reasons why mining activity itself has gravitated to locations such as China isn’t due to conspiracy theories involving lizards but instead ancillary costs.
Specifically the following factors:
relatively low labor costs (e.g., professional hashing facilities need to be maintained by a workforce 24 x 7 and wages in China are lower than Russia and the US for this activity)
relatively low property costs (e.g., if you have good guanxi, you can utilize and own land at rates below those found in parts of Russia and the US)
first-to-market with hardware; because a lot of the final assembly of hashing equipment takes place in southern China, in terms of logistics and transportation end-users have a lead-time advantage over other geographical regions
close personal connections with hardware manufacturers and fabrication plants in China and Taiwan; acquiring hardware for mining cryptocurrencies is just as relationship driven as other specialized non-commoditized industries. Because medium and large miners know who the chip design teams are and what the ASIC roadmaps will be, they can stand in line at the front and acquire hardware before others.
What will happen after a block reward halving?
Just as oil producers with the highest marginal costs have been forced to exit the fracking market over the past couple of years, Bitcoin miners with the thinnest margins will likely exit the market immediately.
What this actually results in, at least the short run, is a more concentrated group of larger hashing farms and pools.
Because miners as a whole are effectively being given a 50% pay cut to provide the same utility as before. And ceteris paribus, if Alice doesn’t currently have thick 50% margins, then she will likely exit the market.
In contrast, some of the most profitable miners in China and Republic of Georgia are now operating — even with the large difficulty rise over the past 6 months — with 50+% margins. They may be squeezed, but they do not have to exit the market.
Basically, the less efficient players will be squeezed out and the more efficient players will remain. Who is likely be be more efficient? Larger farms in cheaper locations, or smaller pools made up of less sophisticated players with less capital?
But if the price of cryptocurrencies rise — in this case bitcoins — then won’t former miners come back into the market?
Maybe, but recall, we have seen this song and dance before and it is likely that the block reward halving is already factored into both the current market price and the hardware replacement cycle and as a result there probably will not be a doubling of the market price of bitcoins. However, that is a topic for a different post.
Other public blockchains
What do mining pool distributions look like for other cryptocurrencies?
Above is the distribution of mining pools for Litecoin over the past day. Interestingly, Coinotron — a pool I used when mining 3 years ago — currently represents 2.8% of the block making during that time frame. Two years ago, in May 2014, it represented about 50%.
In August 2015, Litecoin underwent its first block reward halving. Contrary to popular belief, its market price did not double. In fact, nine months later the price of a litecoin measured in USD is just fifty cents higher than what it was pre-halving.11
Above is the distribution of mining pools for Ethereum over the past day.
Interestingly Ethereum formally launched in August 2015 and has seen the same consistent pattern of 3-4 pools representing the majority of block making activity as other cryptocurrencies have witnessed.
In fact, Dwarfpool, despite its name, has flirted with the 50% threshold several times, most notably in March. The Ethereum development team plans to transition the network from proof-of-work to proof-of-stake (Casper) later this year; it is unclear if the “staking” process will result in similar centralization.
Other cryptocurrencies continue to face similar pool centralization. This includes Namecoin which last year saw one pool, F2Pool provide more than 50% of the network hashrate for multiple months. While it does not appear that F2Pool behaved maliciously, the fact that one block maker could potentially rewrite history by doing block reorgs motivated Onename to migrateaway from Namecoin.
It is surprising that with the 60%+ hashrate located in China that there is scant detail in English about how that ecosystem works. But there are reasons for this.
Recall that based on the current 25 BTC block reward, roughly $450 million in mining rewards has been divvied out over the past year to miners. On paper that would mean that China-based miners received more than $270 million in revenue, which cements this industry as one of two that continually see large annual revenue flows (the second being exchanges themselves).
I contacted a mining operator in China that currently operates about 40 petahashes per second in equipment. Note: miners use the abbreviated term ‘P’ and ‘PH’ to denote petahashes per second.
According to him:
“Our public hashing number is based on all our own hardware. This includes two facilities in western Sichuan plus a new Xinjiang site. All of these machines were originally S3’s from Bitmain but we have replaced them with S7’s. We want to build larger operations than what we have today, but our goal is to maintain a specific percentage of the entire network.”
“Remember our electric rates changes from season to season: different time of year and that hydro power has problems in the winter because of less melt water which results in an energy price that is twice as the rate in the summer.”
“The land is basically free because it is in the mountains and no one is interested in buying property there. So all it takes is construction materials and labor. We hired 10 people last year. We intentionally hired more than we needed so we can build a team and send them places. Our front end operation probably only needs 4-5 people and we pay them $1,000 a month which is actually very competitive for that region.”
“We know a Chinese guy, Mr. LY. He lives in Sichuan and was originally a hydroelectric operator but now owns his own hydro power station. He learned he could make more money mining than just running the station.”
“Why are people like us able to be competitive? In Yunnan, Guizhou and Sichuan there was an overinvestment in hydropower last decade and now there is a surplus of electricity.12 Dam operators couldn’t sell the electricity generated so that’s where Bitcoin miners moved to. Also, in Liaoning, some people can free electricity because of the proximity to oil fields – they are given cheap electricity to local residents as compensation for confiscated land/polluting the environment — it is subsidized electricity.”
“No one really pays taxes because miners don’t generate something considered valuable. That’s to say from the perspective of taxpayer, miners don’t generate something of value, because the government doesn’t really recognize bitcoin. Bitcoin mining isn’t illegal, we still pay a small amount of taxes but it’s like running a company that doesn’t make money. Instead a miner just pays a small amount of taxes and all the profit is invisible to the law as it stands today.”
I also reached out to another mining operator based in southern China who explained that in practice, mining farms that produce 1 PH or more are usually not based in cities:
“Most of the time they are not in cities, more like in the middle of nowhere and it would be inaccurate to name towns.”
Instead he listed provinces where they are spread out including: Heilongjiang,Liaoning, Hebei, Sichuan, Tianjin, Anhui, Jiangsu, Ghuizhou, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, Guangdong. “Shenzhen for sure, there are testing facilities that are easily over 1P.”
What about ‘subprovincial’ locations?
“It is inaccurate to present information that way. A lot of the time, the sites are between borders because it’s in the middle of nowhere. And it normally spreads over lots of sites. One place has nearly 200 sites crossing two provinces; a lot of small ones representing about 100KW of power each. They are spread over several hundred kilometers; no economy of scale after a certain point.”
No service-level agreements
This type of self-doxxing, quasi-dynamic environment has led to another interesting phenomenon: ad hoc customer service via social media.
For example, two days ago, a user sent approximately 291.2409 bitcoins as a mining “fee.”13 A small pool called BitClub Network built the block that included this fee. This fee is equivalent to about $136,000.
The community as a whole then began a crowdsourced investigation into who may have sent this fee and the motivations for doing so, with many believing it to be a mistake. After all they reasoned, a typical “fee” that most mining pools require in order to be included in the next block is usually less than 25 cents on most days.
A user affiliated with BitClub has since publicly stated it would like to return the fee to the original entity that sent it, though it is unclear if he is speaking with any authority or if the whole thing was a ruse to begin with.
But, as I have argued before, this not only sets a bad precedent for miners as a whole due to a loss of revenue from the forthcoming ‘halvening,’ but the ability to contact a block maker sets a dangerous precedent for the core utility of the network: the disappearance of pseudonymous consensus.
Or in other words, if block making was actually pseudoymous and decentralized, with 100+ unidentified pools creating blocks each day, it would be difficult if not impossible to locate and provide timely customer service to a user who made a mistake.
For instance, the most well-known block reorg occurred in March 2013 and it was only resolved when miners, including Slush and BTCGuild, contacted and coordinated with one another via IRC. If the network was more decentralized and pseudonymous, this coordination would have been very difficult to do, and this was by design.
I pointed out this irony on Twitter earlier this week as well: that there are trade-offs with this approach and the downside of using a bearer asset-based system that had no service level agreement, no EULA, no terms of service results in a world in which users who make mistakes have to complain on social media and hope someone is charitable.
And this happens on a regular basis: earlier this month a user accidentally sent 13.65 bitcoins to the BTCC pool and used reddit as his customer service forum.
That type of friction is not what most consumers want.14 It is a poor user experience which has gradually led to the creation of ‘trusted’ intermediaries in this ecosystem which as described in previousposts, recreates the existing financial system but without the same level of oversight and financial controls.
The cryptocurrency community is learning the hard way why intermediaries exist, why SLAs exist, why legal identities are required for financial transactions, why consumer protection laws arose and so forth. Pointing out these patterns is not malice or due to a lack of understanding of how cryptocurrencies work, but rather it serves as illustrations for why it has been hard to find real sustainable traction in the space.
Thus, for all the hype around “trust anchors” tied into public blockchains such as Bitcoin, claims of decentralization and “trust-lessness” are empirically untrue.
In practice, due to centralization and identity leakage, the cost to successfully reorganize a block isn’t through a Maginot Line attack (e.g., via hashrate), but through cheaper out-of-band attacks, such as hosting events in which self-doxxed miners participate. But that is also a topic for a different post.
16 months ago, Vitalik Buterin and others jokingly quipped that the trends towards centralization in Bitcoin mining (and other cryptocurrencies) resulted in a world where each coinbase transaction effectively arose from a multisig process.
To quote Buterin: “with Bitcoin, we’re paying $600 million a year on a 5-of-10 multisig.”
10 is roughly the amount of quasi-permanent block makers in a given day. And $600 million was the amount of revenue that miners received at that time due to the higher market value of bitcoin.
In theory, anyone can turn on their computer and hope to become a block maker on a public blockchain — no one has to register with a “Blockchain Admin” because there is no admin. However, in practice it requires a certain amount of technical knowledge and more importantly, capital, to profitably and sustainably operate a mining farm and pool.
And in order to scale this profitably, in practice, most miners at some point reveal their legal identities thereby negating the core characteristic of a public blockchain: pseudonymity. How? Miners, after having erected purpose-built facilities or to liquidate their holdings, may be required by external authorities to go through a gating / vetting process (such as KYC).
Ironically, a substantial increase in cryptocurrency prices may inevitably result in self-doxxing of all major farms. How? As market prices increase, miners in turn expend more capital to increase their own hashrate to chase the seigniorage rents.
Because of the KYC requirements of utilizing resources like electricity at a hydroelectric dam and the subsequent identity leakage, this turns the block making process itself into a mostly known, permissioned activity. Consequently, based on this past history, the term DMMS should probably be qualified with a “quasi” modifier in the front: QDMMS.
Similarly, while many enthusiasts have been led to believe a block reward halving will somehow re-decentralize the mining ecosystem, the fact of the matter is chip performance (as measured in hashrate efficiency) is only one factor in the total calculation that professional miners must account for.15
Furthermore, semiconductor engineering itself is effectively on a known, mature trajectory and which appears to be lacking any significant leaps in technological improvement. The largest entities, such as Intel, see this relatively static path which is one of the reasons why they have formally abandoned their tick-tock roadmap and now plan to lay off 12,000 people.
In contrast, energy prices, land prices, labor costs and taxes are among other major components that professional mining operators look at as a whole and decide whether to stay in a market or not. Even if there is some price increase after the halvening, home mining by amateurs outside of China will likely continue to remain unprofitable after July.
Thus a year from now the mining ecosystem will probably look a lot like it does today, with most farms and pools being self-doxxed and relatively centralized.16
[Special thanks to Antony Lewis for his constructive feedback]
There are other reasons too including not wanting to divulge any comparative advantage they might have that would incentivize new entrants to come into the market. [↩]
Note: it is believed that some large mining operators, such as Bitfury, may actually spread some of their hashers (workers) across multiple pools, in order to reduce their own pool percentage and thereby reduce the concerns over centralization. This can only be proven with an on-site physical audit. [↩]
Note: a fee implies something that is mandatory. The discussion surrounding what is and is not a fee or how it should be calculated and applied is a contentious topic in the cryptocurrency community. [↩]
Cryptocurrencies are effectively designed ‘for cypherpunks by cypherpunks.’ While caveat emptor may be desirable to certain demographics, others prefer consumer protection which bearer-based systems do not have. [↩]
Note: in terms of efficiency, 28nm chips are usually in the range of 0.25-0.35 watts/(gh/s), while the newer 14nm or 16nm ones are more likely 0.12 watts/(gh/s) or less. [↩]
Three years since the current wave began and $1 billion later, cryptocurrency / public blockchain ecosystem is experiencing such a level of “fast growth” that no one is able to publish any real usage numbers.1
Sarcasm aside, despite copious amounts of news coverage, interviews and conferences, very few VC-backed cryptocurrency-related startups are divulging any non-gamable numbers.
I had hoped to do a regular quarterly update (see previous January post regarding usage numbers) but there just isn’t much public data to go on. In fact, there is less data today than 3 months ago.
For instance, at some point in the past couple of months, Coinbase removed its wallet transaction volume chart from its chart site. This coincides with a public announcement made in February that ‘Coinbase is not a wallet.’ As Brian Armstrong, CEO of Coinbase stated:
Over the next year or so, you’ll see the Coinbase brand shift from being a hybrid wallet/exchange to focusing on purely being a retail and institutional exchange. It will take some time to update, but the transition will happen.
Interestingly, this somewhat conflicts with another statement made in a Forbespiece this past week covering Coinbase and Blockchain.info, stating:
Currently, 80% of Coinbase’s customers buy bitcoin as an investment, and 20% transact with it, though that balance is currently shifting more toward transactions.
Perhaps transaction volume overall is increasing, but if so, why remove the wallet transaction volume chart? Or is it solely related to transaction volume on the exchange?
The same Forbes article also mentioned another specific aggregate number:
“Startups play a pretty integral role in the sense that we represent most of the end. If you look at users of Bitcoin on the network, most of them are represented by one of the major Bitcoin companies,” says Peter Smith, chief executive of Blockchain, adding that five or six companies, including Coinbase and Blockchain, represent about 80% of transaction volume on the network. Numerous startups are also using Bitcoin to enable their users to more easily send remittances, cross-border payments and peer-to-peer payments, as well as make mobile in-app purchases.
Maybe this is true, maybe there are 5 or 6 companies that represent the lionshare of volume on the Bitcoin network itself. If so, we should be able to see that.
This is a simplified, color coded version of a tool that Chainalysis provides to its customers such as compliance teams at exchanges. The thickness of a band accurately represents the volume of that corridor, it is drawn to scale. The names of certain entities are redacted.
The image is based on data for the first quarter of 2016 and is an update to the chart I published in an article back in January.
Based on the chart above, there are in fact 5-6 organizations that represent 80% of the volume; both Coinbase and Blockchain.info are among them (Blockchain.info also operates SharedCoin).
In fact, Chainalysis recently updated their methodology and found that Coinbase transactions represent every 6th or 7th transaction on the Bitcoin blockchain. 2 This specific area of data science is continuously undergoing refinement and should be looked at once again in the coming months.
The same Forbes article says that Coinbase has 3.5 million users and Blockchain.info has 6.5 million wallet holders.
But as we have looked at before, what does that even mean? Few companies publicly define what a user or wallet actually represents. I have looked at this twice in the past:
The bottom line is that “monthly active users” (MAU) — which is one of the standard methods for measuring real growth (and success) of an application, is still largely unreported by any cryptocurrency-related company that has raised a Series A or higher.3
Other public data
Where can we find data that is still be published and could reflect usage numbers of public blockchains?
According to CoinATMRadar, the ‘number of Bitcoin ATMs installed by Bitcoin machine type’ increased from 536 at the beginning of January to 612 at the end of March. This comes to roughly 0.84 ATMs installed per day or a rate slightly higher than the past 2 years (it is on pace for 308.2 installations altogether this year compared with 275 per year for 2014 and 2015).
In terms of market prices, there were some relatively big swings in volatility (about $100 from peak to trough) in the first quarter due in part to the continued block size debate which still remains unresolved.9
Some venture funding bounced back from the dearth in Q4 2015.
According to the venture capital aggregation at CoinDesk there was $148 million of publicly announced rounds for both Bitcoin-related and Blockchain-related startups spread among 14 deals in Q1 2016. Though two investments alone (DAH and Blockstream) accounted for more than two-thirds of that funding tranche.
However, the list is probably not complete as two investments into Kraken’s Japanese subsidiary were for undisclosed amounts (first from SBI in January and then by Money Partners Group in March). Similarly, Ripple also received capital from SBI in January (for a reported 3 billion yen or ~$25 million).
In addition, last week, CB Insights (a venture tracking firm) held a webinar that covered the “Bitcoin / Blockchain” ecosystem (deck) (recording).
While providing a good general overview, I think it lacks a number of recent developments in the overall “Blockchain” capital markets world.10
For instance, Tradeblock recently launched Axoni (a private / permissioned blockchain) and Peernova isn’t really a “Blockchain” company now. 11 The webinar is a little outdated on the cryptocurrency side of things too. For example, Mirror is completely out of the ecosystem altogether, 21inc is basically a software company at this point, Buttercoin is bankrupt and Blockscore shouldn’t be included in either bucket.
I would be remiss to not include Counterparty, a platform has effectively plateaued (see image above) and has now been eclipsed by Ethereum based on multiple measurements including transaction growth (which actually may be eventually be gamed via “long chains” just like some Bitcoin transactions are).
Ignoring the liquidity and market cap sections (basically all cryptocurrencies are illiquid and easily manipulable) there is a marked difference in terms of terms of social media engagement and interest between the two platforms. For example, in terms of public interest, one measure that could be added to the Coingecko list is the amount of organized Meetup’s: Ethereum has roughly a hundred globally and Counterparty has about 10.
As an aside, I attended two Ethereum meetup’s last month: one hosted by Coinbase in San Francisco and another one hosted by IFTF in Palo Alto. Both were well-attended with roughly 120 people showing up for the latter.
[Note: I do not own, control or hold any cryptocurrency nor do I have any trading position on them either.]
Why is no one actively publishing numbers?
It could be the case that some of the startups feel that any user / usage number is commercially important and therefore treat it like a trade secret.
Is there really less transparency in this market compared to other tech markets?
Maybe, maybe not. What about public markets?
Last spring, Blizzard Entertainment announced it would no longer publish World of Warcraft subscription numbers. This was done because of the continual decline in subscriptions (more than halving from its 12 million peak). Similarly, last fall, Microsoft said it would no longer publish Xbox One unit sales and would instead share Xbox Live usership. ((Disclosure: I own an Xbox One)) At the time this move was seen as a way to downplay the growing gap in sales between Sony’s PS4 and the Xbox One.
An exception to this rule is Zynga — the mobile / social gaming company — which has seen continual drop offs in monthly active users for over three years, but still publishes numbers. 12
Back to the public blockchain sphere: why would 40+ companies that have closed a Series A or higher as a whole decide not to publish user / usage numbers in a market that claims to always be growing by leaps and bounds?
One of the problems appears to be that when you raise a lot of money, $50+ million for B2C applications your charts are expected to look a bit like other high-growth companies.
For instance, above is a two-year chart displaying two types of users: daily active and paid for Slack. With 3.5x daily user growth over the past year, Slack announced last week that it has closed its new round, raising $200 million at $3.8 billion post-money valuation. About a third of its daily users which are paid users, a relatively high conversion rate.
Obviously social media commenters will point out that “cryptocurrencies” are not the same thing as communication tools, but the point remains that eventually the aspirations of investors will re-calibrate with the actual growth trajectories of a platform. And as of right now, based on public data it is unclear where that traction is in the cryptocurrency world — perhaps it does exist somewhere but no one is publicly revealing those stats.
It bears mentioning, based on anecdotes there are several cryptocurrency-related startups that have gained relatively large customer bases in certain corridors focused on cross-border payments and remittances involving The Philippines.13 There are also several cash-flow positive companies in this space that have flown under the radar. On the flipside, based on similar anecdotes, multi-level marketing scams like MMM Global also have seen continued traction.14
Where is the growth, where are the numbers? Those are the two questions that continue to drive blog posts on this site. Perhaps startups in the public blockchain ecosystem will be more forthcoming later this year as more capital is deployed. We will try to revisit this topic once more information is publicly available.
It will also be interesting to see how many more cryptocurrency-related companies rebrand or pivot into the “private blockchain” sphere without actually changing how they interact with cryptocurrencies. Thus, my older October post on the Great Pivot should be revisited at some point as well. In addition, if “private blockchain” platforms are eventually flipped on into production mode, they may begin to yield usage numbers worth looking at in a year or so.
And according to other data science companies I have spoken to in the recent past, several confirm this as well. [↩]
A notable exception was in December 2015 when BitPay provided a transaction chart to Forbes. Additionally, BitGo has published numbers from time to time. And while it hasn’t raised a Series A, Blockstack is also fairly open about its userbase. [↩]
Blockstack.org is not the same thing as Blockstack.io — two different groups. [↩]
Flavien Charlon, creator of Open Assets, also maintains Openchain. [↩]
Monegraph is a platform for managing digital artwork. [↩]
During its crowdsale last year, Factom sold about 4.4 million factoid (tokens) for 2,278 bitcoins. [↩]
CoinSciences, the team behind Coinspark, also has another product called MultiChain. [↩]
One interesting stat they mentioned was in terms of ratios: in 2015 there was about $15 billion invested in “fintech” overall and about $450 million in the entire umbrella of “cryptocurrency / blockchain” ecosystem. That amounts to about 3%. [↩]
Peernova has transitioned from being a Bitcoin mining company to creating “Blockchain-inspired” tools for other industries. [↩]
Since then, the paper and portions thereof, have been translated into multiple languages, emailed and downloaded thousands of times, copied word-for-word by many consulting companies and used as a primer for managers and executives at organizations big and small. In short, it helped articulate what was then happening in a new niche industry, one that has grown over the subsequent months.
What has changed and why did it become popular to the point where vendors now use bullet points marketing their product as a “permissioned ledger”?
Before answering these questions I should point out that it was Robert Sams, CEO of Clearmatics, that actually coined the term “permissioned ledger.” He first publicly used it at a Coinscrum event a month before the publication of CaaS. Prior to that he had been using it in private discussions including on a now-defunct mailing list which incidentally involved other notable individuals who still work in the overall “blockchain” space.1
Let’s quickly look at what happened to the market participants that were highlighted in the main body of the report (by alphabetical order):
Clearmatics: in November 2015 they announced they had closed their seed funding; have also publicly announced their pilot “utility settlement coin” with UBS (note: ‘settlement coin’ is not a cryptocurrency)
CryptoCorp: rebranded as Blockstack and were acquired in October 2015 by Digital Asset Holdings (DAH)
Eris Industries: in January 2016 they announced they were selected to be part of the PwC “strategic blockchain portfolio”2
Ripple (Labs): in October 2015 they announced that their Series A had closed at $32 million in funding with the inclusion of Santander. In January 2016 additional funding from SBI Holdings into Ripple’s Japanese subsidiary was also announced.
Tembusu System: they had a co-founder dispute that led to dormancy of the company
Tezos: the project has continued in the background as a part-time project of its creator
Tillit: rebranded as Ldger and is currently focused on market place lending and structured products; no longer uses Ripple.
If we extend the analysis to the tangentially related projects listed in Appendix A:
Blockstream: in October 2015 it announced a cryptocurrency product called “Liquid” for wallets and exchanges and in February 2016 announced it had closed its Series A funding of $55 million
Augur: in October 2015 it concluded its crowdfunding of over $5 million and in March 2016 launched its beta
SKUChain: in January 2016 it announced its seed funding and in March 2016 joined the Plug and Play FinTech Incubator
Ethereum: officially launched its Frontier release at the end of July 2015 and then launched a “production” version called Homestead in March 2016
Pactum: turned from a standalone product into a technology specification and approach – currently being used by ULedger – and being further developed by Bitsapphire
Symbiont: in June 2015 it announced closing a seed round for $1.25 million and then in March 2016 announced it was creating a new company with Ipreo
Vennd: in April 2015 it joined the Startmate accelerator and later moved away from the “vending machine” cryptocurrency creation market
What about the rest of the marketplace?
The non-cryptocurrency distributed ledger marketplace has bifurcated into two distinct areas:
those creating some type of ledger or blockchain; and
those creating some type of application that connects to a ledger, chain or network
[Note: sometimes those creating #1 are also creating #2 but usually not vice versa]
Altogether, since September 2015, at R3 we have been approached or pitched by around 150 vendors of all shapes and sizes who do something orthogonally related to distributed ledgers.
By and large, most of them are uninvolved with cryptocurrencies themselves: that ship seems to have sailed with the Great Pivot. Perhaps that will change again?
We are currently tracking around two dozen companies that have built or are building some kind of distributed ledger and about the same amount of startups trying to build applications on top of a ledger. 4
Many of these can be seen on slides 21 and 23 of the presentation I published in December:
The end of “Proof-of-work maximalism”
What has resonated with people, especially financial institutions regarding this new market?
Part of it for sure is related to hype. Distributed ledgers and blockchains have been sold as silver bullets and panaceas to all the worlds ills. This exuberance will likely lead to another washout cycle which has happened in many other tech segments (most notably cleantech).
Another reason is that as articulated in Appendix B, while there was latent interest in the cryptographic toolkit utilized by Ethereum and Bitcoin, managers were finally afforded an explanation as to why something like proof-of-work is purposefully expensive and why it is unneeded and undesirable in an environment in which trusted intermediaries with legal contracts already operate in (e.g., capital markets).
In short: CaaS began to untie the narrative and fable that “the only secure network is one that involves proof-of-work.”
While they are not the only entities experimenting with blockchains, regulated financial institutions have also spent the past year looking at the consequences of using pseudonymous consensus methods, discovering that platforms like Bitcoin fundamentally lackdefinitive settlement finality which was briefly discussed on page 22 and 23 in CaaS.
The reaction on social media to this over the past year has ranged from acceptance all the way to angry threats. Yet fundamentally it is empirically clear that the marketing spin which proof-of-work maximalists have used — such as “hardening a chain” — is simply a misapplication of Bitcoin’s Sybil protection. But that is a topic for another day.5
This was supposed to be a brief post so we have to pass on dovetailing into the myriad of other interesting changes in the landscape.
Regular readers may have noticed just a few posts on this site over the past few months. Why? Part of this is because the content I do write is typically sent to R3 members only.
What about other discussions?
Even though the capital markets have largely settled on a specific class of ledger — one that is integrated with the existing legal system without any type of cryptocurrency or proof-of-work — the debate around public versus private blockchains will likely continue into the year by enthusiasts.
For those involved in regulated capital markets who are looking at solutions to problems with a set of requirements involving post-trade activities of clearing and settlement, it is worth pointing out that yesterday Richard Brown unveiled the project he has been working on the past 7 months: Corda.
A year from now the distributed ledger landscape will likely look a lot different than what it did in 2016 let alone 2015. It will be interesting to see how many projects are still replicating and reusing older “blockchain” designs versus building systems that are fit-for-purpose like Corda.
Source: I am an advisor to Clearmatics and a member of the mailing list. This included: Vitalik Buterin (Ethereum), Vlad Zamfir (Ethereum), Dominic Williams (Mirror / String), Jae Kwon (Tendermint), Andrew Miller (IC3 / University of Maryland), Nick Szabo (Mirror / Access), Jonathan Levin (Chainalysis), Dave Hudson (Peernova), Richard Brown (R3), Zaki Manian (SKUChain) and about a dozen others. [↩]
According to Dominic Williams: 21.91% of all tweets using the term “marmots” involved Eris Industries and Preston Byrne (its COO). [↩]
I am frequently asked this question because there is some confusion related to the legacy name and the current branding of certain technology. The two are distinct. And how we got there involves a little history.
Hyper, the parent company of Hyperledger, was founded by Dan O’Prey and Daniel Feichtinger in the spring of 2014. Fun fact: one of the alternative names they considered using was “Mintette.com” — after the term coined by Ben Laurie in his 2011 paper.
The simplest way to describe Hyperledger, the technology platform from Hyper, during its formative year in 2014 was: Ripple without the XRP. Consensus was achieved via PBFT.1 There were no blocks, transactions were individually validated one by one.
Hyperledger, the technology platform from Hyper, was one of the first platforms that was pitched as, what is now termed a permissioned distributed ledger: validators could be white listed and black listed. It was designed to be first and foremost a scalable ledger and looked to integrate projects like Codius, as a means of enabling contract execution.
Most importantly, Hyperledger in 2014 was not based off of the Bitcoin codebase.
Note: in the fall of 2014 Richard Brown and I both became the first two advisors to Hyper, the parent company of Hyperledger. Our formal relationship ended with its acquisition by DAH.2
In June 2015, DAH acquired Hyper (the parent company of Hyperledger) which included the kit and caboodle: the name brand, IP and team (the two Dans). During the same news release, it was announced that DAH had acquired Bits of Proof, a Hungary-based Bitcoin startup that had designed a Java-based reimplementation of Bitcoin (which previously had been acquired by CoinTerra).3
It was proposed at that time that Hyperledger, the Hyper product, would become the permissioned ledger project from DAH. It’s product landing page (courtesy of the Internet Archive) uses roughly the same terminology as the team had previously pitched it (see also the October homepage older homepage for DAH as well).
Source: Digital Asset / Internet Archive
On November 9, 2015, on a public blog post DAH announced that it was “Retiring Hyperledger Beta, Re-Open Sourcing Soon, and Other Changes.”
The two most notable changes were:
(1) development would change from the languages of Erlang and Elixir to Java and Scala;
(2) switch to the UTXO transaction model
The team noted on its blog in the same post:
We are also switching from our simplistic notion of accounts and balances to adopt to de facto standard of the Bitcoin UTXO model, lightly modified. While Hyperledger does not use Bitcoin in any way, the Bitcoin system is still extremely large and innovative, with hundreds of millions of dollars invested. By adopting the Bitcoin transaction model as standard, users of Hyperledger will benefit from innovation in Bitcoin and vice versa, as well as making Hyperledger more interoperable.
During this same time frame, IBM was working on a project called OpenChain, which for trademark reasons was later renamed (now internally referred to as OpenBlockchain).4
IBM’s first public foray into distributed ledgers involved Ethereum vis-a-vis the ADEPT project with Samsung (first announced in January 2015). Over the subsequent months, IBM continued designing its own blockchain (see its current white paper here).
In December 2015, the Linux Foundation publicly announced it was creating a new forum for discussion and development of blockchain technology. Multiple names were proposed for the project including Open Ledger (which was the name originally used in the first press release). However, in the end, the name “Hyperledger” was used.
How did that occur?
DAH, one of the founding members of the project, donated two things to the Linux Foundation: (1) the brand name “Hyperledger” and (2) the codebase from Bits of Proof.
Recall that Bits of Proof was the name of a Bitcoin startup that was acquired by DAH in the fall of 2014 (the Chief Ledger Architect at DAH was the co-founder of Bits of Proof). 5 Architecturally, Bits of Proof is a Java-implementation of Bitcoin. 6
In other words: today the term “Hyperledger” represents an entirely different architectural design and codebase than the original Hyperledger built by Hyper.7
The major architectural switch occurred in November 2015, which as noted above involved adopting the UTXO transaction set and Java language that Bits of Proof was built with. Therefore, Hyperledger circa 2016 is not the same thing as Hyperledger circa 2014.
Over the past two months there have been multiple different codebases donated to the Linux Foundation all of which is collectively called “Hyperledger” including the IBM codebase (partly inspired by Ethereum) as well as the DAH and Blockstream codebase (one is a clone of Bitcoin and the other is a set of extensions to Bitcoin). The technical discussions surrounding this can be found on both the public Linux Foundation mailing list and its Slack channel.
How do different, incompatible codebases work as one?
This technical question is being discussed in the Linux Foundation. It bears mentioning that as of now, the codebases are incompatible largely due to the fact that Bitcoin uses the UTXO transaction set and OpenBlockchain uses an “accounts” based method for handling balances. There are other reasons for incompatibility as well, including that they are written in completely different languages: Java/Scala versus Go versus C++ (Blockstream).
How extensive is the reuse of the Bits of Proof Bitcoin codebase donated to the Linux Foundation from the DAH team? According to a quick scan of their GitHub repo:
So when someone asks “what is Hyperledger technology?” the short answer is: it is currently the name of a collective set of different codebases managed by the Linux Foundation and is not related to the original distributed ledger product called Hyperledger created by Hyper. The only tenuous connection is the name.
Timeline in brief: Hyperledger was originally created in Spring 2014 by Hyper; Hyper was acquired in June 2015 by DAH; the original Hyperledger architecture was entirely replaced with Bits of Proof in November 2015; the Hyperledger brand name and Bits of Proof code was donated to the Linux Foundation in December 2015.
Interestingly enough, the current OpenBlockchain project from IBM also uses PBFT for its consensus mechanism and uses an “accounts” based method; two characteristics that the original Hyperledger platform from Hyper had too. [↩]
Following the bankruptcy of CoinTerra, the Bits of Proof team became independent once again. [↩]
CoinPrism launched a project called OpenChain, before IBM did. [↩]
Sometimes there is a confusion between Bits of Proof and Bits of Gold. Bits of Proof was the independent Java-implementation of Bitcoin (which is not the same thing as bitcoinj). Bits of Gold is an Israeli-based Bitcoin exchange. A co-founder of Bits of Gold also works at DAH and is their current CTO. [↩]
In the future it may contain some modifications including Elements from Blockstream. [↩]
What was once the original Hyperledger GitHub repo has been handed over to the Linux Foundation but some of the original code base and documentation from the 2014 project canstill beviewed elsewhere. [↩]
[Note: I neither own nor have any trading position on any cryptocurrency. The views expressed below are solely my own and do not necessarily represent the views of my employer or any organization I advise.]
Below are several questions I recently received from the CFA Institute along with my responses.
Q1. In your book you make a convincing case that Bitcoin has a number of significant structural design flaws that will likely prevent it from ever develop into something of economically meaningful scale. Could you briefly outline the main reasons for your view?
A1. The two fundamental challenges that do not appear surmountable in the short-run are:
(1) An endogenous money-like informational commodity (such as bitcoin or litecoin) that lacks purchasing power stability relative to goods and services which live external to the system. This is a characteristic that is common to contemporary cryptocurrencies that are divorced from external information: how to securely provide information of the exogenous outside world back into the internal network in a trust-minimized manner? There have been multiple proposals over the past 2 years but no production systems in large part because solving this is solving a public goods problem, so where does the funding come from to R&D it?
(2) The second main challenge is sustainable decentralized security. Empirically all proof-of-work based cryptocurrencies have trended towards some form of centralization. Looking at CoinGecko, all of the top PoW cryptocurrencies are currently dominated by a handful of pools. The reason why has to do with the inhomogeneous Poisson process used by these systems which creates variance in payouts. And as we see in the world of traditional finance, one way to reduce risks is to pool capital. Thus, with the origination of the first mining pools in late 2010, we see miners – the security force – acting rationally by pooling hashrate to smooth out the variance in payouts.
Ernie Teo and Dave Hudson are just a handful of researchers who have looked into the long-term implications this has and have shown via simulations that as block rewards decline over time, the labor force declines as fewer participants can profitably compete in the mining process. Thus there is an open question as to whether or not any PoW cryptocurrency can remain robustly decentralized and secure or if they just “self-destruct.” Note: that there are over 100 dead altcoins, so empirically these networks are not automatically self-healing or anti-fragile.
Solving both of these issues – if they are indeed solvable – so far has remained in the realm of posturing on social media: very little real research and statistical modelling has taken place which is very surprising considering many companies have raised funds with the assumption (and promise) that these two issues will be solved.
I remain skeptical that the first is solvable without compromising the integrity of the network: how do you rebase the purchasing power of an endogenous unit of account without needing to trust the external data source? Vitalik Buterin, Robert Sams and a few others have proposed solutions dubbed “stablecoins” but most of the community, especially early adopters of popular cryptocurrencies are against purchasing power stability, preferring volatility with the belief that external market forces will somehow coordinate and permanently smooth it out, usually in a trajectory towards the moon.
Similarly I have yet to see any modelling that shows how POW mining becomes more decentralized over time. There have been companies that claim and market that they will “redecentralize” with embedded ASICs, but when you drill down deeper it is merely decentralizing hashing, not block making (the key part).
Q2. There seems to be a new consensus developing in fintech circles and among incumbents of ‘Bitcoin bad, blockchain good’. Do you agree with this or is it too simplistic – can you truly have one without the other?
A2. I think it is too simplistic and a little unfair to Bitcoin. Satoshi, from his written accounts, did not appear interested in developing software for financial institutions. He had a problem-set in his mind: how to build a censorship resistant payments system without introducing some kind of trusted third party to prevent double spending. In 2007, when he began the project (or so he stated on a mailing list) if he had thought about how to build a distributed ledger for regulated financial institutions, the deliverable would look different than Bitcoin does. We only have the benefit of hindsight to make that “Blockchain good, Bitcoin bad” claim today.
Why? Because quite frankly, Bitcoin itself does not really solve anything for banks.
Banks have seen probably 100-200 proof-of-concept/pilot projects over the last 18 months and have rejected nearly all of them. Not because it involved a cryptocurrency but because the tech didn’t solve their actual problems. I have yet to be in a meeting where someone says “I hate bitcoin because it is bitcoin” — perhaps some banks do, but all of the people I interact with at banks want solutions to their problems and cryptocurrencies in their current form, were not designed to solve problems banks have. So why should they use them?
For instance, if I built some typewriters and then claimed that banks weren’t buying them because they’re anti-typewriter. It’s not because they are anti-typewriter it is because they don’t have a use for typewriters in 2016. Yet the useful parts of typewriters are of course the keyboard which can be repurposed and used with laptops. Similarly, the useful bits of cryptocurrencies are the cryptographic signing and shared data structure elements.
Q3. Incumbent organisations experimenting with blockchain technology seem to be mostly designing permissioned blockchains. Could you elaborate on how these differ from, for example, the Bitcoin blockchain, and some of its advantages and disadvantages?
A3. Since September 2015, R3 has been pitched by over 100 software companies ranging from pre-seed startups to large enterprises. Among them are about 30 different distributed ledger proposals. Some are very much half-baked altcoins. A large number are highly modified derivatives of existing platforms (e.g., Bitcoin, Ethereum, Ripple) and a few others were customized and built from the ground up or with elements of existing systems. Universally they all involve some kind of permissioning: in which the validators on the network are gated and vetted and the users of the network are KYC’ed.
Why are they building these? There are a number of different motives but by and large this has to do with the operating environment their customers exist in: trusted, known relationships. Those relationships, market structures and laws, much to the chagrin of cypherpunk prophecies, are not going to disappear. So if you are building a commercial business and want to actually generate revenue and not permanently live off of venture funding, you will need to deliver products customers want and not just work on public goods problems.
Another advantage of designing these types of permissioned systems is that the validation model – the creation of contracts and service level agreements around who or what validates transactions – typically removes the probabilistic settlement issues found in public blockchains like Bitcoin. Public blockchains cannot provide legal settlement finality of exogenous financial instruments. And introducing new risks into the financial system via probabilistic finality is absurd. Regulated financial institutions cannot and do not want to be in a position in which assets on their balance sheet only have a 95% possibility that they own them or that a block reorganization from a pool in a sanctioned country mines it.
Incidentally there are now Bitcoin mining companies that are pitching themselves as “trusted miners” – which is an oxymoron. In fact, if the validation process (mining) of public blockchains becomes fully trusted, gated and permissioned then users lose the benefit of censorship resistance while they simultaneously have to pay the large operating costs that proof-of-work requires. Or in other words, a permissioned-on-permissionless system that provides more kabuki theater than it does commercial utility.
Q4. Increasingly, financial institutions are trying to figure out whether they can benefit from integrating blockchain technology into their operations, including your organisation R3CEV. What do you see as the main barriers of integrating blockchain into existing financial services?
A4. There are multiple challenges each financial institution has and technology alone probably only solves a fraction of them. For instance, what are the problems a blockchain actually solves for an organization? Maybe there are only a handful if any. What are the switching costs? What are the total costs of operation? How does it plug into their existing legacy systems?
Most startups lack the subject matter expertise or the relationships into the financial services industry to be able to answer those questions, so they end up building tech for tech sake. Science fair projects that remain underutilized and even unused. No amount of marketing can ultimately salvage a platform that does not solve a problem that customers do not have.
[Note: opinions expressed below are solely my own and do not represent the views of my employer or any company I advise.]
This past week Joi Ito, director of MIT Media Lab, weighed in on the block size debate, stating:
The future of Bitcoin, decentralized ledgers and other Blockchain-like projects depends on this community. Many people call them “Bitcoin Core” as if they are some sort of company you can fire or a random set of developers with skills that you can just train others to acquire. They’re not. They’re more like artists, scientists and precision engineers who have built a shared culture and language. To look for another group of people to do what they do would be like asking web designers to launch a space shuttle. You can’t FIRE a community and, statistically speaking, the people working on the Bitcoin ARE the community.
The crux of his comment is that there is only a handful of people in the world who have the skills or as Tom Wolfe might call it, The Right Stuff.
Yet it’s unclear how many real blockchain engineers there are in the world. Who are those capable of building from scratch a network with the features and characteristics of Ethereum, Zcash, Bitcoin or Ripple (among others)?
After all, there is no PhD in Blockchainology (yet) or Distributeledgerology (god help us) so how does one qualify? By random lines of code in a github repo or hours spent in IRC chat rooms?
Maybe none of the above.
By all accounts, it is a hobbyist field in still — it is sufficiently esoteric that it’s not very accessible unless you have the time to decipher it on your own. But there doesn’t appear to be anything magical about this technology either.
For instance, as a personal anecdote, last year I traveled as a guest lecturer with Blockchain University (which is on semi-permanent hiatus) to both India and Japan and gave several other guest presentations with BU throughout the year. The primary goal of BU was to help educate developers — and some entrepreneurs — in the burgeoning artisan skill of block making.
While the learning curve was somewhat difficult (since Satoshi apparently uses every number format in the history of number formats), like all other technology, eventually developers got the hang of it.1
Similarly, many working groups at financial institutions exploring this technology are basically self-taught, autodidacts just like the rest of the community largely is.2
In other words, the problem with Ito’s comment is that it assumes that only the few dozen rocket scientists working in Peenemünde could possibly ever build rockets. Whereas empirically, knowledge transfer occurred (via Operation Paperclip and Operation Osoaviakhim) and the ability to build rockets was disseminated worldwide, including the infamous shuttle he cites.
So too has the knowledge of building magic internet ledgers.
Groups such as Bitcoin Core may have some bright developers, but it certainly doesn’t have a monopoly on talent, especially when it comes to building and shipping commercial products for regulated financial institutions. But the key take away is there are now tools and venues for IT team both small and large to learn and get up to speed on how this tech actual works, it is no longer siloed off in random IRC rooms or obscure crypto mailing lists.
I would like to thank Ryan X. Charles for pointing that out; as an aside, I believe Ryan holds the distinction to have the first formal title of “blockchain engineer” at a non-Bitcoin company. [↩]
Actually there are quite a few financial engineers who have formal backgrounds involving elements of this technology as well as many bank architects who need to build and maintain stable, secure networks. There are also various professors and cypherpunks who formally studied distributed computing/consensus in college involved too. [↩]
[Note: opinions expressed below are solely my own and do not represent the views of my employer or any company I advise.]
Yesterday the following question and comment was made to the previous blog post:
So just to be clear, you consider a company a “blockchain company” even if it runs its platform using Bitcoin’s blockchain as the rails ? For example, I believe Symbiont does this, but they certainly license out their software for a profit.
Yes, technically speaking using any blockchain as a “rail” (e.g., for storing or moving messages between parties) could effectively classify the startup as a “blockchain” company. But I also think it’s worth looking at whether or not this is useful or even a wise decision.
In the short term, maybe: if a company only cares about distributing data to a geographically distributed third party, then using a blockchain as a “rail” could be a solution for a few problems. For instance: Peernova, Chain, DigitalX (AirPocket) and others have built systems/platforms that are independent of a blockchain but then will store a “hash” of information onto a blockchain such as Bitcoin (typically via OP_RETURN). This is a process called “anchoring.”
But you can actually “anchor” in multiple mediums, it just happens that this medium is what they have currently chosen to do in the short run (e.g., could also tweet it, post it on a public mailing list, broadcast it on TV, or if you are paranoid use a numbers station). I wrote about the anchoring idea last month and previously elaborated why users such as banks do not need to use a public blockchain for anchoring.
There is another company called GuardTime that is pitching a “trust anchoring” service as well (called KSI). Their product is similar to Surety which publishes hashes of data into newspapers. If you are interested in this general idea, be sure to look into linked timestamping and “How to time-stamp a digital document” by Haber and Stornetta (and again, this is not an endorsement).
Regarding Symbiont, my understanding is that they are still using “embedded consensus” (based on their blog post) because their core team created Counterparty, which also uses an “embedded consensus mechanism” tied to Bitcoin. Currently I do not think that it is a particularly elegant solution for post-trade but it may have its uses. However that is a topic for another day (see this paper starting at page 5).
Long term, no: I don’t think it is necessarily wise for Bob to rely or depend on Alice’s chain for the security of Bob’s chain. It may be a short term stop-gap occurrence, but network designers should ultimately have to assume that other networks can become compromised and/or are unsustainable. The network needs to be as self-reliant as possible. And it is currently not possible to accurately forecast the security of Bitcoin (or other public blockchains) as it is economically driven – directly proportional to the market price of the tokens.
I think the drama around OP_RETURN size (40 versus 80 bytes) two years ago (see pages 29-30) and even the current block size debate should also serve as a cautionary tale to any organization looking at using a public blockchain. Because of the way “decentralized governance” works (an oxymoron?), the end-users are at the mercy of nebulous governance structure that can arbitrarily nerf or take away a feature (like OP_RETURN) just as much as they gave it without direct feedback or recourse from the users themselves.
As an aside, there are also cross border/remittance companies like Align Commerce that attempt to send bitcoins back and forth between liquidity providers/exchanges and do not rely on the appreciation or depreciation as part of their business model — in fact, they dislike any volatility as it harms their margins (e.g., they lock in a price for their customers for a short window of time). But since they do not rely on bitcoins qua bitcoins, they could just as easily create and use their own proprietary ledger (it doesn’t even need to be decentralized). Whether or not the “rebittance” business model makes sense is also another topic for another day (I recommend this post from Save On Send for starters).
Recall 15-20 years ago people used to attend “Internet conferences” and tell their friends that they were building an “Internet company.” That sounds anachronistic two decades later.
Today a small business owner, Bob, would simply say he operates a small business that happens to have a website, but that doesn’t mean he is operating a website company. Or if Bob accepted payments via Stripe, he wouldn’t say his company is an ACH or Stripe company – Bob is just using these “rails” as a means to an end. Hopefully when all the hype and noise lowers over time we will begin to see the companies that are actually trying to create real commercial businesses that just happen to integrate with DLT, rather than everyone positioning themselves as a DLT company that might also have a commercial product.
I was recently asked by someone: what are short arguments as to why permissioned blockchains are preferable than public ones for regulated financial services companies?
There are multiple reasons why permissioned blockchain are currently more appropriate than public ones specifically for regulated financial companies:
Governance: public blockchains are designed around being censorship-resistant which makes the ability to change, enhance or upgrade the network difficult to do (e.g., as shown by the current block size debate). “An Act of Congress” is the inside joke on how difficult it is supposed to be to make major changes to fully decentralized blockchains. In contrast, permissioned chains are usually built with a known, agreed upon governance structure with explicit decision making processes. One trade-off comes with reduced censorship-resistance. See Appendix A for more.
Most public blockchains were intentionally not designed around the needs of regulated financial institutions, quite the contrary: many were designed with the goal of circumventing institutions and regulatory bodies. As a consequence, they likely cannot in their current form fulfill the functional and non-functional requirements that large regulated financial institutions need in order to operate. And in order to modify an existing public blockchain to do so, you typically end up breaking their core utility (censorship resistance)
Financial institutions need to know who they are dealing with, who their counterparties, customers and staff members are. As a result, architects building systems for financial institutions have a different set of design assumptions than those programmers designing public blockchains. In short: participation and validation on a permissioned blockchain involves known, trusted parties that are legally obligated to perform certain tasks. In contrast, participation and validation on public blockchains is assumed to involve, unknown and untrusted parties hence the reason for proof-of-work. If financial institutions are already working with trusted parties, then design features found in public blockchains — like proof-of-work — effectively are very expensive dice rolling machines, they provide no real utility other than to generate random numbers. And to compound this issue, due to AML / KYC / KYCC regulations for financial institutions in many countries, payment service providers (which effectively what “mining pools” are) potentially requires KYC of the mining pool. If you know the identities of all the pools then you are no longer operating an unknown network, the design assumptions change.
Who are you going to call when something goes wrong with a transaction? For instance, in the traditional financial world, institutions and organization create and sign service-level agreements with service providers: contracts with specific guarantees and conditions — along with clauses for when something goes wrong (e.g., customer service reqs). In a permissioned blockchain ecosystem, this tradition will continue because mistakes will be made and will need to be fixed. In contrast, when something goes wrong or is broken on a public blockchain, you are probably out of luck unless you know some mining pool operators.
Sustainability. Because public blockchains are effectively unowned, then you end up recreating a ‘tragedy of the commons’ in which no one wants to pay but everyone wants to use. We see this with the Bitcoin network, where no one wants to pay (higher) fees to use the network and no one wants to pay developers to enhance the network. As a consequence, there are now over 100 dead altcoins because their was no incentive to maintain the network — the commons collapsed as it was no long sustainable to operate via charity and altruism. In contrast, permissioned blockchains are closer to owning private property: a set of stakeholders have a direct incentive to maintain the network through business and commercial incentives. This is not to say that either Bitcoin or Ethereum will collapse tomorrow, but the longevity of a public blockchain is an open question.